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{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2020}}
{{Infobox terrorist attack
| title = Khobar
| partof = [[terrorism in Saudi Arabia]]
| image_size = 300px
| image = AnschalgInZahran1996 KhobarTower.jpg
| caption = Building #131 after the bombing.
| coordinates = {{coord| 26.261243| 50.206825| display=title,inline}}
| location = [[Khobar]], [[Saudi Arabia]]
| date = {{start date and age|1996|06|25|df=yes}}
| time = 9:50 p.m.
| timezone = [[Coordinated Universal Time|UTC]]+3
| type = [[Truck bomb]]
| fatalities = 19
| injuries = 498
| perps = [[Hezbollah Al-Hejaz]]
}}
The '''Khobar Towers bombing''' was a [[Terrorism|terrorist attack]] on part of a housing complex in the city of [[Khobar]], [[Saudi Arabia]], near the national oil company ([[Saudi Aramco]]) headquarters of [[Dhahran]] and nearby [[King Abdulaziz Air Base]] on 25 June 1996. At that time, Khobar Towers was being used as living quarters for coalition forces who were assigned to [[Operation Southern Watch]], a [[no-fly zone]] operation in southern Iraq, as part of the [[Iraqi no-fly zones]].
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* Staff Sergeant Kevin Johnson
* [[Sergeant (United States)|Sergeant]] Millard D. Campbell
* [[Senior airman|Senior Airman]] Earl
* Senior Airman Jeremy A. Taylor
* [[Airman first class|Airman 1st Class]] Christopher Lester
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After the bombing of Khobar Towers, the U.S. military and intelligence community came under heavy criticism for their lack of preparation and foresight for what was considered an intelligence failure. According to the ''New York Times'', "significant shortcomings in planning, intelligence, and basic security left American forces in Saudi Arabia vulnerable."<ref name=nyt1>[https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/07/world/fatal-lapses-special-report-us-missteps-delay-opened-door-saudi-blast.html How U.S. Missteps and Delay Opened Door to Saudi Blast] (7 July 1996). ''New York Times''</ref>
Numerous warnings had been made available to the intelligence community and military command, and up to "ten incidents [were] reported suggesting that the Khobar Towers are under surveillance" from April to June 1996.<ref>{{cite news|title=Many Warnings And Then the Bomb|date=6 December 1996|work=[[The New York Times]]|page=A10|id={{ProQuest|115931884}}}}</ref> These warnings came both before and after the beheadings of four Saudi nationals after their publicly confessed role in the November 1995 attacks in Riyadh. Clinton Administration officials admit that they "received a wave of threats against Americans and American installations in Saudi Arabia" in the weeks leading up to the attack, "but failed to prepare adequately for a bomb of the power that killed 19 American military personnel."<ref name=nyt2>{{cite news|author=Shenon, Phillip|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/27/world/bombing-saudi-arabia-security-officials-say-size-bomb-caught-military-surprise.html|title=Officials Say Size of Bomb Caught Military by Surprise|date=27 June 1996|work=New York Times}}</ref> Threats were also downplayed by the Saudis when Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud characterized acts carried out by Saudi Islamic jihadists in 1995 as "boyish", and stated that the Saudi "Kingdom is not influenced by threats".<ref name=nyt2/> Senator [[Arlen Specter]] (R-PA) commented during a Senate intelligence committee meeting by saying "there was no intelligence failure ... there had been more than 100 intelligence reports on alerts of a general nature, and very specific reports" of an extant and present threat to the Khobar Towers complex.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/13/world/panels-fault-pentagon-on-fatal-saudi-bombing.html|title=Panels Fault Pentagon on Fatal Saudi Bombing|date=13 September 1996|work=New York Times}}</ref>
The CIA was blamed for misjudging the bomb-making capabilities of Saudi militants, arbitrarily deciding that no bomb could exceed the size of that used in the November 1995 bombings in Riyadh (200 lbs). According to official U.S. government estimates, the Khobar bomb weighed in at approximately 5,000 pounds.<ref name=nyt1/> American commanders were also blamed, as they had not taken every precaution advised by the Pentagon; specifically, because "the project was deemed too costly",<ref name=nyt1/> they had failed to implement a recommendation to coat Khobar's windows with plastic to prevent flying glass.
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* Hani al-Sayegh
* [[Ibrahim Salih Mohammed Al-Yacoub|Ibrahim al-Yaqoub]]
* [[Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed Al-Nasser|
* Mustafa al-Qassab
* Sa’ed al-Bahar
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===Attribution to al-Qaeda===
[[Abdel Bari Atwan]] wrote:<ref>{{cite book|author=Abdel Bari Atwan|title=The Secret History of Al Qaeda|pages=[https://archive.org/details/secrethistoryofa0000atwa/page/168 168–169]|publisher=University of California Press|year=2006|isbn=0-520-24974-7|url=https://archive.org/details/secrethistoryofa0000atwa/page/168}}</ref>
{{
In 2004, the [[9/11 Commission]] noted that [[Osama bin Laden]] was seen being congratulated on the day of the Khobar attack, and stated there were reports in the months preceding the attack that Bin Laden was seeking to facilitate a shipment of explosives to Saudi Arabia. According to the United States, classified evidence suggests that the government of [[Iran]] was the key sponsor of the incident, and several high-ranking members of [[Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran|their military]] may have been involved.<ref>{{cite news|title=Terrorism and Iran: Washington's Policy Performs a Gingerly Balancing Act|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/23/world/terrorism-and-iran-washington-s-policy-performs-a-gingerly-balancing-act.html|author=Risen, James, Jane Perlez|newspaper=The New York Times|date=23 June 2001}}</ref><ref>An Op-Ed piece by [[Louis Freeh]] in the 25 June 2006 ''[[Wall Street Journal]]'' alleges Iranian involvement.</ref> A U.S. federal court speculated that the Khobar Towers bombing was authorized by [[Ali Khamenei]], the [[Supreme Leader of Iran]].<ref>[http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/2006/2000CV2329-12036-12222006a.pdf Memorandum Opinion] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070614085928/http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/2006/2000CV2329-12036-12222006a.pdf |date=14 June 2007 }}, United States District Court, '' 22 December 2006''</ref>
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[[William J. Perry|William Perry]], who was the [[United States Secretary of Defense]] at the time that this bombing happened, said in an interview in June 2007 that "he now believes al-Qaida rather than Iran was behind a 1996 truck bombing at an American military base."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/06/06/Perry-US-eyed-Iran-attack-after-bombing/UPI-70451181161509/|title=Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing |publisher=UPI.com |date=6 June 2007 |access-date=3 September 2010}}</ref>
On 22 December 2006, high court judge Royce C. Lamberth ruled that Iran and Hezbollah were directly and personally responsible for the attack, stating that the leading experts on Hezbollah presented "overwhelming" evidence of the group's involvement and that six captured Hezbollah agents detailed the role of [[Iranian intelligence]] and military officials in providing money, explosives, arms and weapons, plans, and maps.<ref name="Held Liable">{{cite news|last=Leonnig|first=Carol D.|url= https://www.washingtonpost.com/
=== Implications for U.S.-Iran relations ===
Within days of the blast, counterterrorism officials on President Clinton’s National Security Council staff concluded that elements inside Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were the perpetrators.<ref>{{cite journal |id={{ProQuest|2307371563}} |last1=Benjamin |first1=Daniel |last2=Simon |first2=Steven |title=America's Great Satan |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=98 |issue=6 |date=2019 |pages=56–60, 62–66 }}</ref> They put pressure on the president and his national security adviser, Sandy Berger, to take action. They were joined by others inside and outside the administration, notably FBI Director [[Louis Freeh|Louis J. Freeh]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Freeh |first=Louis J.
By the time Saudi Arabia and the FBI concluded their investigations, Iranians had elected a new president, [[Mohammad Khatami]], in May 1997. Khatami surprised the international community by urging a “dialogue of civilizations” with the West in order to overcome almost two decades of animosity and Iranian isolation.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jehl |first=Douglas |date=1997-12-15 |title=IRANIAN PRESIDENT CALLS FOR OPENING DIALOGUE WITH U.S. |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/15/world/iranian-president-calls-for-opening-dialogue-with-us.html |access-date=2023-05-30 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Clinton, who had initially taken a stand toward the Islamic Republic, including imposing major economic sanctions on the country, reversed his thinking in the hope that Khatami potentially represented a game-changing shift in Iran’s conduct.
The prospect of an opening with Tehran, which intrigued many U.S. allies and even domestic critics of administration policy, drove Clinton’s response to the Khobar attack. The White House and State Department sent various signals to the Iranians, some of which they reciprocated, but ultimately hopes for a significant improvement in relations remained unfulfilled.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Slavin |url=https://www.amazon.com/Bitter-Friends-Enemies-Barbara-Paperback/dp/B008CMI27G/ref=sr_1_2?crid=11AJD4H1X8HS3&keywords=slavin+bosom&qid=1685464567&s=books&sprefix=slavin+bosom,stripbooks,74&sr=1-2 |title=Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies |date=2009 |publisher=St Martins Grifin, Paperback |pages=
In June 1999, Clinton authorized what he later called a “Hail Mary,” sending a direct message to Khatami. Delivered by Omani Foreign Minister Yousef bin Alawi in July, the letter attempted to achieve multiple purposes: to signal Tehran that Washington was open to a rapprochement but also to make clear that the United States held the IRGC responsible for the bombing. Clinton was under pressure from FBI Director Freeh and other domestic actors to press for accountability for the attack.<ref>{{Cite book |
The attempt backfired. Although Khatami was reportedly happy with the American initiative, especially because it was accompanied by an oral message of strong personal support from Clinton delivered by the Omani envoy, the Iranian president’s colleagues in the leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reacted vehemently to the text of the letter. Two months later, the Iranians responded with a written denunciation of the allegation of culpability and a refusal to consider boosting bilateral ties under such circumstances.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Secret U.S. Overture to Iran in 1999 Broke Down Over Terrorism Allegations |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/index.htm |access-date=2023-05-30 |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu}}</ref>
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* [[Iran and state-sponsored terrorism]]
* [[Riyadh compound bombings]] (12 May 2003). The next major attack, which triggered a second series of terrorist attacks.
* ''[[The Kingdom (2007 film)|The Kingdom]]'': Feature film inspired by the attack.
* ''[[The Siege]]'', a 1998 film that utilizes stock footage from this bombing to portray a fictitious bombing of an army barracks
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[[Category:Islamic terrorist incidents in 1996]]
[[Category:Mass murder in 1996]]
[[Category:
[[Category:Attacks on military installations in the 1990s]]
[[Category:Building bombings in
[[Category:Car and truck bombings in Asia]]
[[Category:20th-century history of the United States Air Force]]
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[[Category:Presidency of Bill Clinton]]
[[Category:Hezbollah attacks]]
[[Category:1996 building bombings]]
[[Category:20th-century mass murder in Asia]]
[[Category:Islamic terrorism in Saudi Arabia]]
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