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[[Collectivization in the Soviet Union|Collectivisation]] in the Baltic states was introduced in early 1947, but the progress was slow. Despite new heavy taxes on farmers and intense propaganda, only about 3% of farms in Lithuania and Estonia joined [[kolkhoz]]es by the end of 1948.<ref name=zunde /><ref name=raun /> Borrowing from the collectivisation experiences of the early 1930s, [[kulak]]s were named as the primary obstacle and became targets of repressions.<ref name=raun />
It is unclear when the idea of a mass deportation was advanced. On 18 January 1949, leaders of all three Baltic republics were called to report to [[Joseph Stalin]].<ref name=rahi /> That day, during a session of the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]], the decision was made to carry out the deportations.<ref name=rahi2008 /> On 29 January, the top secret decision No. 390-138 ss<ref group=nb>Initials ''ss'' stand for top secret (совершенно секретно).</ref> was adopted by the [[Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union]], approving the deportation of kulaks, nationalists, bandits (i.e. [[Forest Brothers]]), their supporters and families from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.<ref name=original group=nb /><ref name=bougai /> The decision specified deportee quotas for each republic: 8,500 families or 25,500 people from Lithuania, 13,000 families or 39,000 people from Latvia, and 7,500 families or 22,500 people from Estonia.<ref name=rahi /> Lists of kulaks to be deported were to be compiled by each republic and approved by each republic's Council of Ministers. It also listed responsibilities of each Soviet ministry: the [[Ministry of State Security (Soviet Union)|Ministry of State Security]] (MGB) was responsible for gathering the deportees and transporting them to the designated railway stations; the [[Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia)|Ministry of Internal Affairs]] (MVD) was responsible for the transportation to the [[Forced settlements in the Soviet Union|forced settlements]], provision of employment at the destination, and continued surveillance and administration; [[Ministry of Finance (Soviet Union)|Ministry of Finance]] was to allocate sufficient funds (5.60 [[Russian ruble|rubles]] per person per day of travel); [[Ministry of Communications (Soviet Union)|Ministry of Communications]] was to provide the
== Preparations ==
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Due to the immense scale of the Operation Priboi, which spanned three Soviet republics, considerable resources were needed. MGB needed to assemble personnel, transport vehicles, and communication equipment all the while keeping the operation secret. MGB also needed to draw up plans for where the operative groups to be deployed and how the deportees to be transported to the railway stations.<ref name=rahi /> Local MGB officials, which numbered 635 in Estonia, were not sufficient and 1,193 MGB operatives from other parts of the Soviet Union were transferred to Estonia alone.<ref name=rahi /> In addition to the troops already stationed in Latvia and Estonia, an additional 8,850 soldiers were deployed to Estonia and Latvia from other parts of the Soviet Union to take part in the operation.<ref name=strods1997 /> They arrived to the republics between 10–15 March.<ref name=rahi /> They were not told of their actual mission until later and their arrival was explained as a military exercise.<ref name=strods1997 />
An additional 5,025 submachine guns and 1,900 rifles were brought in to ensure that the operatives were sufficiently armed. Telecommunications was a vital component to ensure smooth running of the operation, thus the MGB commandeered all civilian telephone exchanges for the duration an brought in an extra 2,210 MGB communications personnel.<ref name=strods1997 /> 4,437 freight [[Stock car (rail)|railway car]]s were delivered. A total of 8,422 trucks were organised. 5,010 civilian trucks were commandeered and the remaining vehicles were military origin, including 1,202 imported from the [[Leningrad Military District]], 210 from the [[Byelorussian Military District]] and 700 from Internal Troops.<ref name=strods1997 /> These additional vehicles were stationed just outside the border of the Baltic Republics in advance so as not to raise suspicion and sent in at the start of the operation.<ref name=strods />
The preparation on the MVD side was slower. USSR MVD order No. 00225 instructing various branches of MVD to prepare for the deportation and to assist the MGB was issued only on 12 March. Six months later, an internal review commission criticized the delay.<ref name=rahi /> Special representatives of MVD arrived to local districts only on 18–22 March.<ref name=rahi />
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