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Space Shuttle abort modes: Difference between revisions





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Cutoff and separation would occur effectively inside the upper atmosphere at an altitude of about 230,000 ft (70,000 m), high enough to avoid subjecting the external tank to excessive aerodynamic stress and heating. The cutoff velocity would depend on the distance still to be traveled to reach the landing site and would increase based on the distance of the orbiter at cutoff. In any case, the orbiter would be flying too slowly to glide gently at such high altitude, and would start descending rapidly. A series of maneuvers in quick succession would pitch the orbiter's nose up to level off the orbiter once it reached thicker air, while at the same time ensuring that the structural limits of the vehicle were not exceeded (the operational load limit was set to 2.5 Gs, and at 4.4 Gs the OMS pods were expected to be torn off the orbiter).
 
Once this phase was complete, the orbiter would be about 150 nmi (278&nbsp;km) from the landing site and in a stable glide, proceeding to make a normal landing about 25 minutes after liftoff.<ref>{{Cite websiteweb|title=NASA Intact Ascent Aborts Workbook, chapter 6 RETURN TO LAUNCH SITE|url=https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/383447main_intact_ascent_aborts_workbook_21002.pdf|access-date=2021-03-28|archive-date=2021-03-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210321153202/https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/383447main_intact_ascent_aborts_workbook_21002.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
 
If a second main engine failed at any point during PPA, the shuttle would not be able to reach the runway at KSC, and the crew would have to bail out. A failure of a third engine during PPA would lead to loss of control and subsequent loss of crew and vehicle (LOCV). Failure of all three engines as horizontal velocity approached zero or just before external tank jettison would also result in LOCV.<ref name = NASACA/>
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#RTLS resulted in the quickest landing of all abort options, but was considered the riskiest abort. Therefore, it would have been selected only in cases in which the developing emergency was so time-critical that the other aborts were not feasible, or in cases in which the vehicle had insufficient energy to perform the other aborts.
 
Unlike with all other United States orbit-capable crewed vehicles (both previous and subsequent, as of 20212024), the shuttle was never flown without astronauts aboard. To provide an incremental non-orbital test, NASA considered making the first mission an RTLS abort. However, [[STS-1]] commander [[John Young (astronaut)|John Young]] declined, saying, "let's not practice [[Russian roulette]]"<ref name="popmech">{{cite web
| url = http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/air_space/1282596.html?page=4
| title = Astronauts in Danger
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After the loss of ''Challenger'' in STS-51-L, numerous abort enhancements were added. With those enhancements, the loss of two SSMEs was now survivable for the crew throughout the entire ascent, and the vehicle could survive and land for large portions of the ascent. The struts attaching the orbiter to the external tank were strengthened to better endure a multiple SSME failure during SRB flight. Loss of three SSMEs was survivable for the crew for most of the ascent, although survival in the event of three failed SSMEs before T+90 seconds was unlikely because of design loads that would be exceeded on the forward orbiter/ET and SRB/ET attach points, and still problematic at any time during SRB flight because of controllability during staging.<ref name = NASACA>{{cite web|title=Contingency Aborts|url=http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/383441main_contingency_aborts_21007_31007.pdf|website=NASA.gov|access-date=February 1, 2015|archive-date=February 26, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150226074439/http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/383441main_contingency_aborts_21007_31007.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
 
A particularly significant enhancement was bailout capability. Unlike the ejection seat in a fighter plane, the shuttle had an inflight crew escape system<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20000817130106/http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/reference/shutref/escape/inflight.html spaceflight.nasa.gov]</ref> (ICES). The vehicle was put in a stable glide on autopilot, the hatch was blown, and the crew slid outon a pole to clear the orbiter's left wing. They would then parachute to earth or the sea. While this at first appeared only usable under rare conditions, there were many failure modes where reaching an emergency landing site was not possible yet the vehicle was still intact and under control. Before the ''Challenger'' disaster, this almost happened on [[STS-51-F]], when a single SSME failed at about T+345 seconds. The orbiter in that case was also ''Challenger''. A second SSME almost failed because of a spurious temperature reading; however, the engine shutdown was inhibited by a quick-thinking flight controller. If the second SSME had failed within about 69 seconds of the first, there would have been insufficient energy to cross the Atlantic. Without bailout capability, the entire crew would have been killed. After the loss of ''Challenger'', those types of failures were made survivable. To facilitate high-altitude bailouts, the crew began wearing the [[Launch Entry Suit]] and later the [[Advanced Crew Escape Suit]] during ascent and descent. Before the ''Challenger'' disaster, crews for operational missions wore only fabric flight suits.
 
Another post-''Challenger'' enhancement was the addition of East Coast/Bermuda abort landings (ECAL/BDA). High-inclination launches (including all [[ISS]] missions) would have been able to reach an emergency runway on the East Coast of North America under certain conditions. Most lower-inclination launches would have landed in Bermuda (although this option was ''not'' available for the very lowest-inclination launches—those to an orbital inclination of 28.5°—which launched due east from KSC and passed far to the south of Bermuda).
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==Ejection escape systems==
An ejection escape system, sometimes called a "[[launch escape system]]", had been discussed many times for the shuttle. After the ''Challenger'' and ''Columbia'' losses, great interest was expressed in this. All previous and subsequent U.S. crewed space vehicles have launch escape systems, although {{as of|20212024|lc=on}} none have ever been used for an American crewed flight.
 
===Ejection seat===
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| ATO
| T+5 minutes, 45 seconds
| Sensor problem shutdownshut SSME No. 1 down. Mission continued in lower than planned orbit.
|-
| 1993-03-22
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'''Canada'''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/EN/TP12952/PDF%5CHR/TP12952E.PDF|title=NASA SPACE SHUTTLE EMERGENCY LANDING SITE CONTINGENCY PLAN|publisher=Transport Canada|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130517012846/http://www.tc.gc.ca/Publications/EN/TP12952/PDF/HR/TP12952E.PDF|archive-date=2013-05-17}}</ref>
*[[CFB Goose Bay]], Goose Bay, Labrador
*[[CFB Namao]], Edmonton, Alberta (until 1994)<ref name="heritage2">[http://www.abheritage.ca/aviation/history/military_namao.html CFB Namao] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081009210917/http://www.abheritage.ca/aviation/history/military_namao.html |date=2008-10-09 }} Alberta Online Encyclopedia - Alberta's Aviation Heritage. Retrieved: 2011-03-01</ref>
*[[Gander International Airport]], Gander, Newfoundland
*[[Stephenville International Airport]], Stephenville, Newfoundland

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_abort_modes"
 




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