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'''Fund administration''' is the name given to the |
'''Fund administration''' is the name given to the executionof middle-office activities including [[fund accounting]], [[financial reporting]], [[net asset value]] calculation, [[capital call]]s, distributions, investor communications and other functions carried out in support of an [[investment fund]], which may take the form of a traditional [[mutual fund]], a [[hedge fund]], a [[private equity]] fund, a [[venture capital]] fund, a [[pension fund]], a [[unit trust]], or other pooled investment vehicle. |
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Managers of funds often choose to outsource some or all of these activities to external specialist companies, such as |
Managers of funds often choose to outsource some or all of these activities to external specialist companies, such as the fund's [[custodian bank]] or [[transfer agent]]. These companies are known as fund administrators. |
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==Administration services== |
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==Calculation of NAV, and other administrator activities== |
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These administrative activities may include the following administrative functions, which may include "fund accounting" |
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=== United States === |
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| ⚫ | These administrative activities may include the following administrative functions, which in turn may include "fund accounting" services. Some of these items may be specific to fund operations in the US, and some pertain only whether the fund is an [[U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission|SEC]]-registered fund: |
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*Calculation of the [[net asset value]] ("NAV"), including the calculation of the fund's income and expense accruals and the pricing of securities at current market value, is a core administrator task, because it is the price at which investors buy and sell shares in the fund.<ref name=autogenerated2>[http://files.irishfunds.ie/1433105561-2009-9-guide-to-sound-practices-for-hedge-fund-administrators.pdf ''Guide to Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Administrators'']</ref> This involves trade capture; security valuation (for highly illiquid securities, considerations include whether counterparty valuations are available and/or appropriate and whether the securities can be valued by independent vendors); [[reconciliation (accounting)|reconciliation]]s; [[expense]] calculation; and NAV calculation and reporting.<ref name=autogenerated2 /> The accurate and timely calculation of NAV by the administrator is vital.<ref name=autogenerated2 /><ref>[https://www.iomfsa.im/media/2320/soundpracticeguidelines.pdf "Sound Practice Guidelines for Administrators of Alternative Funds including Experienced Investor Funds in the Isle of Man"]</ref> |
*Calculation of the [[net asset value]] ("NAV"), including the calculation of the fund's income and expense accruals and the pricing of securities at current market value, is a core administrator task, because it is the price at which investors buy and sell shares in the fund.<ref name=autogenerated2>[http://files.irishfunds.ie/1433105561-2009-9-guide-to-sound-practices-for-hedge-fund-administrators.pdf ''Guide to Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Administrators'']</ref> This involves trade capture; security valuation (for highly illiquid securities, considerations include whether counterparty valuations are available and/or appropriate and whether the securities can be valued by independent vendors); [[reconciliation (accounting)|reconciliation]]s; [[expense]] calculation; and NAV calculation and reporting.<ref name=autogenerated2 /> The accurate and timely calculation of NAV by the administrator is vital.<ref name=autogenerated2 /><ref>[https://www.iomfsa.im/media/2320/soundpracticeguidelines.pdf "Sound Practice Guidelines for Administrators of Alternative Funds including Experienced Investor Funds in the Isle of Man"]</ref> |
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The '[[credit crisis]]' of the early 2010s had a significant effect on providers of fund administration services. |
The '[[credit crisis]]' of the early 2010s had a significant effect on providers of fund administration services. |
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=== Europe === |
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Referred to as collective investment management, fund management in Europe covers services such as NAV calculation, investment compliance, regulatory and financial reporting.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Northern Trust |url=https://www.northerntrust.com/wealth-management/europe/services/global-asset-servicing/fund-administration |access-date=2023-01-30 |website=northerntrust.com}}</ref> |
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==Fund administrator liability== |
==Fund administrator liability== |
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''Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich'' (SDNY, 2010) is the major case relating to fund administrator liability for failure to handle its NAV-related obligations properly.<ref name=autogenerated4>{{Cite web |url=https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2016/05/10/madoff-anwar-case-with-235-million-in-settlement-monies-finally-comes-to-a-close |title="Madoff Anwar case, with $235 million in settlement monies, finally comes to a close" |access-date=2019-02-06 |archive-date=2019-04-25 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425061326/https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2016/05/10/madoff-anwar-case-with-235-million-in-settlement-monies-finally-comes-to-a-close |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name=autogenerated1>[https://www.law360.com/articles/691802/the-citco-settlement-and-what-lies-ahead-for-pwc "The Citco Settlement And What Lies Ahead For PwC,"<!-- Bot generated title -->] Law360.</ref> The case was a consolidated proceeding against defendants that provided auditing and hedge fund administration and management services to investor plaintiffs whose investments were lost in the [[Bernard Madoff]] [[Ponzi scheme]]. Defendants were entities and individuals associated with among others [[Fairfield Greenwich Group]], [[Citco|Citco Group Ltd]] ("Citco"), and GlobeOp Financial Services.<ref name=autogenerated4 /><ref name=autogenerated1 /> Investors accused the defendants of collecting hundreds of millions of dollars in fees for their services, while ignoring warning signs that should have alerted them to the existence of Madoff’s fraud. Plaintiffs alleged they lost $7.5 billion.<ref name=autogenerated4 /><ref name=autogenerated1 /> |
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The defendants settled in 2016 by paying the ''Anwar'' plaintiffs $235 million.<ref name=autogenerated4 /><ref name=autogenerated1 /> |
The defendants settled in 2016 by paying the ''Anwar'' plaintiffs $235 million.<ref name=autogenerated4 /><ref name=autogenerated1 /> |
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Before the case settled, the court held that although the administration agreements did not explicitly name plaintiff investors as third-party beneficiaries, plaintiffs satisfactorily alleged intent to permit third-party enforcement given that the administration agreements requirement that the Citco defendants render certain specific performance directly to plaintiffs.<ref name=autogenerated3> |
Before the case settled, the court held that although the administration agreements did not explicitly name plaintiff investors as third-party beneficiaries, plaintiffs satisfactorily alleged intent to permit third-party enforcement given that the administration agreements requirement that the Citco defendants render certain specific performance directly to plaintiffs.<ref name=autogenerated3>{{Cite web |url=https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/5052 |title=''Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich'' (SDNY)<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=2019-02-06 |archivedate=2019-08-13 |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20190813131303/https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/5052 |url-status=deviated }}</ref> The court also held that plaintiffs adequately alleged that there was a discrete group of potential investors who were known parties to the Administrators, and that the Administrators intended those investors to rely upon the NAV to invest in the Funds.<ref name=autogenerated3 /> In addition, the court held that the Administrator sending NAV statements to interested investor parties was sufficient to allege a "linking" requirement.<ref name=autogenerated3 /> |
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The court held that the case was parallel with ''Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.'', 592 F. Supp.2d 608, 641 (SDNY 2009), in which <blockquote>The NAV, which was to be independently calculated and reported by [the Administrators], was fundamental to Plaintiffs' initial investment decisions, decisions to invest additional funds, and decisions to maintain the investments over time. The number of shares that the Plaintiffs received in exchange for their investment amounts depended on [the Administrators'] NAV calculations. Plaintiffs' subsequent reported profits also turned on [the Administrators'] calculations. Therefore, Plaintiffs necessarily relied on [the Administrators'] NAV calculations.<ref name=autogenerated3 /></blockquote> The court held further that "As in ''Pension Committee'', ... it is reasonable to infer from Plaintiffs' allegations that the Administrators were aware that Plaintiffs would—and did—rely on their statements of the Funds' NAVs that were sent to the investors.... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs allege a relationship between the investors and the Administrators that gives rise to a [[duty of care]] ...."<ref name=autogenerated3 /> |
The court held that the case was parallel with ''Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.'', 592 F. Supp.2d 608, 641 (SDNY 2009), in which <blockquote>The NAV, which was to be independently calculated and reported by [the Administrators], was fundamental to Plaintiffs' initial investment decisions, decisions to invest additional funds, and decisions to maintain the investments over time. The number of shares that the Plaintiffs received in exchange for their investment amounts depended on [the Administrators'] NAV calculations. Plaintiffs' subsequent reported profits also turned on [the Administrators'] calculations. Therefore, Plaintiffs necessarily relied on [the Administrators'] NAV calculations.<ref name=autogenerated3 /></blockquote> The court held further that "As in ''Pension Committee'', ... it is reasonable to infer from Plaintiffs' allegations that the Administrators were aware that Plaintiffs would—and did—rely on their statements of the Funds' NAVs that were sent to the investors.... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs allege a relationship between the investors and the Administrators that gives rise to a [[duty of care]] ...."<ref name=autogenerated3 /> |
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== Current Fund Administrators == |
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* [https://www.phxa.com Phoenix American Financial Services] |
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* [https://www.sociumllc.com/why-socium-fund-administrative/ Socium Fund Services] |
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* [https://sudrania.com/ Sudrania Fund Services] |
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==See also== |
==See also== |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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*[https:// |
*[https://books.google.com/books?id=txbOdeWvzWUC&q=%22fund+administration%22+nav+obligation ''Fundamentals of Fund Administration: A Guide''] |
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*[https://books.google.com/books?id=txbOdeWvzWUC&dq=%22fund+administration%22+nav+obligation&source=gbs_navlinks_ ''Fundamentals of Fund Administration: A Guide''] |
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Fund administration}} |
{{DEFAULTSORT:Fund administration}} |
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Fund administration is the name given to the execution of middle-office activities including fund accounting, financial reporting, net asset value calculation, capital calls, distributions, investor communications and other functions carried out in support of an investment fund, which may take the form of a traditional mutual fund, a hedge fund, a private equity fund, a venture capital fund, a pension fund, a unit trust, or other pooled investment vehicle.
Managers of funds often choose to outsource some or all of these activities to external specialist companies, such as the fund's custodian bankortransfer agent. These companies are known as fund administrators.
These administrative activities may include the following administrative functions, which in turn may include "fund accounting" services. Some of these items may be specific to fund operations in the US, and some pertain only whether the fund is an SEC-registered fund:
This list is not exhaustive, and particularly where a fund manager has chosen to outsource some of these tasks to an external company, some or all of the administrative activities of the fund may or may not be described as "fund administration". Specific activities that definitely do not fall under fund administration are those directly associated with the marketing and development of a collective investment scheme:
In the view of some fund managers, any task necessary for maintenance of the fund that does not fall into one of the two categories above could be classed as fund administration, and could potentially be a candidate for outsourcing.
The 'credit crisis' of the early 2010s had a significant effect on providers of fund administration services.
Referred to as collective investment management, fund management in Europe covers services such as NAV calculation, investment compliance, regulatory and financial reporting.[3]
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich (SDNY, 2010) is the major case relating to fund administrator liability for failure to handle its NAV-related obligations properly.[4][5] The case was a consolidated proceeding against defendants that provided auditing and hedge fund administration and management services to investor plaintiffs whose investments were lost in the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme. Defendants were entities and individuals associated with among others Fairfield Greenwich Group, Citco Group Ltd ("Citco"), and GlobeOp Financial Services.[4][5] Investors accused the defendants of collecting hundreds of millions of dollars in fees for their services, while ignoring warning signs that should have alerted them to the existence of Madoff’s fraud. Plaintiffs alleged they lost $7.5 billion.[4][5]
The defendants settled in 2016 by paying the Anwar plaintiffs $235 million.[4][5]
Before the case settled, the court held that although the administration agreements did not explicitly name plaintiff investors as third-party beneficiaries, plaintiffs satisfactorily alleged intent to permit third-party enforcement given that the administration agreements requirement that the Citco defendants render certain specific performance directly to plaintiffs.[6] The court also held that plaintiffs adequately alleged that there was a discrete group of potential investors who were known parties to the Administrators, and that the Administrators intended those investors to rely upon the NAV to invest in the Funds.[6] In addition, the court held that the Administrator sending NAV statements to interested investor parties was sufficient to allege a "linking" requirement.[6]
The court held that the case was parallel with Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 592 F. Supp.2d 608, 641 (SDNY 2009), in which
The NAV, which was to be independently calculated and reported by [the Administrators], was fundamental to Plaintiffs' initial investment decisions, decisions to invest additional funds, and decisions to maintain the investments over time. The number of shares that the Plaintiffs received in exchange for their investment amounts depended on [the Administrators'] NAV calculations. Plaintiffs' subsequent reported profits also turned on [the Administrators'] calculations. Therefore, Plaintiffs necessarily relied on [the Administrators'] NAV calculations.[6]
The court held further that "As in Pension Committee, ... it is reasonable to infer from Plaintiffs' allegations that the Administrators were aware that Plaintiffs would—and did—rely on their statements of the Funds' NAVs that were sent to the investors.... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs allege a relationship between the investors and the Administrators that gives rise to a duty of care ...."[6]
