|
→Opposition to the House of Sa'ud: grand mosque seizure is more an action of opposition than crticism previously included in this section and the next section citation could be better
|
→Internal Opposition: typo corrected
|
||
| Line 40: | Line 40: | ||
Due to its authoritarian and theocratic rule, the House of Saud has attracted much criticism during its rule of [[Saudi Arabia]]. Its opponents generally refer to the Saudi monarchy as totalitarians or [[dictator]]s. |
Due to its authoritarian and theocratic rule, the House of Saud has attracted much criticism during its rule of [[Saudi Arabia]]. Its opponents generally refer to the Saudi monarchy as totalitarians or [[dictator]]s. |
||
There have been numerous incidents of demonstrations and other forms of resistance against the House of Saud. On [[November 20, 1979]] the Masjid al-Haram in Makkah was violently siezed by a group of dissidents. The [[Grand Mosque Seizure|Seizure]] |
There have been numerous incidents of demonstrations and other forms of resistance against the House of Saud. On [[November 20, 1979]] the Masjid al-Haram in Makkah was violently siezed by a group of dissidents. The [[Grand Mosque Seizure|Seizure]] was carried out by 500 heavily armed and provisioned Saudi Dissidents, consisting mostly of members of the former [[Ikhwan]] tribe of [[Utayba]]<Ref> The Middle East Review of International Affairs [http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a8.html STATE, ISLAM AND OPPOSITION IN SAUDI ARABIA: THE POST DESERT-STORM PHASE.] Retrieved on 2006-12-29</ref> but also of other peninsular Arabs and a few Egyptians enrolled in Islamic studies at the Islamic University of Medina, took over and besieged Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. |
||
The seizure was led by [[Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaybi]] and [[Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Qahtani]] who cited the corruption and ostentasiousness of the ruling house of [[Saud]]. Utaybi and his group spoke against the socio–technological changes taking place in [[Saudi Arabia]]. Utaybi demanded that oil should not be sold to the [[United States]]. Utaybi also spoke against the stanglehold had on the interpretation and development of [[Wahhabi]] [[Islam]] placed on it by the [[Saudi]] regime in a corrupt alliance with the [[Ulema]] of Saudi Arabia.<Ref> J.A. Kechichican, "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-'Utaybi's 'Letters to the Saudi People'", The Muslim World, Vol.50 (1990) pp. 1-16.</ref> |
The seizure was led by [[Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaybi]] and [[Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Qahtani]] who cited the corruption and ostentasiousness of the ruling house of [[Saud]]. Utaybi and his group spoke against the socio–technological changes taking place in [[Saudi Arabia]]. Utaybi demanded that oil should not be sold to the [[United States]]. Utaybi also spoke against the stanglehold had on the interpretation and development of [[Wahhabi]] [[Islam]] placed on it by the [[Saudi]] regime in a corrupt alliance with the [[Ulema]] of Saudi Arabia.<Ref> J.A. Kechichican, "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-'Utaybi's 'Letters to the Saudi People'", The Muslim World, Vol.50 (1990) pp. 1-16.</ref> |
||
 |
|---|
|
|
| Basic Law |
|
|
|
Government
|
|
|
|
Recent elections |
|
 Saudi Arabia portal
|
|
|
The House of Saud (آل سعود Template:ArTranslit) is the royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The modern nation of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932, though the roots and influence for the House of Saud had been planted in the Arabian peninsula several centuries earlier. Prior to the era of the Kingdom's founder, Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, the family had ruled the Nejd and had conflicted on several occsaions with the Ottoman Empire and the RashidisinMakkah. The House of Saud has gone through three phases: the First Saudi State, the Second Saudi State, and the modern nation of Saudi Arabia.
The history of the Al Saud has been marked by a desire to unify the Arabian Peninsula and to spread what it promotes as a more purified and simple, though often criticized as less tolerant, view of Islam embodied by Wahhabism which has gained international controversy since the events of 9/11. The House of Saud is also linked with Wahhabism (Saudis deprecate the term, preferring IkhwanorSalafi) through the marriage of the son of Muhammad ibn Saud with the daughter of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhabin1744.
"The royal family today is made up of an estimated 25,000 members, of whom around 200 are princes wielding influence." [1] The current head of the Al Saud and ruler of Saudi Arabia is King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz. On 20 October 2006, he announced the creation of a committee of princes to vote on the viability of kings and the candidature of nominated crown princes. The committee, to be known as the Bay'ah Council, would include all the sons and some grandsons of the late King Abdul Aziz who would vote for one of three princes nominated by the king as Heir Apparents. In the event that if either the sitting king or the crown prince were deemed unfit to rule, a five-member transitory council would be empowered to run state affairs for a maximum of one week, before naming a successor. This system would, theoretically, prevent situations, as was the case with the late King Fahd, who after multiple strokes beginning in 1995, remained on the throne for 10 years, most of them without the faculties to rule.
The Head of the House of Saud is the King of Saudi Arabia who serves as Head of State and monarch of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The King holds almost absolute political power. The King appoints ministers to his cabinet who supervise their respective ministries in his name. The key ministries of Defence, Interior, Municipal & Rural Affairs, and Foreign Affairs are reserved for the Al Saud though most portfolios, such as Finance, Information, Planning, Petroleum Affairs and Industry, have traditionally been given to commoners, often with junior Al Saud members serving as their "deputies." House of Saud family members also hold many of the Kingdom's critical military and governmental departmental posts.
Long term political and government appointments, such as those of King Abdullah, who has been Commander of the National Guard since 1963, Crown Prince Sultan, Minister of Defence & Aviation since 1962, Prince Mutaib Minister of Municipal & Rural Affairs since 1975, Prince Nayef who has been the Minister of Interior since 1975, and Prince Salman, who has been Governor of the Riyadh Region since 1962, have perpetuated the creation of fiefdoms where senior princes have, often, though not exclusively, co-mingled their personal wealth with that of their respective domains. They have often appointed their own sons to senior positions within their own fiefdom. Examples of these include Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah as Assistant Commander in the National Guard, Prince Khalid bin Sultan as Assistant Minister of Defence, Prince Mansour bin Mutaib as Assistant Minister for Municipal & Rurul Affairs and Prince Mohammed bin Nayef as Assistant Minister in the Interior Ministry. In cases, where portfilios have notably substantial budgets, appointments of younger, often full, brothers have been necessary, as deputies or vice ministers, ostensibly to share the wealth and the burdens of responsibility, of each fiefdom. Examples of these include Prince Abd-al Rahman who is Vice Minister of Defence & Aviation under Prince Sultan, Prince Badr, Deputy to King Abdullah in the National Guard, Prince Sattam, who is Deputy to Riyadh Governor, Prince Salman, and Prince Ahmed, who holds the Deputy Minister's portfolio in Prince Nayef 's Interior Ministry.
The sharing of family wealth has been a critical component in maintaining the semblance of a united front within the royal family. An essential part of family wealth is the Kingdom in its entirety, which the Al Saud view as a totally owned family asset. Whether through the co-mingling of personal & state funds from lucrative government positions, huge land allocations, direct allotments of crude oil to sell in the open market, segmental controls in the economy, special preferences for the award of major contracts, outright cash handouts, and astronomical monthly allowances, - all billed to the national exchequer - all told, the financial impact may have exceeded 25% of the Kingdom's annual budget during the reign of King Fahd. Over decades of oil revenue generated expansion, royal receipts estimates have varied, ranging as low as $50 billion and as high as over $1 trillion. Nonetheless, wealth sharing of this sort has allowed many of the senior princes & princesses to accumulate largely unauditable wealth and, in turn, pay out, in cash or kind, to lesser royals and commoners, and, thereby, gaining political munition through their own largesse.
During times of high oil prices such as the late 70s, early 80s, and after the US invasion of Iraq, national income has been able to out pace the developmental needs & social obligations of the Saudi government and the effect of royal skimming were barely noticeable. During the mid 80s through the 90s, when international crude oil prices dropped to the teens and below, the subsequent shortfall in income, and the availability of surprisingly limited financial reserves (when compared to such countries as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates which continued to grow during crude price droughts through dividends generated by years of prudent investments) may have contributed to growing national discontent with the Al Saud and planted the seeds for the growth of Al Qaeda sympathizers in the Kingdom. According to well publicized unsubstantiated reports, King Abdullah, has intentions to reduce the Al Saud's share of the budget, an act which may sow discontent within the family, but would be popular with the Kingdom's citizenry.
Unlike Western royal families, the Saudi Monarchy has not had a clearly defined order of succession. Historically, upon becoming King, the monarch has designated an heir apparent to the throne who serves as Crown Prince of the Kingdom. Upon the King's death the Crown Prince becomes King, and during the King's incapacitation the Crown Prince likewise assumes power as regent. Though other members of the Al Saud hold political positions in the Saudi government, technically it is only the King and Crown Prince who legally constitute the political institutions.
Succession to the throne has been traditionally by consensus and though age remains an influential factor within the family, senior princes have been bypassed, either by their own unwillingness or their inability, to build the consensus necessary primarily from within the royal family, but also from the clergy and merchant community. The Bay'ah Council, whose membership is restricted to the surviving sons and senior grandsons of the late King Abdul-Aziz, ushers in a public face to this well-tried tribal process.
Tribal traditions remain a critical influence in Saudi Arabia. Though nominally head of the royal family, both King Khalid and KingFahd respected and often deferred family (with intricate links to broad government procedure and policy) matters to older brother, Mohammed bin Abdul Aziz (who had stepped aside from succession), during his lifetime. This tradition continues today with neither senior Prince Bandar bin Abdul Aziz nor Prince Mishaal bin Abdul Aziz (both older than Crown Prince Sultan), holding any official role in government but both being key players in the Kingdom's political hierarchy. Sons of former kings Faisal, Khalid, Fahd, and, to a lesser extent, Saud, including those not in government, also maintain significant political & family influence, and are expected to participate on the Bay'ah Council. Interestingly, in contradiction to widely held opinions, senior princesses also wield significant, albeit private, influence in royal family politics.
Sons of Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi state) have been, thus far, the only eligible candidates allowed to serve as King or Crown Prince. With the aging of this pool (there is an estimated 22 surviving sons, the oldest being in their mid 80s and the youngest is in their 60s), a decree by the late King Fahd expanded the candidates to include the male progeny of King Abdul Aziz's sons. This decree has expanded the pool to over 150 eligibles, though consensus and competency will limit this number.
Sons & grandsons of King Abdul Aziz are referred to with the style "His Royal Highness," differing from the royals belonging to the Cadet line which are given the "His Highness" (HH) honorific.
The Cadet line include the Al Kabir, the Bin Jiluwi, the Thunayan, the Sudairi and the Farhan, all of whom are branches of the Al Saud. Many of these hold senior government & military positions, or are in business. Intermarriage between branches is a common way of establishing alliances and reinforcing influence. Though the Cadet line are not in contention for the throne, there are those with the seniority to command respect and these often wield tremendous power.
 |
This article does not cite any sources. Please help improve this articlebyadding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
Find sources: "House of Saud" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (October 2006) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
 |
This article contains weasel words: vague phrasing that often accompanies biasedorunverifiable information. Such statements should be clarified or removed.
|
Due to its authoritarian and theocratic rule, the House of Saud has attracted much criticism during its rule of Saudi Arabia. Its opponents generally refer to the Saudi monarchy as totalitarians or dictators.
There have been numerous incidents of demonstrations and other forms of resistance against the House of Saud. On November 20, 1979 the Masjid al-Haram in Makkah was violently siezed by a group of dissidents. The Seizure was carried out by 500 heavily armed and provisioned Saudi Dissidents, consisting mostly of members of the former Ikhwan tribe of Utayba[1] but also of other peninsular Arabs and a few Egyptians enrolled in Islamic studies at the Islamic University of Medina, took over and besieged Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca.
The seizure was led by Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaybi and Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Qahtani who cited the corruption and ostentasiousness of the ruling house of Saud. Utaybi and his group spoke against the socio–technological changes taking place in Saudi Arabia. Utaybi demanded that oil should not be sold to the United States. Utaybi also spoke against the stanglehold had on the interpretation and development of Wahhabi Islam placed on it by the Saudi regime in a corrupt alliance with the Ulema of Saudi Arabia.[2]
Utaybi recieved little mass support outside of small circles of manual workers and students of tribal origin, of the lower classes and foreign labourers (from Egypt, Yemen and Pakistan.) The Saudi Royal family turned to the Ulema who duly issued a fatwa permitting the storming of the holy sanctuary.
Saudi, Jordanian and French armed forces took part in the bid to eject Utaybi’s Group. All surviving males (including Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaybi) were beheaded publicly in four cities of Saudi Arabia[3]
The Saudi monarchy has been a reliable ally of the United States for over five decades. Since the events of 9/11, though, there has been a large anti-Saudi shift in U.S. public opinion as well as a call to review the relationship. As the world's largest producer of crude oil, Saudi Arabia has often received the brunt of the public's ire particularly when gasoline prices fluctuate upwards. Lucrative oil and business ventures and contracts that have recently been awarded to non-US firms have also raised the concerns of whether Saudi Arabia is committed to the United States.
Opponents of the regime often accuse the US government of backing or propping-up "Saudi tyranny," but supporters point out that the House of Saud's consistent reliability to US administrations since FDR's presidency has been key to US influence in the region and amongst Muslim nations where the Saudis, as hosts of the Holy Cities of Makkah & Madinah and a donor of significance, garner respect and influence. Financially, the largest beneficiaries of the Kingdom's hydrocarbon fueled growth included US corporations such as Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Bechtel, Fluor, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, JP Morgan Chase, Citicorp, Kraft and General Foods. Opponents of the Saudi regime question whether Saudi Arabia's internal policy, developed on the basis of the very conservative Wahhabi Islamic tradition, is the root cause for the events of 9/11. Supporters argue that political stability in the Kingdom, and the subsequent unrestricted flow of crude oil, is an essential component to the international community's financial well-being. Internal strife & international doubts aside, supporters argue, the rulers in Riyadh have reliably offered this stability for decades.
"I just long for the day I wake up and find that the Saudi royal family are swinging from the lamp-posts and they've got a proper government that represents the people of Saudi Arabia." - Ken Livingstone [2] (William Hague, a British Conservative, later remarked in his News of the World column that he was glad to see that left-winger Livingstone had finally come to see the merits of the death penalty.)
