in the laws as approximation section, where would laws like say, the [[Gas Laws]] fit into the various types mentioned? they are not precisely an approximation, because they are exact if applied to an ideal gas, the only snag being that in real life there aint no such thing, leaving one with the uneasy feeling that rather than the law being the approximation, it is the real stuff out there that is regarded as an approximation to the ideal.
in the laws as approximation section, where would laws like say, the [[Gas Laws]] fit into the various types mentioned? they are not precisely an approximation, because they are exact if applied to an ideal gas, the only snag being that in real life there aint no such thing, leaving one with the uneasy feeling that rather than the law being the approximation, it is the real stuff out there that is regarded as an approximation to the ideal.
== Unreferenced ==
{{Veri policy}}
Revisionasof23:42,28September2006
The section "Description" is a nonneutral point of view. The rest of the article is not as bad, but still mostly carries a subtle bias in favor of the existence of universal, eternal, absolute laws. For example, even the sentence which suggests we might not know the ultimate physical laws still assumes the existence of physical laws in the sense put forth under "Description". Critical 02:01, 1 Dec 2004 (UTC)
About Users Critical and CStar
For the record, the user Critical ( talk, contributions), who slapped the "disputed NPoV" sticker on this page, has made his or her first edits tonight (or today) and within less than two hours has attacked eight articles for PoV, including (ironically given the CStar example given on the Logical fallacy talk page), Physical law. These were the only "edits" (plus weak justifications on talk pages in the same vein as this one). I don't think the PoV claim has merit. We may ask if this series of attacks is to be taken seriously.
For the following reasons I am thinking that these pages has been the victim of a tiresome semi-sophisticated troll and the PoV sticker should be removed sooner rather than later, if not immediately. We may note that CStar ( talk, contributions) after making edits, paused during the period user Critical made edits, and then CStar took up responding to these edits after the series of user Critical edits ends, as if there is only one user involved, and the user logged out, changed cookies and logged back in. Further, user CStar left a note on Charles Matthew's talk page, Chalst's talk page, and Angela's talk page pointing to a supposed PoV accusation placed on the Logical argument page, when in fact no such sticker has been placed. Perhaps the irony regarding the Physical law page is not so ironic. Hu 05:18, 2004 Dec 1 (UTC)
I have responded to this on the logical fallacy talk page, as well as on the pages of the above mentioned users. It does appear that these pages were as Hu suggests the victim of a tiresome semi-sophisticated troll. But I wasn't the perpetrator. This suggestion appears to have been an honest mistake, I consider the matter closed, and it appears that Hu does as well. CSTAR 01:41, 2 Dec 2004 (UTC)
Knowledge and epistemology
I wasn't aware of this page until the little incident alluded to by the above discussion brought it to my attention. Now that I'm here though I do have some remarks about the article (Yikes but I won't dare touch it)
Doesn't the first paragraph mix two things which should be separate? (1) What is a physical law is and (2) how we obtain physical laws.
Now it is arguable that one can't meaningfully separate the two. I don't think I believe that, but I'm certain willing to listen to an argument in favor of this.
Do physical laws have to be generalizations? If so, how general do they have to be? Generality does seem to be a desirable property of physical laws, but again I don't think this really gets to the heart of the matter. Some kid discovering the principle that toys fall when let go, has discovered a physical law.
The properties of physical laws listed in the Description section, should have more clearly identified source attribution, that is some comment such as
Universality (R. P. Feynman, The Feynman lectures on XYZ, 1971).
Some of these I find hard to believe can be attributed to the sources mentioned. For instance, the property of Omnipotence to Feynman? Maybe, but I find it hard to swallow that he would have said something like that.
References are now clearly distinguished.--Johnstone 14:32, 4 Dec 2004 (UTC)
Movable type
What is a "movable type" law of nature?
The distinction seems spurious, at least without further clarification and some reference. Statistical laws can also be laws of nature; many well-known laws are.CSTAR 14:00, 3 Mar 2005 (UTC)
A confusing sentence
"Some of the more famous laws of nature are found in Isaac Newton's theories of (now) classical mechanics, presented in his Principia Mathematica, and Albert Einstein's theory of relativity."
Despite what I write here, I see no great error in the article. It accurately describes the subject in the context of its typical usage. I guess I am only interested whether there is sufficient objection (other than mine, as I will describe) to the semantics of the phrase "physical law" to include noting such an objection in the article.
There is an argument to be made, perhaps elsewhere, for a return to at least a weakly more positivist perspective in scientific discussions; here, I only ask whether there is avoidable confusion, identified by Apostrophe, in comparing "physical law," an historical verbal construction, with "theory," which is a more modern and more meaningful formalism.
The reason the sentence Apostrophe cites makes no sense (Apostrophe is right to question it) is that the usage of the word "law" in this context has a metaphorical, social and literary source, rather than a source in the practice of scientific enquiry. The usages "physical law," "scientific law," "law of nature" and so on descend to us from the period when Western thinkers and investigators- in the process of developing techniques of reductionist enquiry- presumed a supernatural world where "natural lawgiving" entities existed. One goal of enquiry about the world, for them, was to ever more clearly describe the nature of such esoteric "laws" that are followed by the natural world, these laws being prescribed from outside of nature.
Whether or not a supernatural lawgiver exists, the presumption of the supernatural (including "irreducible complexity" and so on) is no longer part of scientific enquiry. But the metaphorical usage, "law," remains embedded throughout the literature, especially throughout the "meta-literature," that is, that literature that seeks to relate the practice of science, scientific ideas and the current state of scientific enquiry to non-scientists, and that that is used to teach science.
The continued use of this word seems to be a problem. One sees that "laws" are made by people, obeyed by people, flaunted by people, ignored by people, enforced by people, altered or abolished by people, to prescribe the behavior of people. People may invoke supernatural inspiration for the laws they prescribe, of course. No one has ever received a ticket for breaking a "physical law."
Continuing to use "law" in this way also invites the intrusion into scientific discourse- through the exploitation of what amounts to an archaic, misleading metaphor- of new avatars of old supernatural ideas, unnecessarily implying as the usage does the existence of an associated sentient "lawgiver." Few who now invoke the phrases "law of nature" or "physical law" intend this.
It would be helpful if the use of "law" in this context were just abandoned. It makes no sense to describe the more or less regular way in which objects in the world behave by resorting to such loaded social metaphors. It doesn't take much thinking to find alternate, less baroque phrases that would serve just as well; "observed basic nature;" "natural behavior;" "basic behaviours;" "observed fundamental behaviors;" "fundamental natural behavior" and so on. These examples aren't devoid of metaphor (maybe only organisms "behave?") or undesirable suggestion of unapparent hierarchy, but they're descriptive and pretty neutral. Smarter people can do better, I'm sure.
If the NSF and the NCSE and other entities who seek to clarify the distinction between "science" and "not science" were to urge that we abandon these archaic terms (including also the oxymoron "scientifically proved" for the meaningful and more accurate "clearly and convincingly supported by evidence" and so on) and substitute others that (in English, anyway) are more neutral, I predict the chief objections would come from those who desire to continue to insert supernatural cause and other "not science" propaganda into science curricula. Eliminating the semantic quagmire these terms instigate would be a simple step toward clarity, reducing confusion in the minds of those who mistake metaphor for synonym. Have you ever noticed, listening to or reading discussions aimed at lay persons of theories of a multiple-dimensional world, how the notion of "dimension" as described by a physicist (who means by this something like "linearly independent degree of freedom") is obviously misinterpreted to mean something else entirely by many in the audience (something instead like "an alternate physical world, where Spock has a beard")?
I fear I've gone too long. I'm new to Wikipedia. The question is whether the article can support a (short) linguistico-philisophico critique addressing Apostrophe's question? Or, whether such an objection is so insignificant that it should not be attached. Rt336800:05, 29 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
what about the laws?
Laws as Idealizations
in the laws as approximation section, where would laws like say, the Gas Laws fit into the various types mentioned? they are not precisely an approximation, because they are exact if applied to an ideal gas, the only snag being that in real life there aint no such thing, leaving one with the uneasy feeling that rather than the law being the approximation, it is the real stuff out there that is regarded as an approximation to the ideal.
