The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian Revolution; The Jugo-Slav Movement, by Alexander Petrunkevitch, Samuel Northrup Harper, Frank Alfred Golder, Robert Joseph Kerner This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: The Russian Revolution; The Jugo-Slav Movement Author: Alexander Petrunkevitch, Samuel Northrup Harper, Frank Alfred Golder, Robert Joseph Kerner Release Date: August 9, 2009 [EBook #8465] Last Updated: January 8, 2013 Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION *** Produced by David Starner, David Widger and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team
[FN: Several months before the revolution the following
confidential conversation took place between Alexeiev, the
Russian commander-in-chief, and a journalist:
ALEXEIEV: I can get nothing from them [ministers]. My
supplies are decreasing.... It is even necessary to think.
Through the Duma they begged the Emperor to put in ministers
whom the people could trust, but he, as if to show his
contempt for public opinion, selected men of low character,
one worse than the other, men with whom even decent
monarchists would not shake hands, and in shame withdrew
from court.]
[FN: about bread. We are already cutting down the allowance.
They have forgotten about food for the horses....]
JOURNALIST: What are you going to do about it?
A. What shall I do? With these people there is nothing that can be done.
J. Have you said anything to the Tsar about it?
A. I have... but it does no good.
J. Why?
A. While you talk to him he pays attention, gets worked up, is eager to do
something... but as soon as he leaves you he forgets about it. All kinds
of pressure are brought to bear upon him, he is not a free man.
J. Is it true that the Tsarina has much influence?
A. It is only too true. Her influence is irresistible. What is worse she
never comes out in the open. She interferes with everybody, but works
behind their backs. You never can tell what she will do next. Every time
she comes here she makes new trouble.
J. Do the ministers ever consult you?
A. They come, they talk. What can they do? The honest ministers leave and
the worthless remain.... If it were not for the war I would resign too. If
I should leave what would not they do with the army? Do I not understand
that Sturmer and Company are thinking only of an alliance with Germany?...
The home situation is serious. They [ministers] are purposely instigating
hunger disturbances in order to provoke a revolution so as to have an
excuse for breaking away from the Allies and end the war. Our army is now
in condition to crush Germany and without that there can be no real peace
in Europe. But a permanent peace is not wanted by Sturmer and Protopopov,
they wish to keep the people under the heel of a strong Germany. Apart
from the Germans no one will protect them from the revolution. The pity of
it all is that at the head of the government there still are men who are
interested in crushing the people.]
[FN: Princess Vasilchikov, a prominent court lady, became
convinced that the Empress and her ministers were ruining
the country and therefore wrote her a courteous letter,
pleading with her to save Russia. For her pains she received
an order to retire to her estate, and her husband, who held
a very prominent position, left the capital with her.
(Novoe Vremia, March 11-24, 1917.)]
Members of the royal family and the grand dukes urged the Tsar to change
his course and not ruin the country and the dynasty but he, drugged by Dr.
Badmaev and duped by Rasputin, Protopopov and Company, sent them all out
of the capital with orders not to return until sent for. They became so
desperate that they murdered Rasputin but the Empress remained and the
government policy became more reactionary than ever and as Prince Iusupov
said the country was drifting to destruction or to a state of anarchy. It
was quite evident that the only way to save the country was through a
revolution and it was merely a question whether it would come first from
the top or from the bottom and when.
[FN: As late as October, 1916, the old Empress saw her son
at Kiev and pointed to him that Rasputin and the other
members of the court circle would overthrow the dynasty and
destroy the country but it did no good. Only a few days
before the outbreak of the revolution his own brother,
Mikhail Alexandrovich, pleaded with him along the same lines
and with the same success. (Rech, March 7-20, 1917.)]
[FN: The old and scholarly Grand Duke Nicholas
Mikhailovich went to see the Emperor about November 1, 1916,
and in order to impress him with the critical situation of
the country he wrote out his ideas so as to leave them. He
was received in a kindly manner by the Tsar who listened to
the reading of the letter and then took it over so as to
read it to the Empress. When he came to the place where her
name was mentioned she snatched it from him and tore it up.
In the course of the conversation that followed the old Duke
said some sharp things but he could not get anything but
smiles from the Tsar, and when the old man's cigarette went
out the Tsar lighted it for him. It was impossible to get an
out and out talk, or satisfaction of any kind, and Nicholas
Mikhailovich left the court in disgust. Two days later he
was requested to retire to his estate for two months. Here
is the Grand Duke's letter:
"You have said more than once that you would carry on the
war to a successful finish. Do you believe that with the
conditions as they exist at present in the rear this can be
done? Are you acquainted with the internal situation, not
only in the interior of the Empire but also on the outskirts
(Siberia, Turkestan, Caucasus)? Are you told all the truth
or is some of it concealed from you? Where is the root of
the evil? Allow me to tell you briefly the essentials of the
case.
『So long as your method of selecting ministers was known to
a limited circle only affairs went on somehow, but from the
moment your system became generally known it is stupid to
govern Russia in that way. Repeatedly you have told me that
you could trust no one, that you were being deceived. If
that is true then the same influences are at work on your
wife, dearly beloved by you, who is led astray by [—].
[FN: the evil circle that surrounds her. You trust Alexandra
Fedorovna—that is easy to understand. But that which comes
out of her mouth is the result of clever fabrication and not
the truth. If you are not strong enough to remove these
influences from her, at least put yourself on guard against
this steady and systematic interference of those who act
through your beloved. If your persuasion is ineffective, and
I am certain that you have more than once fought against
this influence, try some other means so as to end with this
system once for all. Your first impulses and decisions are
always unusually true and to the point, but as soon as
another influence comes in you begin to hesitate and end up
by doing something different from what you originally
decided. If you should succeed in removing this continuous
invasion of the dark forces there would take place at once
the birth of a new Russia, and there would return to you the
confidence of the greater number of your subjects. All other
matters would soon settle themselves. You would find people
who under different conditions would be willing to work
under your personal leadership. At the proper time, and that
is not far distant, you can of your own free will organize a
ministry which should be responsible to you and to
constitutional institutions. This can be done very simply,
without any force from outside as was the case with the act
of October 17, 1905. I hesitated a long time before
venturing to tell you this truth, and I finally consented
when your mother and sister urged me to do so. You are at
the beginning of a new era of disturbances, I will go
farther, at the beginning of a new era of attempts at
assassination. Believe me that in trying to loosen you from
the chains that bind you I do it from no motives of personal
interest and of this you and Her Majesty are convinced, but
in the hope and in the expectation of saving you, your
throne, and our dear native land from some very serious and
irreparable consequences.』(Rech, March 9-22, 1917.)
[FN:『An important rôle was played at court by Dr. Badmaev,
Rasputin's friend. There were many rumors afloat in court
and it is difficult to tell the truth. But this I can say
that Nicholas Alexandrovich was drugged with different drugs
from Thibet. In this Rasputin took part. During the last
days they brought the Emperor to a state of almost total
insanity and his will power was completely gone. In all
matters of state he consulted the Empress who led him to the
edge of the precipice.』Interview given out by Prince
Iusupov, in Novoe Vremia, March 14-27, 1917.]
[FN: One of the editors of the Novoe Vremia who has large
acquaintance in the aristocratic circles of the capital told
the writer that for months before the revolution it was
commonly talked about in the homes of military leaders and
fashionable circles that for the good of Russia the Empress
must be killed. Last fall (1916) there came to his home one
of his friends, an aide-de-camp of one of the grand dukes,
and confided to him that he was meditating an act of
terrorism in order to get a certain person out of the way.
Another topic of conversation was the revolution after the
war.]
[FN:『I will say this—at court there reigned a kind of
nightmare, each day fewer and fewer people remained there.
If the revolution had not broken out from the bottom it
would have from the top.』Interview given out by Prince
Iusupov, in Novoe Vremia, March 14-27, 1917.]
It is only since the political upheaval that the activities and plans of
the grand dukes have become public, but the cry for a revolution on the
part of the great mass of intelligent people was heard before and
everywhere. On my return to Russia, in February, 1916, after an absence of
a little more than two years, I noticed many changes but none greater than
in the public opinion in regard to the administration. On the way across
Siberia, I met with many Russians, some of whom were army officers, and
one and all bitterly criticized the government for its mismanagement of
the war, for the betrayal of Russia as they called it, for its
incompetency, and general worthlessness. At the capital, it was the same,
everywhere, street, car, and public places, the government was denounced;
there was no attempt at concealment. In the archives where I worked, which
are almost under the very nose of the imperial family, the criticism was
as open as in private homes. In fact there was no exception. When mention
was made of the Court, of Rasputin, and of the Empress, there was a kind
of a painful smile; it was not a subject that self-respecting patriotic
Russians liked to talk about in public or before strangers; it was like
dirty linen that ought not to be hung out for public view.
There was reason enough and suffering enough to justify the complaining.
Petrograd was overcrowded owing to the thousands of refugees who had been
driven there, rooms and apartments were difficult to find and very
expensive, and the cost of living had gone up so high that it was hard for
the poor to make ends meet. It was almost impossible to get about in the
city, as the war had reduced the number of cabs and the few that did
business asked such exorbitant fares that only the rich could afford to
ride in them. The street car situation was in a hopeless tangle. Even
before the war there were not enough accommodations for the public, but
since the opening of hostilities many of the cars had broken down and
there were no mechanics to repair them and no new cars to replace them. At
a time when the population increased, the transportation facilities
decreased. Passengers poured into the cars like a stream, filled the
seats, blocked the aisles, jammed the entrance, stood on the steps, hung
on behind, and clung to anything that might bear them along. Difficult as
it was to get into the car, it was worse to get out, and it is easier to
imagine than to describe the pushing, swearing, tearing, and fighting that
one witnessed. The railways were in an equally bad condition. One had to
wait weeks for a ticket. Men and women were crowded into the same coupés;
the cars were packed so full of human beings that they suggested cattle
cars, except that they were not so sanitary, for they contained people
suffering from contagious diseases and were without fresh air.
The food situation was very serious. For many years, Russia had been the
granary of Europe but during the winter of 1916-17 suffered from shortage
of food. Passengers told how in southern Russia grain and flour were
rotting and yet in northern Russia the inhabitants were starving owing to
the breakdown of the transportation system. It was pointed out that while
the railway officials refused to give cars for bringing in the necessities
of life, yet articles of luxury, expensive fruits, and such things did
come into the city—a state of affairs which meant, of course, that
some one was grafting. Sugar could be obtained only by cards and in very
limited quantities; flour could not be bought at all, and black, sour
bread could often be had only by standing in long lines and for hours at a
time. There were no shoes and people asked what became of the hides of the
thousands of animals that were annually slaughtered and shot. It was said
that these, like other things, were sold to Germany.
As usual the poorer classes suffered the most. The well-to-do sent their
servants who after a time returned with bread; at the worst it was only an
inconvenience, but the workman had no servants to run his errands. In the
morning, the laborer left his home for his work with little or no
breakfast, at noon there was no luncheon for him because his wife was
standing in the bread or sugar line, and when he returned in the evening
there may have been bread enough but little else. The wife was tired and
discouraged, the children crying and hungry, and life became a burden.
We may say that the conditions in Russia were no worse than in France or
Germany. This is doubtless true, but there is this difference: the people
of France and Germany had confidence in their leaders and realized that
they were doing the best that they could, while the Russians knew they
could put no trust in their Government, that the suffering was unnecessary
and was due to corruption, favoritism, and incompetency. The Russians have
as much patriotism and patience as any other people, but when they saw
themselves abused and imposed upon they had a right to complain.
In addition to the criticism of the Government the other favorite topic of
conversation was the revolution that would come after the war. This was
discussed as openly as the problems of war; the two were bound up
together, first a successful ending of the war, and then a change in
government.
This public denunciation and open discussion of a coup d'état came
as a shock to me, for I remembered quite vividly how the same people
cheered the Emperor when he declared war. Three years ago no one would
have dared to talk like that. To be sure enough was said then of the
desirability of a more liberal government, but it was a far-off question,
one that the next generation might have to deal with. Now the talk was of
an overturn immediately after the war.
The court circle was not ignorant of what was being said for the spies
kept them fully informed. In conversation with a journalist two months
before the outbreak of the revolution, the Minister of the Interior,
Protopopov, a protégé of Rasputin, said that he was aware of the
revolutionary propaganda and that he was ready to face any attempt that
might be made to overthrow the government.
"I will not stop at anything," he remarked,... "the first thing that I
shall do is to send them [revolutionaries] from the capital by the car
loads. But I will strangle the revolution no matter what the cost may be."
[FN: Novoe Vremia, March 19-April 1, 1917.] He had no doubt that he
could handle the situation and he inspired those about him with the same
confidence, particularly the Emperor whom he assured that the discontent
was confined chiefly to the intelligentsia and to a small number of the
gentry, and that the common people and the army were devoted to the
autocracy.
To the question that arises why the revolution, which was expected after
the war, came off before its conclusion, the answer is that the present
revolution was not planned nor desired by any one of importance; it came
as a surprise to all. It just happened. If some one must have the credit
or blame, it is Protopopov who was at the time suspected of being queer
mentally and who has since lost his reason entirely. He was so sure of
himself and of his ability to put down the uprising and thereby show
himself a real statesman that he concluded not to wait for the revolution
to come in the ordinary course of events, but to hurry it a bit. Although
there is no conclusive proof for this statement, there is plenty of
convincing circumstantial evidence. We know that it was proposed to have
the workmen of Petrograd strike on February 27, the day of the opening of
the Duma, as a protest against the government; we know also that to meet
this situation, the Minister of the Interior had placed machine guns in
the garrets, in steeples, on housetops, and other such places where they
could command the important streets and shoot down the mob. The rising did
not take place because Miliukov, the great liberal leader, learned that
the Government was behind this move and that preparations had been made to
slaughter the unsuspecting workmen. He, therefore, addressed them in an
open letter calling on them not to make any demonstration, and they did
not. For the time being the strike was off, but the air was full of
discontent and restlessness, and it was difficult to say when trouble
would break out again. With this in view, a number of representatives of
various organizations met to discuss the situation and to determine what
attitude they should take and what counsel they should give to the labor
leaders. Miliukov and a few others urged that all uprisings should be
discouraged because they would interfere with the war, would cost the
lives of many innocent persons, and would accomplish nothing. There were,
however, others, especially Anisimov, who argued strongly in favor of a
strike, saying that this was the opportune time to overthrow the present
regime and to establish a democratic government.[FN: I have this story
from Miliukov.] When the revolution came off and the papers of the secret
police were seized, it was discovered that Anisimov, who urged the revolt,
was the paid agent of the Government and was doubtless doing its bidding.
This shows that the Government instigated and abetted the uprising. But
this is not all the evidence. Between February 27 and the outbreak of the
revolution men impersonating Miliukov went to the factories, calling on
the workmen to rise against the Government.[FN: I have this story from
Miliukov.] There is still another bit of evidence. In order to give the
laboring classes cause for revolt, the food supply in the factory
districts was reduced and many people suffered from hunger and in their
desperation came out into the streets. During the revolutionary week
little, if any, food came in, but immediately after it the soldiers found
250,000 "puds" of flour, [FN: Russkaia Svoboda, 1917. No. 3, p.
24.] enough to last Petrograd ten days, meat, besides other food hidden in
police stations and elsewhere out of reach of the public. It has been said
that the Government instigated the uprising in order to bring about a
separate peace with Germany. No direct proof has as yet been produced to
substantiate this charge, and the only testimony that I have bearing on
this case is the statement made by commander-in-chief Alexeiev in a
confidential interview with a journalist already quoted. [FN: There is not
the least bit of evidence to show that the Emperor himself was mixed up in
these intrigues. Among the papers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there
is but one document that throws any light on the question of a separate
peace during the time of the monarchy. It is a letter from the minister of
the German Court to the minister of the Russian Court insinuating a
separate peace. This letter was shown, as was intended, to the Tsar, who
read it, put it aside, and did not answer it. This, however, does not mean
that Sturmer, Protopopov and the clique of the Empress were not planning
to bring about a situation which would compel a separate peace.]
These four points—the encouragement of a revolt by the secret
agents, the impersonation of Miliukov, the concealment of food in the
factory districts, the desire of a separate peace with Germany—make
out a fairly good case to show that the Government was behind the
disturbance. Aside from the reason already given for the desire of a
separate peace, the other reason for the action of the ministry was this:
It feared that the revolutionary movement, if permitted to take its
natural course, would develop such strength that it could not be put down
when it broke out, and, therefore, the Minister of the Interior decided to
take it in hand and at the right moment crush it with such force that it
would be a long time before it could raise its head again. Before it was
over he hoped to drag in prominent members of the Duma (or the Duma
itself) and other revolutionary leaders, and make an end of them. This
plan need not astonish us, for this method, in one form or another, had
been made use of by the autocracy time and again. Protopopov overreached
himself, his scheme miscarried, the soldiers about the capital went back
on him, and the little comedy that he had staged in which he was to play
the leading part became a tragedy and the shot which was intended for the
revolution hit his royal master and brought autocracy to the ground. In
view of the fact that Protopopov has since become insane, one wonders
whether the man was mentally well balanced at the time that he was in
office. But the Tsar has only himself to blame for his plight; he was
warned against this nominee of Rasputin, but he would not take advice.
Early in the week of March 5-12, 1917, the trouble began in the factory
districts. There were bread riots, car stoning, window smashing, and other
such acts, which are more or less common and no one paid much attention to
them. On Thursday, the disturbances spread to other parts of the city and
crowds began to gather on the Nevski, but the throng was orderly and the
police seemed to have little difficulty in keeping it on the move. Friday
the crowd was more bold: it marched up and down the streets, calling for
bread, singing revolutionary songs, and occasionally waving a red flag and
quickly snatching it back again. This, too, did not make much impression
for it is well known that in Russia strikes and disturbances have in view
political as well as economic betterment. Late Friday afternoon, while I
was walking on the Nevski, a company of mounted police and a large number
of Cossacks dashed by on the way to disperse a procession that was coming
towards me. When I came up to the Fontanka Bridge I noticed the crowd was
gathered about the Cossacks; it patted the horses and cheered their
riders, while the police were nowhere in sight. I listened to what was
being said and heard that the police tried to use their whips and swords
on the people and this angered the Cossacks so much that they attacked the
police, killed the captain, and drove them all away. It was no secret that
there was bad blood between the soldiers and the police; the former
complained that while they were suffering and fighting at the front, the
latter were having an easy time, enriching themselves by graft, and
oppressing the soldiers' families. The soldiers and the strikers started
out with one idea—hatred of the police. When the police had been
dispersed, the Cossacks and soldiers begged the people to move on, but
they, especially the young women students who were numerous, went up to
them and pleaded with them to espouse their cause. "Comrades," they would
say, "come over on our side, our cause is your cause." The rough, ignorant
warriors were disturbed; they did not like their jobs, and in a kindly way
begged the men and women to go home, but, as it did no good, for they
massed again, the Cossacks rode in a body into their midst and kept
turning and turning until the crowd was forced from the street onto the
sidewalk. In the meantime, another company of Cossacks formed a line
across the street, from wall to wall, and swept everybody before it into
stores, courtyards, and other openings. Even this did not do much good,
for as soon as the horsemen passed, the mob fell in behind and cheered the
Cossacks. There was no roughness, but at the same time it was easy to see
that the crowd did not yet know to what extent the army could be trusted.
By Saturday the inhabitants of the city began to feel the effect of the
disorder; cars were not running, telephones were barely working, factories
and shops were closed, banks and stores were locked, there was little to
eat, for the only provision on hand was water; every one who could filled
the tubs for fear the water mains would be blown up. The crowd on the
streets was larger than ever, more red flags were in evidence, but all
this failed to give the impression of a revolution. Such demonstrations
had been seen before; revolutionary talk was cheap and was not taken
seriously. As on the day before, the soldiers and Cossacks tried by gentle
means to disperse the crowd, but failed, for the men and women in the
crowd complained that they were hungry and pleaded with the military for
the sake of their own families to stand by the people. It was easy to see
that these guardians of the peace were in trouble, they knew that every
word said was true, and what was more to the purpose, members of their own
families were in the crowd. An officer who was sent with his company to
shoot on the people told how that same morning his own sister took part in
the demonstration and called for bread for her children. This was no
exceptional case. But as soldiers they must do their duty and keep order.
Realizing that the stratagems of the day before failed in their purpose,
the Cossacks tried other tactics on this day. They fell behind the
procession, and discharged their pistols in the air and dashed at full
speed into the mob. Woe unto him who did not get out of the way. But they
all did; in a second there was not a person on the street. It is still a
wonder how it was all done so quickly. As soon as the horsemen passed, the
crowd dropped behind them and raising their hats cheered them. "Comrades,"
they said,﹃come over to us, you know that the government is bad, you know
how the soldiers have been killed through its incompetency, you know that
our wives and children are hungry,﹄and more such pleas. The Cossacks and
the other soldiers who tried to keep order were caught, they begged the
crowd to break up and go home, they pointed out that they had to do their
duty and that somebody might get hurt. It was reported that in some places
the soldiers did fire and kill several persons. During Saturday, men were
sent, it is not clear by whom, to the different factories to persuade the
workers to join in a great demonstration on Sunday. The military commander
of the city telegraphed to the Emperor for orders and the latter sent word
to shoot, if necessary, and to put down the uprising at any cost, and that
accounts for the posters that were put up on Sunday morning warning the
inhabitants not to gather in the streets because the soldiers would shoot
to kill. This had happened before and was no joke, and many people would
not leave their homes that day. Those who did had to walk; there was no
other way of getting about. Few people, on the whole, were on the street
that morning aside from the soldiers and Cossacks who were guarding the
bridges and keeping an eye out for disturbances. After luncheon I started
to make a call and as I passed the barracks of the Volynski regiment,
situated near where I lived, I saw a company of soldiers lined up, heard
the command to load, to shoulder arms, to march, and off they went to the
Nevski. I followed them for a distance and then turned aside and went my
way. In returning I had to cross the Nevski and found that all avenues
thither were guarded and that no one was allowed to go in that direction.
I managed, however, by showing my American passport, to get through the
line and reach the street. Excited people were moving up and down and from
them I learned that about three o'clock a number of people forced their
way to the Nevski and were fired upon by the soldiers and the machine guns
that were concealed. Among the killed of the day was a captain of police
who was knocked down by a Cossack.
Sunday night was full of excitement and fear and there were not many who
slept soundly. Firing was heard at different times but what it portended,
none of us could tell. It became evident that the situation was becoming
serious, yet we all felt that the Government could handle it. When I went
out on the street Monday morning, the first thing I saw was the placard of
the military commander announcing that unless the workmen went to the
shops, they would be sent to the front the following day. Groups of people
were talking excitedly and from them I learned that the Volynski regiment
had revolted and had killed its officers, because the day before they had
commanded the soldiers to shoot on the people. It seems that the soldiers
returned home much excited over their deed and full of remorse. In the
course of the night some of the revolutionary soldiers from the city
upbraided them and they were greatly incensed with their officers and the
Government. They, as well as other regiments, were particularly worked up
over the report that hirelings of the secret police dressed in soldiers'
uniforms went about firing on the crowd and that the new recruits, under
penalty of death, were commanded to shoot on the people in the streets.
When in the morning the officers congratulated the men on their deed of
yesterday, they jumped on them and murdered them. I heard that other
regiments had also revolted; but there were so many rumors afloat that it
was not easy to know what to believe. About four in the afternoon, I
started for home and found the Nevski full of frightened and nervous
people, and hardly any soldiers. No one seemed to know what to expect.
Sounds of shooting were heard and they were explained as the battle
between the regiments that had revolted and those that had remained loyal.
In the distance columns of smoke were seen and report had it that palaces
were burning. Again it was difficult to know the truth. As I proceeded on
my way, I was joined by the little minister of the British American
Church, where I had attended services the day before, where he had prayed
fervently for the Tsar and his family and asked God to put down the
anarchists, and other lawless men. We were discussing the situation, not
knowing exactly what to make of it. Perhaps the word revolution passed our
lips but neither of us nor those about us took it seriously. Near the
Liteiny a gate opened and about two dozen armed soldiers led by a petty
officer stepped out and marched towards the center of the street.
Immediately the crowd, excited and scared, scattered and ran for their
lives but the soldiers motioned for them to stop and told them that they
would not shoot. We left them, and proceeded on our way, trying as before
to interpret what we saw. While in the midst of our discussion we were
struck by a new and unfamiliar sound—tra-ta-ta, tra-ta-ta, and we
instinctively knew that a machine gun was firing. In a flash the streets
were cleared and my minister and I found ourselves sticking like posters
against the wall. It was my first "baptism of fire" and I had enough
presence of mind to observe its effect upon myself and others. Physically
there was no effect for no one seemed hit. I tried to locate the gun and
the man behind it, but did not succeed. When the firing ceased, I went on
my way. As I neared the Nicholas station, there came rushing forth from
around the corner a crowd of hoodlums and soldiers, with drawn swords,
which they had taken from the officers, and such other weapons as they
could pick up, shouting, "Down with the Government!" Then it dawned upon
me that the revolution was on in earnest, that the anarchists of
yesterday's prayer had become the heroes of a great cause. What struck me
most of all was the kind of men and women who made this world event. I
watched them during the week, and they seemed to be in great part boys and
girls, hoodlums, students, poorly dressed men and women, without
organization, plans, or leaders. It is difficult to analyze the various
motives that brought them out into the street. Not one of the so-called
revolutionists was seen, heard, shot, or wounded. When it was all over
they appeared on the scene, rushing from Switzerland, the United States,
France, and other parts of the world, to make speeches and to divide the
spoils. It was a revolution without revolutionists, unless you call the
soldiers that, but they were not consciously making a revolution, and when
it was done, they were thoroughly surprised and frightened. There are a
number of reasons why the Government collapsed so easily. It was not
really overthrown but it toppled over like a rotten tree, and until it
fell, the people did not realize how decayed it actually was. Its
misconduct of the war, scandals like that of Rasputin, ministers such as
Protopopov discredited and disgraced the dynasty and when the end came, it
had few friends who shed tears.
Another important factor in helping the revolution was the large number of
students and liberals who served in the army. To fill the ranks and to
provide educated men for officers, it was necessary to call on university
students, experts in various fields of engineering, all of whom, more or
less, desired a liberal government. These men worked among the soldiers
and officers with a view to creating a feeling of distrust in the Emperor,
and the Government, and its incompetence and corruption gave plenty of
material for the propagandists. Loyalty to the dynasty was undermined and
as soon as one prop was removed, as soon as one company of soldiers went
over, the others followed and the whole edifice came tumbling down.
Still another factor was the large number of new recruits that were
stationed in the capital; they were as yet not well disciplined, obedience
had not yet become a second nature to them. Many of them had come from the
factories, some of them were personally acquainted with the men and women
who were in the demonstrations and therefore would not fire on them. Had
there been at the time in the city three or four old and well-disciplined
regiments, or had the Cossacks who were on hand not interfered with the
police, the uprising would have been crushed quickly and effectively as
similar affairs had been before.
Yet one other factor contributed to the success of the revolution and that
was the over-confidence of the Government. The soldiers had been loyal
until now and it never occurred to those in power that they might not
always be so. They made no special preparations other than placing machine
guns on roofs. They did not even make use of the armored cars. When they
realized that the army in the city could not be trusted, they called for
troops from the front but they came too late.
From the point of view of the monarchy it was unfortunate that Protopopov
sent the Emperor to the front after having secured from him a signed blank
to dismiss the Duma; for if the Tsar had been at Tsarskoe Selo, he might
have been prevailed upon to make some concessions and saved the dynasty
for a time at least.
By Tuesday morning, March 13, the revolution was generally accepted as a
fait accompli; it was believed that the old despotism was gone
never to return. This was followed by an outburst of idealism and
patriotism such as comes but once or twice in the life of a nation. Every
Russian was bubbling over with enthusiasm over the glorious future of his
country. Liberty so greatly desired, so long worked for, so much suffered
for had at last come. The intelligent and persecuted Russians, they who
had spent years under the shadow of the police, in prison, in exile, and
in Siberia, had their day at last and they were eager to realize their
Utopia. Their first demand was that all prison doors should be opened and
that the oppressed the world over should be freed. The Russian Revolution
was not a class revolution, it was brought about neither by the
proletariat nor by the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy; all classes
contributed, it was a national revolution. So worthless had the monarchy
become that all the people were glad to get rid of it and see it go. They
who helped to bring about its ruin were the first to deny it and seek
safety; and even the Synod, in an almost unseemly haste, took out the
names of the imperial family from the prayer book.
The revolution was picturesque and full of color. Nearly every morning one
could see regiment after regiment, soldiers, Cossacks, and sailors, with
their regimental colors, and bands, and revolutionary flags, marching to
the Duma to take the new oath of allegiance. They were cheered, they were
blessed, handerchiefs were waved, hats were raised, cigarettes were
distributed as mark of appreciation and gratitude to these men, without
whose help there would have been no revolution. The enthusiasm became so
contagious that men and women, young and old, high and low, fell in
alongside or behind, joined in the singing of the Marseillaise, and walked
to the Duma to take the oath of allegiance and having taken it they felt
as purified as if they had partaken of the communion. Another picturesque
sight was the army trucks filled with armed soldiers, red handkerchiefs
tied to their bayonets, dashing up and down the streets, ostensibly for
the purpose of protecting the citizens but really for the mere joy of
riding about and being cheered. One of these trucks stands out vividly in
my mind: it contained about twenty soldiers, having in their midst a
beautiful young woman with a red banner, and a young hoodlum astride the
engine, a cigarette in one hand and a sword in the other. The streets were
full of people, or "tovarishchi" (comrades), as they called one another,
not only the sidewalks but in the very center, for the tramways were not
running. Great events were transpiring and every one who could came out to
hear and to see what was going on. There were no newspapers and the street
was the news center. Automobiles came dashing through scattering
proclamations and copies of the Izvestiia (a news-sheet published
by a committee of newspaper men with the authority of the Duma); and as
the crowd made a rush to pick these up it looked for a moment as if the
whole world was walking on its head and feet at the same time. Those who
were fortunate enough to seize a paper ran home with it to read it to the
family, those who were not gathered around one of the many bonfires, made
from the wooden imperial eagles, crowns, and other insignia of royalty, to
listen to the reading of the news, usually by a student. The part played
by the students during the revolution has not received the attention it
deserves. When all others were hiding or excited it was the students who
took charge of the leaderless soldiers, found food for them, collected
money for their welfare, and told them what to do. It was interesting to
watch with what deference the soldiers looked up to them and hung upon
their words. This importance was not wholly lost upon the students, both
men and women, and they read the proclamations as if they were tablets of
law handed down from heaven. After the reading came the discussion. One of
the favorite topics was the comparative bloodlessness of the revolution
(something like 169 killed and 1264 wounded) which proved that the Russian
Revolution was superior to the French or any other. Having started in this
vein the discussion turned on the mighty and noble deeds Russia was going
to do now. Just as it once freed Europe from the yoke of Napoleon so will
it now liberate her from the militarism and barbarism of William and give
freedom to all the world, to all nationalities, races, and creeds. The
light of the world is to come from Russia. The crowd meant it. The
soldiers were in earnest and patriotic—the praise showered upon them
and the responsibility placed upon them seemed to uplift them—the
man with the hoe became a free citizen and behaved as such. On Wednesday,
March 14, the soldiers posted bulletins in different parts of the city
calling on their comrades to abstain from liquor and violence and to
prevent others from committing lawless deeds. Not satisfied with mere
words small companies of militia visited the places where drinks were sold
and emptied the barrels and bottles into the gutter. For days the Astoria
Hotel looked and smelled like a wrecked saloon after Carrie Nation and her
associates had stoned it.
For some time the whereabouts and intentions of the Tsar were unknown and
numerous rumors were afloat. Some said that he had committed suicide, that
he was in the city, that he was on the way, that he was under arrest, that
he had fled the country. Another interesting question was the form of the
new government, should it be a republic or a constitutional monarchy. Many
of the educated classes and members of the Duma advocated a constitutional
monarchy of the English type, while others, particularly the socialistic
groups, favored a republic, a democratic republic; whatever they meant by
that is not clear. Needless to say the great mass of people did not know
the difference between one kind of government and another but they shouted
as loudly as those who knew. One soldier demanded a republic like that of
England, another insisted on a republic with a tsar at the head, the wife
of the porter of the house where I lived cried as if her heart would break
because "they wanted a republic," and some of the peasant women in the
country clamored for the tsar because﹃if they take away the tsar they
will also take away God and what will then become of the muzhik.﹄In one
place at the front several regiments almost came to blows over this
question. An orator ended his eloquent speech by saying that﹃from now on
Russia will have but one monarch, the revolutionary proletariat.﹄This
phrase puzzled the soldiers, they also misunderstood the word "monarch"
which they thought to be "monakh" (monk). They therefore concluded that it
was planned to put a monk on the throne, and an argument arose whether
they would have a monk or not. Some were in favor and others opposed. By
the time it got to the next regiment the question was whether they would
have the monk Iliodor as their ruler. It was no longer a question whether
Russia was to have a tsar but whether the tsar should be a monk or not,
and whether it should be Iliodor or some other one.
Strange to say, as evening came a kind of fear seized the population,
particularly the more ignorant. It was difficult for them to shake off the
terror of the old police; all the time that they were talking against the
tsar they had a feeling that they were doing wrong, and that some one was
denouncing them. It was hard for them to believe that all that they saw
and heard during the day was real and that the old regime was powerless.
Some one would start a rumor that a monarchist general with an army was
marching on the city and that he would kill and burn. Early Friday
evening, March 16, as I was walking down the street, soldiers ran by me
shouting for every one to get under cover for several hundred police from
Tsarskoe Selo were coming and that there would be street fighting.
Frightened mothers grabbed their little ones and hurried home,
storekeepers closed the shops, porters barricaded the gates, housewives
extinguished the lights, and the streets became as dark and as silent as a
cemetery. This lasted for an hour or more and then came more soldiers
announcing that all was well, that the supposed policemen were
revolutionary soldiers who had come to take the oath of allegiance.
The exultation reached its highest point when the first temporary
government, with Prince Lvov at the head, was announced. Every one was
pleased with the men selected, they were without doubt the ablest leaders
of the country, men who had always fought for the cause of liberty and for
the interests of the public. There was nothing but praise for them and
assurances of support. The fact that there was a "pravitelstvo"
(government) calmed the people and they gradually went back to their old
occupations, but as new men, with broader outlooks and with higher
aspirations.
The taking of the oath of office by the new Ministry was the last act of
that wonderful week to be unanimously approved by the people. When the
temporary government attempted to govern it was interfered with by the
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; the cry was raised by the
Socialist groups that it was they who had won the revolution and that
they, therefore, should have all the power. Since then the country has
become more and more divided against itself, love has turned into hate,
joy into sorrow.
[FN: As used in this paper, the term Jugo-Slav comprehends
the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but not the Bulgars. It is
not necessary here to consider whether the latter are Slavs
or Slavicized Tartars, but merely to point out that since
the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Bulgars have taken no
part in the movement which has resulted in the creation of
Jugo-Slav nationalism. The word "jug" means "south" in
Slavic. It is also written "youg" and "[iu]g."]
If there are miracles in history, the Jugo-Slav movement is a miracle. It
is the story of a nation which entered its new home in the Balkans in the
seventh century and became divided geographically and politically, in
faith and written language, and in economic and social life, until at last
its spokesmen could truthfully say that it was divided into thirteen
separate administrative units dependent upon fifteen legislative bodies.
[FN: In 1915 the Slovenes inhabiting Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, Istria,
and Goerz-Gradisca, and the Serbo-Croats of Istria and Dalmatia, were
under the direct rule of Austria. Trieste and its district were a part of
Austria. The Serbs of Hungary belonged to Hungary proper for the most
part; the Croats by a fundamental agreement were entitled to autonomy in
Croatia. Fiume, the seaport of Croatia and Hungary, had an administration
of its own. Bosnia-Herzegovina possessed a diet and was under the dual
rule of Austria and Hungary. All the provinces or districts mentioned
above were governed by the two parliaments at Vienna and Budapest. There
were, in addition, two independent Serb states, Serbia and Montenegro.
Down to 1912 Turkey ruled over a large number of Serbs.] How did it come
about that this evolution of twelve centuries, beginning with primeval
unity and passing through a political, economic, and social decomposition
of a most bewildering character, has once more arrived at national unity
and is even now demanding the last step—political amalgamation? Is
it a doctrine or a dream or is it a reality?
I
When the Jugo-Slavs first occupied the western half of the Balkan
peninsula, they were one in speech, in social customs and ancestry, and
were divided only into tribes. The Slovenes, who settled in the northern
end of the west Balkan block, were not separated from their Croat and Serb
kinsmen by the forces of geography, but rather by the course of political
evolution. On the other hand, the Croats became separated from the Serbs
by forces largely geographical, though partially economic and political,
in nature.
The Slovenes gave way before the pressure of the Germans who swept through
the Alps and down the Danube and forced the Slovene vojvodes to
acknowledge their suzerainty and accept their religion. The Germans would
doubtless have succeeded in obliterating them had not the Magyar invasion
weakened their offensive. The Slovenes, however, were left a wrecked
nationality whose fate became blended with that of the Habsburg
possessions and who against the forces of geography—which firmly
bound them to the Croats—were politically riveted to the Habsburg
north. This division was therefore the result of forces created by man and
changeable by him. The Croats settled in the northwestern half of the
territory south of the Slovenes; the Serbs roughly in the southeastern
part of it. Here geographical influences—the direction of the rivers
and the Dinaric ridges—combined with divergent political and
economic possibilities, produced a dualism. The Croats on the Save and its
tributaries naturally expanded westward and aspired to closer connection
with the sea where their struggle with the remnants of Roman civilization
and a superior culture absorbed their energies. They developed out of
their tribal state more quickly, while the Serbs, further inland and amid
more difficult surroundings, developed more slowly. The people who lived
along the Save aspired to control the Dalmatian coast which military and
geographical authorities claim can best be held from the mainland. The
people who lived in Montenegro or along the Morava, which was the gateway
to the peninsula, would naturally expand south and east toward the other
cultural center, Constantinople, and thus seek to dominate the Balkan
peninsula. In both cases, the attraction proved too much for feudal kings
and led to the formation of cosmopolitan empires instead of strong
national monarchies.
The kingdoms of Croatia and Serbia thus parted company politically. The
former became a separate kingdom attached to Hungary in 1102 and to the
Habsburg dynasty in 1527, while the Serbs began their expansion under the
Nemanja dynasty late in the twelfth century and almost realized the
dominion over the Balkans under Stephen Du[s]an in the fourteenth century.
This political, geographical, and economic dualism became still greater
when in 1219 the Serbs cast their lot with orthodoxy. The Croats, like the
Slovenes, adopted Roman Catholicism, the Latin alphabet, and the culture
of Rome. The Serbs accepted Greek Orthodoxy, the Cyrillic alphabet, and
the culture of Constantinople.
The Slovenes became a part of the Austrian possessions of the Habsburgs;
the Croats fell under the dominion of the Hungarian crown and the republic
of Venice; and the Serbs succumbed to the Turks by the middle of the
fifteenth century. The loss of political independence brought with it
ultimately the loss of the native nobility, the sole guardians of the
constitutional and historical rights of the nations down into the
nineteenth century in central Europe. In addition, many towns were
Germanized and the middle class disappeared. The Jugo-Slavs, like the
Czecho-Slovaks, appeared in modern times as a nation which had lost its
native nobility and had been reduced to a disarmed, untutored, and
enserfed peasantry. In the absence of these leaders, the nation turned to
its clergy who in order to retain their hold on the peasantry must needs
ever remain national. But here again the misfortune which awaited the
Jugo-Slavs was that historically three religions had taken deep root, the
Catholic among the Slovenes and Croats, and the Mohammedan and Orthodox
among the Serbs. We may therefore conclude the first half of the
historical evolution of the Jugo-Slavs with the observation that
political, economic, social, and geographical divisions led to their
downfall as a nation and that if they ever desired to become one, each one
of these chasms would have to be bridged. A solution for each of these
problems—the most difficult which ever faced a nation—would
have to be found; meanwhile the policy of the four masters, the German,
Venetian, Magyar, and Turk, would always be "divide and rule," in other
words, to perpetuate the divergencies.
II
The history of the evolution of the Jugo-Slavs from the sixteenth to the
twentieth century has been an effort to find the means of melting down
these differences until finally one—nationalism—accomplished
the purpose. Unity came first in the imagination and the mind, next in
literature and speech, and finally in political action. The four hundred
years beginning with the fifteenth and ending with the eighteenth century
will be remembered by the Jugo-Slavs as the age of humiliation. Only
Slavicized Ragusa and indomitable Montenegro kept alive the imagination of
the nation which was brought back to life by the half-religious,
half-national Slovene poets of the sixteenth century, by the Ragusan epic
poet [Gundulic], by the incessant demands of successive diets of the
ever-weakening Croatia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by
the progressive and zealous Serbs of Hungary, who ever since the fifteenth
century in increasing numbers made their home there, refugees from the
oppression of the Turk, but who ever longed to push out from the frontier
and rebuild Serbia anew. [Krizanic], a Croat Catholic Dalmatian priest, a
firm believer in Jugo-Slav and Slavic unity in general, appealed to the
rising Russian empire to help save dying Slavdom.
While the Turkish and the Venetian empires decayed, the Austrian and the
Russian gained courage. By the end of the seventeenth century the house of
Habsburg had won back all except the Banat and in the eighteenth century
aspired to divide the Balkan peninsula in halves with the Russians. Along
with this future foreign interference in the affairs of the Balkans came
the Germanizing and centralizing "reforms" of Maria Theresa and Joseph II,
whose result was to cripple still further the few constitutional and
historical rights which remained to the Jugo-Slavs. But these "reforms"
had nevertheless salutary effects upon the nation of peasants. The
enlightened despots, spurred on by the loss of Silesia—which was at
the same time a great loss in revenue as well as prestige—sought to
make good the loss by the economic betterment and education of the
peasantry. How else could an agrarian state increase its revenue and
supply able-bodied men for the numerous armies which the overarmaments of
Frederick II had brought upon central Europe? [FN: Emphasis on this
fundamental fact of Habsburg history in the eighteenth century cannot be
too strong. The writer of this paper hopes soon to present archival proof
of the far-reaching results of the seizure of Silesia. The documents are
to be found in the archives of the Hofkammer and Ministerium des
Innern in Vienna.] Centralization and Germanization really helped to
awaken the Slavs. Enlightened despotism gave them the weapons of political
struggle—education and economic resources.
Of the Jugo-Slavs, the Serbs of Hungary were the first to achieve national
and cultural consciousness. In the absence of a native nobility, but with
unusual economic opportunities at their command, they developed a wealthy
middle class—a rare thing among Slavs before the middle of the
nineteenth century. This class came into contact with nationalized western
Europe and found that the bulwark against national oppression was
education for the masses. The nation must be educated and must be
economically sound in order to undertake the political struggle against
the Germans, the Magyars, and the Turks. That was the background of
Dositej Obradovi[c]'s literary labors as he raised spoken Serbian
ultimately to the literary language of the Jugo-Slavs and of
Karad[z]i[c]'s efforts which resulted in that wonderful collection of
Serbian national poems, and which clinched for all time the literary
supremacy of the [S]to dialect. Serbian Hungary was the starting
place for Kara George's revolution which brought partial freedom in 1804
and autonomy in 1830 and thus planted the germ of the modern Greater
Serbia. Napoleon's Illyria, created in 1809, joined for the first time
Slovenes and Croats in one political unit, and the excellent
administration and the schools left an undying memory of what might be if
the Habsburgs cared. Vodnik, the Slovene poet, sang of Illyria and her
creator, but it was the meteoric Croat, Ljudevit Gaj, in the thirties, who
so eloquently idealized it as he poured heated rhetoric into the camp of
the Magyars, who after the Diet of 1825 began their unfortunate policy of
Magyarization. Illyria, though short-lived, became the germ of the Greater
Croatia idea, which, with Greater Serbia, existed as the two, not
necessarily hostile, solutions of the Jugo-Slav problem down to the
Congress of Berlin. It was as yet a friendly rivalry with the possible
formation of two separate units. The occupation of Bosnia in 1878 led to
actual friction between them. On the other hand, the annexation of the
same province in 1908 had just the opposite effect, for from that time the
ultimate ideal was no longer Greater Croatia or Greater Serbia in any
selfish sense, but Jugo-slavia, because, to use a platitude, Bosnia had
scrambled the eggs. Evidence of the fairly amicable relations between
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs at the time of Gaj is not lacking. It was Gaj
who reformed Croatian orthography on the basis of the Serbian. Bleiweis
and Vraz endeavored to do the same in Slovene.
The revolution of 1848 demonstrated still further the friendly relations
of these potential rivals as national unifiers. For the first time, the
Croats and Serbs publicly fraternized and showed that the seemingly
insurmountable barrier of religious difference tended to disappear in the
struggle for national independence. In this sense the events of 1848—when
the hand of the foreign master was for the while taken away—have
given confident hope to those who believe that Jugo-Slav differences are
soluble. Jela[c]i[c], Ban of Croatia, the idol of the Serbo-Croats, was
proclaimed dictator and supported by the Croatian Diet at Zagreb (Agram)
and the Serbian assembly at Karlovac (Karlowitz). The Serb Patriarch
Raja[c]i[c] and the young and gifted Stratimirovi[c], provisional
administrator of the Serb Vojvodina, attended the Croatian Diet and the
High Mass where Bishop O[z]egovi[c] sang the Te Deum in Old Slavic. After
Gaj, Raja[c]i[c], and Stratimirovi[c] had failed at Vienna and Pressburg
to bend the dynasty or the defiant Kossuth, Jela[c]i[c] was empowered to
defend the monarchy and bring back the historical rights of the Triune
Kingdom and the Serb Vojvodina. The dynasty and the monarchy survived, but
Jugo-Slav hopes and the promises they had received were unfulfilled or
soon withdrawn, as for instance the Vojvodina in 1861. Absolutism reigned
supreme from 1849 to 1860.
This disappointment led the Croats and Serbs to try cooperation with the
Magyars, who under Deák and Eötvös appeared to be anxious to conciliate
the non-Magyars in those uncertain years which began in 1859 and ended in
dualism. Austria lacked a great statesman, and the Prusso-Austrian rivalry
led the fearful and impatient Francis Joseph into the Compromise
(Ausgleich) of 1867. It was a work of haste and expediency and bound with
it the fate of the dynasty. Thereafter, the German minority in Austria and
the Magyar minority in Hungary were the decisive factors in the problems
confronting the Jugo-Slavs. Dalmatia was handed over to Austria; Croatia,
by a compromise, which it has never really accepted, to Hungary.
The Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary and Hungary and Croatia opened
in 1868 a period which ended in 1905—it was a period, on the one
hand of the greatest decay and decomposition in the political life of the
Jugo-Slavs, and, on the other, of the greatest literary and intellectual
unity as shaped by Bishop Strossmayer and Peter II and Nicholas of
Montenegro.
Bishop Strossmayer and the Slovene, Croat, and Serb academies, matica, and
learned societies, as well as men of literature, spoke, wrote, and pleaded
for unity in this period, in vain. But they and the universities of Prague
and Zagreb produced a younger generation which later took up the fight for
national unity and which abandoned individual political foibles and looked
over the boundaries of their provinces for inspiration.
Among the Slovenes, politics degenerated into the struggle for minor
concessions from the court at Vienna in regard to the Slovene language and
schools, while political parties multiplied freely through personal and
social differences. The lines which bound them to their kinsmen in the
south were weakest during this period.
The Croats found themselves no match for the astute Magyars who resorted
to packed diets, gerrymandering, bribery, and forgery. The Compromise
(Nagoda) of 1868 was as decisive as the murder of the farsighted Prince
Michael of Serbia in that year. It will be remembered that, in spite of
his many faults, he had made an agreement with Montenegro for the ultimate
merging of their states and, after allying himself with Rumania, had
carried out an agreement with the Bulgarian committee for the amalgamation
of Bulgaria with Serbia, thus obtaining a commanding influence in the
Balkans. With his death, Serbia fell into the hands of Milan and
Alexander, whose weak and erratically despotic reigns ushered in an era in
Serbian history from which she emerged in 1903, through the assassination
and the extinction of the last of the Obrenovics, a country without a good
name, a nation which, through no special fault of its own, had become
degraded.
It was in the midst of this political decay that the Bosnians revolted in
1875 and that Serbia, Montenegro, Russia, and Rumania became involved in
the Russo-Turkish war. Space forbids but the most hasty survey of the
occupation and administration by Austria of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by
virtue of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.
Bismarck, Francis Joseph, and Andrassy were swayed by differing motives
whose total result was that Austria was to become a Balkan power—the
outpost of the German Drang nach Osten—and that it was worth
while making a greater Serbia impossible, even at the cost of increasing
the number of Slavs in the Habsburg monarchy, which, now reenforced by the
Ausgleich, could stand the strain of advancing democracy and the
necessity, therefore, of granting further rights to the Slavs.
The occupation of Bosnia led to the first real quarrels in modern times
between Croat and Serb, for the former wanted Bosnia in Greater Croatia in
order to have connection with Dalmatia; the latter wished it annexed to
Greater Serbia, because it was Serbian. Magyar and German, further,
quarreled as to the status of Bosnia and left it unsettled. But one thing
was settled by the occupation in 1879 and the annexation in 1908. Neither
Greater Croatia nor Greater Serbia were any longer truly possible as a
final solution, only a Jugo-Slavia. The Greater Croatia received a mortal
blow by the addition of Serbs up to more than one third of the number of
Croats in Austria-Hungary, and Serbia faced the future either as a vassal
or as a territory which must be annexed. From that time until the present
the Habsburg monarchy, largely owing to the predominance of the Magyars in
Croatia, adopted a policy of prevention—Jugo-Slav nationality was to
be prevented. Viewed in that light the rule of Count Khuen-Hedérv[a]ry,
Ban of Croatia from 1883 to 1903, in which time, according to Croats, he
corrupted a whole generation, turned Serb against Croat, and played out
the radical demands of the party of Star[c]evi[c] and Frank, is
intelligible. The policy of Count Khuen, which was based on corruption and
forgery, on press-muzzling and career-exploding, has since been imitated,
and its imitation has been largely responsible for this war.
It was not until the Serbs and Croats formed their coalition in 1905 that
the trial of strength had come. In Serbia, Peter Karageorgevitch ascended
the throne and reversed the pro-Austrian policy of his predecessor. This
it will be remembered was influenced until then by the Bulgarian policy of
Russia and by Serbia's defeat at the hands of Bulgaria in 1885. The
commercial treaty with Bulgaria in 1905, and the tariff war which Austria
began immediately afterward, pointed out which way the wind was blowing.
An era big with decisive events arrived. The Jugo-Slavs had learned that
union meant victory, division foreign mastery. Petty politics and
religious fanaticism were forgotten, and Jugo-Slav nationality was formed
in the fierce fires of Austro-Magyar terrorism and forgery and in the
whirlwind reaped from the Balkan wars.
It was too late to talk of trialism unless it meant independence, and,
when it meant that, it did not mean Austrian trialism. The treason trial
by which Baron Rauch hoped to split the Serbo-Croat coalition, and which
was to furnish the cause of a war with Serbia on the annexation of Bosnia
in 1908, collapsed. It rested on forgeries concocted within the walls of
the Austro-Hungarian legation in Belgrade where Count Forgách held forth.
The annexation of Bosnia in 1908 completed the operation begun in 1878 and
called for the completion of the policy of prevention. It was the
forerunner of the press campaign in the first Balkan war, the Prohaska
affair, the attack by Bulgaria upon Serbia and Greece, the rebuff to
Masaryk and Pa[s]i[c], the murder of Francis Ferdinand, and the
Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia. The mysteries connected with the
forgeries and this chain of events will remain a fertile field for
detectives and psychologists and, after that, for historians. For us, it
is necessary to note that, as the hand of Pan-Germanism became more
evident, the Slovenes began to draw nearer to the Croats and the Serbs. It
remained only for the Serbs to electrify the Jugo-Slavs—"to avenge
Kossovo with Kumanovo"—in order to cement their loyalty to the
regenerated Serbs. Religious differences, political rivalries, linguistic
quibbles, and the petty foibles of centuries appeared to be forgotten in
the three short years which elapsed from Kumanovo to the destruction of
Serbia in 1915. The Greater Serbia idea had really perished in 1915, as
had the Greater Croatia idea in 1878. In their place emerged Jugo-Slavia—the
kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—implied by the South Slav
Parliamentary Club in Austria in their Declaration of May 30, 1917, and
formulated by the Pact of Corfu of July 7, 1917, which Pasié, premier of
Serbia, and Trumbié, the head of the London Jugo-Slav Committee, drew up.
The evolution had been completed. Nationalism had proved stronger than
geography, stronger than opposing religions, more cohesive than political
and economic interests. For this, the Jugo-Slavs have not only themselves
and modern progress, like railroad-building, to thank, but also the policy
of the Habsburg monarchy, the hopeful, though feeble, Note of the Allies
to President Wilson, the Russian Revolution, and the entry of the United
States into the war.
For the historian, it remains to examine the depth and the character of
the movement. He should neither lament that it succeeded, nor frown upon
it that it did not come long ago when his own nation achieved its unity.
That it is a reality is proved by the fact that the Central Powers
believed its destruction worth this catastrophic war. A nation of eleven
or twelve millions holds the path to the Adriatic and the Aegean and the
gateway to the Orient and world dominion. It can help to make impossible
the dream of mid-Europe or of Pan-Germany.
The Jugo-Slav movement has ended in the formation of a nation which is
neither a doctrine, nor a dream, but a reality.
[FN: Referring to the Declaration of the Jugo-Slav Club, May
30, 1917, in the Vienna Parliament J. J. Grgurevich,
Secretary of the South Slavic National Council, Washington,
D. C., writes:
"In order to understand correctly this Declaration, it is
necessary to state that the same was presented in the Vienna
Parliament during war time, when each, even the most
innocent, word in regard to rights, principles of
nationality, and liberty of peoples, was considered and
punished as a crime and treason, by imprisonment, even
death.
"Were it not for these facts, this Declaration would never
contain the words: 'and placed under the sceptre of the
dynasty Habsburg-Lorraine.' It was, therefore, necessary to
insert these words in order to make possible the public
announcement of this Declaration; it was necessary to make a
moral sacrifice for the sake of a great moral and material
gain, which was secured through this Declaration among the
people to which it was addressed and which understood it in
the sense and in the spirit of the Declaration of Corfu."]
End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian Revolution; The Jugo-Slav
Movement, by Alexander Petrunkevitch, Samuel Northrup Harper, Frank Alfred Golder, Robert Joseph Kerner
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