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People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force





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The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force was a service branch of the People's Liberation Army that existed from December 2015 to April 2024.

People's Liberation Army
Strategic Support Force
中国人民解放军战略支援部队
Emblem of the People's Liberation Army
Strategic Support Force
Founded31 December 2015; 8 years ago (2015-12-31)
Disbanded19 April 2024; 2 months ago (2024-04-19)
Country People's Republic of China
Allegiance Chinese Communist Party
Type
  • Cyber force
  • Role
  • Cyber warfare
  • Electronic warfare
  • Psychological warfare
  • Part of People's Liberation Army
    March《我们是刀尖,我们是铁拳》
    ("We Are the Knife Point, We Are the Iron Fist")
    Websitechinamil.com.cn
    Insignia
    Badge
    The emblem of PLASSF
    The emblem of PLASSF
    Sleeve insignia

    With an aim to improve the army's ability to fight what China terms "informationized conflicts"[a] and enhance the PLA's power projection capabilities in space and cyberspace, the PLASSF was a force purportedly designed to break stovepipes in the intelligence sharing and coordination departments of the different branches.[1]

    On April 19, 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and split into three independent arms: the People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force, the People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force and the People's Liberation Army Information Support Force.[2]

    History

    edit

    At the 2015 China Victory Day Parade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping announced sweeping reforms to the structure of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the state security apparatus. On 22 December 2015, the Chinese PLA newsletter, Liberation Army Daily, reported that as part of the joint military exercises taking place that same year, strategic and logistical support forces were included in those exercises along with Intelligence and other high-profile units among the Central Military Commission.[citation needed]

    On 31 December 2015, the PLA Strategic Support Force held its first annual meeting at the Bayi Building in Beijing.[3] In attendance were the CMC leadership and leaders of the PLA Ground Force and Rocket Force. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping was also in attendance, giving out military flags and instructional speeches, along with CMC Vice Chairmen and CCP Political Department members Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang. Fan Changlong read out the CMC's orders and decisions issued by Chairman Xi on the formation of the PLA's leadership and forces, while Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang presided over the meeting.

    On 1 January 2016, the next day, Yang Yujun of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense issued a statement on the new Strategic Support Force describing it as formed by the "functional integration" of various support forces that are strategic, basic, and supportive. Another expert, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the PLA Navy, noted:

    The major mission of the PLA Strategic Support Force is to give support to the combat operations so that the PLA can gain regional advantages in the space warfare and cyber warfare domains, and to ensure smooth operations.[4][5][6]

    Specifically, the objectives of the strategic support force were to include:[citation needed]

    Unlike the PLA Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force is more dedicated to 5th Generation Information Warfare and is structured to engage in the information space, with emphasis on electronic countermeasures, network offense and defense, satellite management, and some of the functions of logistical supply and dispatch. It also responsible for influence operations, cyberwarfare, and electronic warfare.[7]

    On 24 July 2019, the government white paper "China's National Defense in a New Era" published by the State Council Information Office stated:

    The strategic support force is a new type of combat force to maintain national security and an important growth point for new combat capabilities, including battlefield environment protection, Information Assurance and Communication Security, Information Security, testing and integrating emerging technologies, among other things.[citation needed]

    In April 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved in a reorganization.[8][2]

    Organizational structure

    edit

    The PLASSF leadership and administrative officials are stationed at their headquarters in the Haidian DistrictofBeijing; the functional departments and leadership of the subordinate units are stationed here. The PLASSF oversees all units responsible for psychological warfare, information warfare, space warfare, cyberwarfare, and electronic warfare operations formerly under the former General Staff Department.[9]

    This includes the cyber espionage capabilities of the former Third Department, the electronic support measures from the former Fourth Department, and the space-based ISR systems and Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau and Satellite Main Station, General Political Department, and General Armaments Department, including the launch, telemetry, tracking, and control facilities and research and development organizations.[9]

    Functional departments

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    General Staff Department

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    The General Staff Department is under the direction of Admiral Li Shangfu, Chief of Staff. His Deputy Chiefs of Staff are Major General Sun Bo and Major General Zhang Minghua. Subordinated to the General Staff Department is the PLASSF Xingcheng "Rehabilitation" Center.

    Political Work Department

    edit

    The Political Work Department is under the direction of Lieutenant General Feng Jianhua. His Deputy Directors are Major General Chen Jinrong and Major General Huang Qiusheng. Subordinated to the Political Department is the Political Bureau.

    Disciplinary Inspection Commission

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    Also called the PLASSF Supervisory Commission, the Disciplinary Inspection Commission is led by Lieutenant General Yang Xiaoxiang, Secretary. The role of the Disciplinary Inspection Commission is to conduct surveillance and conduct "disciplinary inspections" on PLASSF members in accordance with Article 68 of the March 2018 "Supervision Law" passed by the 13th National People's Congress. The position of Secretary was originally held by Deputy Political Commissar Lu Jiancheng (2016–2019). Subordinated to the Disciplinary Inspection Commission is the Disciplinary Inspection Service.

    Space Systems Department

    edit

    Stationed at the Haidian District of Beijing, the PLASSF Space Systems Department (SSD) is the consolidation of all PLA's space-based C4ISR systems. As of 2018 it is headed by Lieutenant General Shang Hong, with Lieutenant General Kang Chunyuan acting as political commissar. The Space Systems Department also oversees all of the space launch bases including:

    Network Systems Department

    edit

    The PLASSF Network Systems Department [zh] (NSD) is the integration of all PLA information and cyberwarfare capabilities and is believed to have taken over many of the capabilities previously held by the Third and Fourth Departments of the PLA. As of 2018 it was headed by Lieutenant General Zheng Junjie, with Lieutenant General Chai Shaoling as political commissar, both of whom are also serving members of the 13th National People's Congress.

    List of military bases under the NSD:[17]

    Directly subordinate units

    edit
    Stationed at No. 9 Anxiang Beili, Deshengmen Wai, Chaoyang District of Beijing, it was founded in 1971 as the 514th Hospital of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In 1997, it became the General Hospital of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In March 1999, it was redesignated as the 306th PLA Hospital. After the 2015 reforms, the Strategic Support Force assumed authority over this hospital. The hospital Dean is Major General Gu Jianwen and its Political Commissar is Major General Zhang Yucai.[citation needed]

    PLASSF universities

    edit

    As for the Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center, they are tasked with conducting launch monitoring, tracking and measurement, as well as launch recovery.

    Unit 63790 - 27th Experimental Training Base / Xichang Satellite Launch Center
    edit

    Headquartered on the Hangtian North Road of Xichang City in the Sichuan Province. It is also home to the Wenchang Aerospace Launch Site.

    Unit 63880 - 33rd Experimental Training Base / Luoyang Electronic Equipment Test Center
    edit

    Stationed at Luoyang in the Henan Province, Base 33 serves as the metrology and instrument measurement center. They also conduct Astronomical mapping and surveying. This base is the most restricted bases in China and was off limits to foreigners until the 1980s during the decommission of various military installations. However, it is still in use and under the control of the CMC Equipment Development Department.

    Ranks

    edit

    Officers

    edit
    Rank group General/Flag/Air officers Senior officers Junior officers Officer cadet
      PLA Strategic Support Force
  • t
  • e
  •                      
    上将
    Shàngjiàng
    中将
    Zhōngjiàng
    少将
    Shàojiàng
    大校
    Dàxiào
    上校
    Shàngxiào
    中校
    Zhōngxiào
    少校
    Shàoxiào
    上尉
    Shàngwèi
    中尉
    Zhōngwèi
    少尉
    Shàowèi
    学员
    Xuéyuán

    Enlisted

    edit
    Rank group Senior NCOs Junior NCOs Enlisted
      PLA Strategic Support Force
  • t
  • e
  •                  
    一级军士长
    Yījí jūnshìzhǎng
    二级军士长
    Èrjí jūnshìzhǎng
    三级军士长
    Sānjí jūnshìzhǎng
    四级军士长
    Sìjí jūnshìzhǎng
    上士
    Shàngshì
    中士
    Zhōngshì
    下士
    Xiàshì
    上等兵
    Shàngděngbīng
    列兵
    Lièbīng

    Notes

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    1. ^ Chinese: 信息化战争; pinyin: xìnxīhuà zhànzhēng

    References

    edit
    1. ^ Ni, Adam (May 29, 2019). "The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force: Update 2019". Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 16 July 2021.
  • ^ a b "Chinese PLA embraces a new system of services and arms: Defense spokesperson - China Military". eng.chinamil.com.cn. Retrieved 2024-04-20.
  • ^ Pollpeter, Kevin; Chase, Michael; Heginbotham, Eric (2017). The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations. RAND Corporation. doi:10.7249/rr2058. ISBN 978-0-8330-9872-6.
  • ^ "China Takes Bold Steps Toward Military Reform" (11 January 2016)
  • ^ Yao Jianing, ed. (6 January 2016). "Expert: PLA Strategic Support Force a key force to win wars". China Military Online. Archived from the original on 14 February 2021. Retrieved 14 May 2022.
  • ^ Newman, Lily Hay (December 20, 2018). "Hacking Diplomatic Cables Is Expected. Exposing Them Is Not". Wired. Retrieved 14 May 2022.
  • ^ "China intensifies disinformation, cyberattacks on Taiwan: report". The Nikkei. 26 November 2022. Retrieved 2022-11-25.
  • ^ "Xi Orders China's Biggest Military Reorganization Since 2015". Bloomberg News. 2024-04-19. Retrieved 2024-04-19.
  • ^ a b PLA Strategic Support Force: The 'Information Umbrella' for China's Military The Diplomat 1 April 2017
  • ^ "Public Bidding Announcement for the Finalist Project of Hardware and Electrical Engineering of the 61726 Troops (中国人民解放军61726部队五金机电入围项目公开招标公告)". China Government Procurement Network (中国政府采购网). 3 May 2018. Archived from the original on 14 September 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
  • ^ "Critical Node: Taiwan's Cyber Defense and Chinese Cyber-Espionage". Jamestown. 5 December 2013. Archived from the original on 22 April 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
  • ^ "How does Taiwan respond to China's gray zone actions (Liao Hongxiang)". Apple Daily. 14 September 2020. Archived from the original on 14 September 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
  • ^ Lindsay, Jon R.; Cheung, Tai Ming; Reveron, Derek S. (2015). China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-020127-2.
  • ^ a b Stokes, Mark A.; Lin, Jenny; Hsiao, Russell (11 November 2011). "The Chinese People's Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure" (PDF). Project 2049 Institute. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 September 2020.
  • ^ "China's attack on Taiwan's Internet base camp hides in Wuhan University (中國對台網攻大本營 藏身武漢大學)". Liberty Times (Taiwan). 9 March 2015. Archived from the original on 12 December 2018. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
  • ^ "Military secrets revealed by Xi Jinping's circular (習近平通令透露的軍事機密)". Ming Pao (Hong Kong). Archived from the original on 12 November 2016. Retrieved 24 August 2016.
  • ^ a b Burton, Rachel (25 September 2018). "The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force: Leadership and Structure" (PDF). Project 2049 Institute.
  • ^ a b Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan; Drun, Jessica. "Exploring Chinese Military Thinking on Social Media Manipulation Against Taiwan". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 15 April 2021.
  • ^ Kania, Elsa (2017-02-15). "The Role of PLA Base 311 in Political Warfare against Taiwan (Part 3)". Global Taiwan Institute. Retrieved 2023-12-09.

  • Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=People%27s_Liberation_Army_Strategic_Support_Force&oldid=1222420791"
     



    Last edited on 5 May 2024, at 21:27  





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    This page was last edited on 5 May 2024, at 21:27 (UTC).

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