Messervy was born in Trinidad on 9 December 1893,[12] the oldest child of Walter John Messervy (born in Jersey in the English Channel), a bank manager in the colony (and later England) and his wife Myra Naida de Boissiere from Trinidad.[13]
In September 1939, Messervy was promoted to colonel[15] and became a General Staff Officer Grade 1 (GSO1) of the 5th Indian Infantry Division, which was about to be formed at Secunderabad. In mid-1940, the division was sent to the Sudan to counter the threat from the Italian forces based in Italian East Africa. Messervy was appointed commander of Gazelle Force.[20] Created on 16 October 1940, it was a mobile reconnaissance and strike formation of expanded battalion size created from elements of 5th Indian Division. During the ensuing East African campaign, Messervy commanded Gazelle Force with notable success, latterly attached to the Indian 4th Infantry Division. By 13 February 1941, the campaign had become static and Messervy's formation was disbanded.[21]
In early March 1941, Messervy was promoted acting brigadier[15] to command the Indian 5th Infantry Division's 9th Indian Infantry Brigade and played a significant role in the third Battle of Keren during the second half of March 1941. His promotion was in part related to his actions during the advance from Kassala through Agordat to the early fighting at Keren during February.[21]
When Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse, then commander of the 4th Indian Infantry Division,[22] was promoted to command XIII CorpsinNorth Africa Messervy, a brigadier for only six weeks, was appointed to take his place.[21] He was promoted to the acting rank of major general as a result of his new appointment.[15]
Western Desert – North Africa
[edit]Messervy, unshaved, giving orders south-west of Gazala.
Messervy took his division to North Africa in April 1941, taking part in Operation Battleaxe in June. During Operation Crusader in November that year, 4th Indian Division, dug in on the Egypt–Libya border, played a key role in repelling Rommel's tanks after they had defeated the British armour at Sidi Rezegh. The division's battle groups took part in the Eighth Army's pursuit when Rommel withdrew from his defensive positions at Gazala in December, ending the year at Benghazi.[23]
In early January 1942 Messervy had received orders to depart for India where he would assume command of the 31st Indian Armoured Division.[24] He was instead appointed to replace Major General Herbert Lumsden, the wounded commander of the 1st Armoured Division which had recently arrived in the desert.[25][26] During Rommel's attack from El Agheila in late January 1942, the division was outmatched by the Axis armour and heavily defeated. Upon Lumsden's return in March, Messervy was moved to command the 7th Armoured Division ("The Desert Rats") which had just lost its newly appointed commander, Major General Jock Campbell, who had been killed in a motor accident, shortly after being awarded the Victoria Cross (VC).[27] This made Messervy the only Indian Army officer to command a British Army division during the Second World War.[25]
When division HQ was overrun by the Germans at the start of the Battle of Gazala, Messervy was captured on 27 May 1942; but, removing all insignia, managed to bluff the Germans into believing he was a batman and escaped with other members of his staff to rejoin division HQ the following day.[25]
Messervy knew little about tanks and was not considered a great success commanding armoured divisions by his superiors. He was dismissed from command of 7th Armoured Division by Eighth Army commander Neil Ritchie in late June 1942 following the severe defeat the division had sustained at the Battle of Gazala. He transferred to Cairo as Deputy Chief of General Staff, GHQ Middle East Command 1942 and was sent to India a few months later to raise 43rd Indian Armoured Division as its commander. Originally intended for service in Persia, the division was disbanded in April 1943 when the threat to Persia was removed by the Soviet victory at Stalingrad.[28]
India and Burma
[edit]Lieutenant-General Frank Messervy, GOC IV Corps in Burma, talks to a sepoy from the 17th Indian Infantry Division, December 1944.[b]Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Messervy receives the sword of General Seishirō Itagaki, commander of the Japanese Seventh Area Army, at a formal ceremony of surrender held in the grounds of HQ Malaya Command, Kuala Lumpur, 22 February 1946.
Much to his horror, Messervy was then made Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles, General Headquarters, India, in 1943, where he argued successfully against the then prevailing view that anything other than light tanks could not be used in Burma. This was to have a significant impact in the next two years when medium tanks were used to telling effect against the Japanese.[28]
In July 1943, Messervy was appointed GOC of the 7th Indian Infantry Division, in succession to Major-General Thomas Corbett, which, although an improvement above his old position, was not initially greeted with much enthusiasm by the division's officers, who all admired Corbett.[29]
The division had been created some three years before Messervy's assumption of command and originally contained many professional soldiers in its ranks. However, many of these men had been, in the usage of the day, "milked" to help create other new units then being formed in the huge expansion of the Indian Army, with the situation being so severe that the division had at one point resembled a training formation rather than a combat division. This all changed in the summer of 1942 when serious training began to take place and which started to absorb the many lessons learned from fighting in the jungle and the Japanese. This would serve the division well when it did enter combat the following year.[28]
The division was sent to the Arakan in Burma to join XV Corps in September. In the Japanese offensive in February 1944, despite having his headquarters overrun and scattered and his supply lines compromised, Messervy's brigades conducted a successful defence whilst being supplied by air (Battle of the Admin Box). After going on the attack in late February, 7th Indian Division was relieved in mid-March.[30]
In March 1944, Messervy lost two brigades sent to reinforce the hard-pressed defences at Imphal and Kohima in India. By May, the whole division was back in the front line in the Kohima sector, fighting a key five-day battle at the Naga Village. It then advanced towards the Chindwin river, combining with Indian 20th Infantry Division to inflict a heavy defeat on the Japanese at Ukhrul.[30]
In December 1944, Messervy was appointed to command IV Corps, which he led in the 1945 offensive during which, he captured the key communications centre at Meiktila in Burma and advanced to Rangoon between February and April. When Messervy returned from home leave hostilities had ceased. He was made Commander-in-Chief Malaya Command in 1945 after the Japanese surrender.[31]
Fighting in Kashmir at the time of Messervy's retirement
On 20 August, a letter signed by Messervy went out to all the brigade headquarters in northwest Pakistan, attaching plans for a certain Operation Gulmarg. According to the plan, 20 lashkars of Pashtun tribesmen were to be armed and trained in various brigade locations in northwest Pakistan for an armed invasion of Kashmir. The information leaked out, one of the letters having fallen into the hands of an Indian officer Major Onkar Singh Kalkat. Kalkat was put under house arrest, but he escaped and made his way to India.[33] By the D-day of 22 October, when the attack was launched, Messervy was away in London, leaving General Douglas Gracey, the Chief of General Staff, as the Acting Commander-in-Chief[34]
On his return, he stopped in Delhi, where Lord Mountbatten made him swear that he had not been asked for, nor had he provided, any help to the tribesmen.[35] But within a week he was found providing arms and ammunition to the Pakistani invading forces.[35] He complained to Governor George Cunningham of the NWFP that Mountbatten had gone over to the side of the "Hindus".[36][c]
Pakistani officers narrate that both Messervy and Gracey were involved in running the day-to-day operations of Pakistan's Kashmir War. Officers were loaned out for commanding the rebel forces and shown on records as being absent.[38] Nevertheless, Messervy issued a statement on 12 November 1947, denying that any "serving Pakistan Army officers are directing operations in Kashmir", which was cited by Pakistan in the UN Security Council debates as proof of Pakistan's innocence.[39]
Messervy was relieved of his post on 15 February 1948,[40] leading to his retirement on 22 August that year.[41][31] He was granted the honorary rank of general.[32]
Later, he wrote an influential article on Kashmir in the Asiatic Review, where he alleged that India had planned to militarily intervene in Kashmir several weeks before the event.[42][43]
He opined that if the pro-India National Conference party was allowed to hold power in Kashmir, India would likely win a plebiscite, but if Pakistan was allowed to hold on to the areas that it had captured, a Pakistan win was 'even more certain'. He had 'few doubts' as to which dominion most people of Kashmir would choose.[44] Historian Gowher Rizvi states that influences of this kind persuaded the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Philip Noel-Baker to ensure that Pakistan's viewpoint was "not ignored" in the UN Security Council.[45]
Messervy died at home in the small village of Heyshott,[46] in the south of England, on 2 February 1974.[47]
^So-called due to his tendency to forego shaving during periods of action.
^This division was sometimes known as 'The Black Cat Division' due to its formation badge, which are clearly visible on the shoulders of the men on parade.
^Cunningham had been aware, from his Governor's position, of the efforts to mobilise the Pasthun tribes. He had alerted Messervy, who apparently promised to warn Liaquat Ali Khan about the inadvisability of such an operation.[37]
^A letter catalogued by MJF[who?], dated 23 March 1948, refers to Sir Douglas David Gracey as Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army at that date; but the International Who's Who states that Messervy was Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army until August the same year.
^Frank Walter Meservy [sic], death registration March Quarter 1974, Registration District: Midhurst, 5h 2245.
^"Failures and Successes of Kashmir War: Muzaffarabad Seminar – 27 November 1990", Defence and Media 1991, Inter Services Public Relations, Pakistan, 1991, p. 114: Quoting General Wajahat Hussain, former ADC to Muhammad Ali Jinnah: "This was the time to take important decisions and it appears that either he wanted to evade making decisions or pretended to be innocent about the conspiracy hatched by high-ranking British officers. His leave enabled General Gracey to take over as the acting Chief and he had to take the blame."
^Razvi, Mujtaba (1971), The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, National Publishing House: [From Cunningham's diary for 7 November 1947] "Messervy came up from Pindi for a talk; just back from England. He was in Delhi two days ago and was surprised to find Mountbatten directing the military operations in Kashmir. M. B. [Mountbatten] is daily becoming more and more an anathema to our Muslims, and it certainly seems as if he could see nothing except through Hindu eyes."
^"Failures and Successes of Kashmir War: Muzaffarabad Seminar – 27 November 1990", Defence and Media 1991, Inter Services Public Relations, 1991, p. 115: "A cell for planning on Kashmir was created in Military Operations Directorate under Brigadier Sher Khan.... Such officers were sent to assist the Mujahideen and were shown as retired or absent without leave. .. General Wajahat further said that "apart from planning military operations, General Messervy had a close liaison with the civil authorities. He used to come to the office at half past seven, Brigadier Sher Khan would present the report on the previous twenty four hours and get instructions for the next day. Then they would visit the operations room where consultations would continue till 10 a.m."
^Thorner, Alice (January 1949), "The Kashmir Conflict, Parts I and II", Middle East Journal, 3 (1), Middle East Institute, JSTOR4322039: 'On November 12, General Sir Frank Messervy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, issued a communique stating that "there is absolutely no truth in the allegations made by the Government of India that serving Pakistan Army officers are directing operations in Kashmir against State forces" (Quoted by Sir Zafrullah Khan to the Security Council on January 17, 1948, Document S/P.V. 220, 63–65).'
^Webb, Matthew J. (2012). "Escaping history or merely rewriting it? The significance of Kashmir's accession to its political future". Contemporary South Asia. 20 (4): 471–485. doi:10.1080/09584935.2012.737311. S2CID143608576.: "While India's intervention was militarily successful, it was also highly controversial. General Sir Frank Messervy, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, alleged that India had planned to militarily intervene in the state several weeks before the event."
^Snedden, Christopher (2005), "Would a plebiscite have resolved the Kashmir dispute?", South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 28 (1): 64–86, doi:10.1080/00856400500056145, S2CID145020726
