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I hope everyone with a vested interest in these articles likes the latest versions. I tried to really summarize the arguments that were made (and often re-made). I haven't touched the "theology" subsection at all yet...
This page is the result of splitting Compatibilism and incompatibilism (again, with much editing).-Tesseract2 (talk) 07:23, 28 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I think it may be fair to reword the introductory portion regarding metaphysics. Such clauses as "for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics", and the like are not precisely correct. It is rather the case that they either make no explicit appeal to a particular metaphysic, or that they are assuming one in their system or argument. And that further, it is sometimes the case that compatibilism is entirely motivated by metaphysical concerns. For instance some view of compatibilist doctrine could be that God determines all that will come to pass, and that the will of men must be such that they are still morally responsible for their actions. Thus the compatibilist position is wholly motivated by a desire to reconcile these two metaphysical truths. So the metaphysical claims are 1. God exists. 2. God has created the world that exists. 3. God has determined the outcome of all contingencies in the world from start to eternity. 4. God will judge men for their moral actions. 5. Moral actions are actions which men are truly responsible for. 6. Actions for which one is responsible are only those in which one is free. Therefore: I must have a version of will which is compatible with the divine determinism of (3), and the freedom of (6).
Thus the introduction is somewhat one-sided in its presentation of compatibilism and its motivations and foundations. It would benefit from a little rounding out.
71.230.164.112 (talk) 18:11, 29 October 2014 (UTC)Scott Doherty[reply]
That section doesn't portray the right connotation of compatibilism. Compatibilists do hold that the agent could have done otherwise and most compatibilists do say that a number of our actions aren't do to external sources (they say that anything we do, conciously or not, is part of our 'free will' i.e. As long as it was from internal sources it was 'person's decision'.) from Stanford encyclopaedia (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#TerOneForFreWilPro)
"The classical compatibilists wanted to show their incompatibilist interlocutors that when one asserted that a freely willing agent had alternatives available to her—that is, when it was asserted that she could have done otherwise—that assertion could be analyzed as a conditional statement, a statement that is perspicuously compatible with determinism."
Additionally, on the Stanford encyclopaedia, there are many instances when compatibilism is portrayed as the belief that the agent could have done otherwise.
" As for the Classical Incompatibilist Argument, some compatibilists have responded to this argument by denying the truth of the second premise: If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does. By doing so, these compatibilists embrace a Garden of Forking Paths model of control."
"This argument shook compatibilism, and rightly so. The classical compatibilists' failure to analyze statements of an agent's abilities in terms of counterfactual conditionals (see section 3.3) left the compatibilists with no perspicuous retort to the crucial second premise of the Classical Incompatibilist Argument (see section 2.1). And the Consequence Argument provides powerful support for this argument’s second premise. If, according to the Argument, determinism implies that the future will unfold in only one way, and if no one has any power to alter its unfolding in that particular way, then it seems that no one can do other than she does. It is fair to say that the Consequence Argument earned the incompatibilists the dialectical advantage. The burden of proof was placed upon the compatibilists, at least to show what was wrong with the Consequence Argument, and better yet, to provide some positive account of the ability to do otherwise. So even though many compatibilists are committed to thinking that the Consequence Argument is unsound, it nevertheless set the agenda for many contemporary compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility."
"The classical compatibilists responded by arguing that determinism is compatible with the ability to do otherwise. To show this, they attempted to analyze an agent's ability to do otherwise in conditional terms (e.g., Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.73; Ayer, 1954; or Hobart, 1934). Since determinism is a thesis about what must happen in the future given the actual past, determinism is consistent with the future being different given a different past. So the classical compatibilists analyzed any assertion that an agent could have done otherwise as a conditional assertion reporting what an agent would have done under certain counterfactual conditions."
"Hence, classical compatibilists were prepared to defend a Garden of Forking Paths model of control. [i.e. the ability to have chose otherwise]"
Basically, the argument that there was no ability to choose otherwise is an incompatibilitic argument- the polar opposite of compatibilism. Therefore, I think that section is insufficient with the compatibilistic thesis and it should be removed.Hubbiskalski (talk) 20:12, 13 December 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Maybe I'm just blind but I don't see those quotes anywhere. Can you tell me what sections they're from? Apollo The Logician (talk) 22:09, 13 December 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Does compatibilism require mind–body dualism, for a belief in an immaterial mind or soul perceiving, thinking, choosing freely (as in will), and as a result acting independently on one's body, which would otherwise be governed only by causally deterministic physics, allowing the mind or soul to act as a puppeteer imposing choices on matter which would otherwise not be open to nondeterministic alternatives? EllenCT (talk) 07:21, 3 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]
To answer my own question, no it is not required, and non-naturalism is not usually used as a foundation for compatibilism, but it solves all of its issues other than the ones it raises (e.g., how does an immaterial mind act on a material body?)[1][2][3] EllenCT (talk) 08:45, 3 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]