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Could someone who knows list the common criticisms of MN? What are the opposing or alternative views?
Could someone (who knows) edit the article make the distinction between the two a little more clear? This is especially important because it M.N. seems often be referred as plain nihilism. If this terminology confusion persists in the field of philosophy, then point out this confusion in the article also. Thanks.
Isn't MN just a type of nihilism? I think it is an old old use of the word too, because it traces back to the words nihilism and mereology, which I think are both Greek, and the position of mereological nihliism was held by Democritus, an ancient Greek atomist. But anyway... I think MN is just a type of nihilism. So that could be pointed out in the article.
I think mereological nihilism should not be as obfuscated as it is in regards to nihilism. It is a branch that one needn't be nihilist to take. It is a sort of metaphysical minimalism. While a nihilist may reject fundamental or common metaphysical assumptions (ethical truths, objective meaning etc) the nature of matter or objects needn't be one of them, and in this way the two ideologies differ. Perhaps something along those lines should be added, and if you get into some of the first formal defining of active and passive nihilism, and subsequent branches, you'll see this distinction. Also, and I'd be less sure on how to deal with this, but there is endless scope for the confusion of mereological nihilism and metaphysical nihilism, and unnecessary links to modal realism. It's a little harder to explain without going into the literature, for me anyhow. Wselfwulf (talk) 16:28, 21 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
I tried to make this article more accessible to a general audience. Ok
I think it would help if an etymology on MN were done. Also, this article needs to be written in a clearer npov encylopedic tone. Of course I say this lacking the ability to do either, hoping that someone smarter than me comes along to do this...
Uh, how much scientific basis does mereological nihilism have? I've talked to a number of people who study theoretical physics and only a handful of them have heard of mereological nihilism, and they're vaguely farmiliar with it. It seems like it's a fringe theory of quantum physics with few supporters. I'd go far enough to say its borderline crank science. For example, I spoke to Jeffery Grupp via email once, and he believes that since no composite objects would exist in accordance with mereological nihilism, the only thing that would exist would the conciousness, the soul- a form of cartesian dualism where our soul is interfacing with an aspect of the blob reality to generate what we see.
It seems to have alot in common with the position of a number of ancient Buddhist Fundamentalist viewpoints, and it sounds alot like Vedic Science the more I've looked into it. A classic example of Vedic Science is Human Deevolution, which, although having generated controversy a number of years ago among the scientific community, is now dismissed as pure pseudoscience.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.202.50.178 (talk • contribs)
Is it really just a philosophical position? Because to me it seems like Grupp is trying to prove it scientifically through a number of articles, and the whole thing seems like its built on and bathing in the fallacy of composition, or something akin to it.
To sum it up:
1. Matter exists. 2. All matter is made up of atoms. 3. Therefore, only atoms exist, and nothing else.
It honestly seems like Grupp and others are trying to prove it scientifically, more along the lines of a revival of ancient forms of Buddhist thought. I believe Sidhartha thought along the same lines, that no material objects actually exist. I'm very interested in Buddhism and am considering converting myself, but I've never heard of this. It sounds like its trying to completely justifiy a radical rejection of materialism, by saying, "if no material objects exist, why fixate so much on materialism?" It's just like what I mentioned about Vedic Sciences and Human De-evolution- trying to form a scientific basis for their religious beliefs. And how many people adhere to MN? The article says its been gathering popularity but shows nothing about this.
....And yet if mind is no different than the rest of matter, that being plain elementary particles, who is arguing for MN? Grupp's theories seem like they're apart of pure fringe science as I've never, ever seen MN mentioned by any well-known physicists or scientists. Is he some kind of crank? Why is he being given tenure at a university?
--Hello again. His resume (CV?) online does not say he is a tenured professor, but an adjunct, and I don't think they have tenure, at least thats what a friend of mine told me. I know he is also still getting his PHD at Purdue too. And your other question, in that paper he gave us, yes there are physicists discussed all over it. Why don't you just email Prof. Grupp? He was always eager to talk about his ideas with us outside of class (even when we were sick of discussing them). And why are you calling him a crank? have you read vaninwagen's stuff on nihilism? That's the stuff that seems weird, to me.
Well, I wasn't calling him a crank specifically, but his ideas can come off as that to people who know little of his work. But thanks, I guess I'll email him.
Adjuncts are untenured. This Grupp guy is not a serious person. He is not well-known among philosphers, his ideas are not influential. He has a number of publications, but they are in little-known and little-read journals. I have never heard of any of them. All mention of Grupp's material should be purged from this entry.
Yes, MN is a philosophical theory. As for the "paradoxical existence," that is not the only position one needs to take on QM, and Feynman never backed up those assumptions much. You are merely demanding that a form of Copenhagenism is the only way to interpret QM--which, of course is not true (e.g., Bohm, etc.). According to what you write, you make it sound like this Copenhagenist theorization must dictate what our observations are, but, of course, in reality, observation must determine theory--and when the computer detects an electron, it is not probable that it exists, it certainly exists, and so it sure can be said that 'THERE IS A PARTICLE THERE,' which, it seems you say cannot occur. It is as if you are saying physicists cannot detect particles, which they can, and when they do. Also, you say a reason why MN is 'suspect', but you did not say why. Can you elaborate on why, rather than just suggest??
The discussion in this article seems misleadingly concerned with the philosophical positions advanced by Grupp. Nihilism, in its "pure" form, has been defended in print (rather than merely "online") by Cian Dorr in "What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology" and in "Composition as Fiction" (co-authored with Gideon Rosen) as well as in Dorr's dissertation, "The Simplicity of Everything." (Princeton, 2000(?)). As someone interested in mereology, I found the repeated reference to Grupp's work out of place. Given that I never across a citation of Grupp's work in my extensive survey of mereology, it seems this article ought not concern itself with his work, but, rather, with Dorr's (insofar as one is concerned with "pure" nihilism). Although, if this article were, say, written by Grupp, I suppose he would be well within his rights to note his contributions.
I had Grupp as an instructor when I was an undergrad at Western Michigan (now I am a grad at another school). I am not agreeing with this discussion here about Grupp, who was one %##@$ good instructor. But rather than write for an hour why this is what I believe, I will just say I don't agree because: 1. Most of what's written here about Grupp is a personal attack (calling him a crank, atheist, and so on) 2. It is clear that people here are not up on the literature, and by mocking the journals Grupp has published in, and saying they are unheard of and they are imposter journals, can't be right and just shows ignorace. For example, David Armstrong is on the editorial board of METAPHYSICA, Barry Smith is on the editorial board of AXIOMATHES, and that's just the start. Unless my professors are lying to me, these are some real big philosophers! I could go on, but this is enough. I like and follow Grupp's research, and think that the discussion of him here is a just a few beers short of being a lynching mob. So it's wrong, and I am going to put a link in the 'externals links' part of the page to his 'mereological nihlism' article. That's the least I can do for him, after how much he's helped me with my life and career. ANd just by putting a little teeny link, well ten none of you can get too bent out of shape about not having your favs displayed here how you want them to be. Cheers, David.
"and these smallest building blocks are individual and separate items that do not ever unify or come together into being non-individual. Thus they never compose anything" This is not absolutely true, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bose-Einstein_condensate. However as this article is about the arguments of mereological nihilism and not about truth, I guess it does not matter.
I'm curious why you think mereological nilihism is incompatible with the existence of Bose-Einstein condensates. I cannot see how this idea could derive from anything but a misunderstanding of M.N. It's a philosophical position - there is no conceivable scientific experiment that could prove or disprove it, because the question is not in that domain. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 54.240.196.185 (talk) 23:34, 26 March 2015 (UTC)[reply]
This page had a lot of errors. I've corrected a couple of the important ones, but it still needs a lot of work. The main error concerned van Inwagen's view, where someone wrote that van Inwagen believed tables to be atoms arranged table wise. That's a common misunderstanding, so I've corrected it and flagged the misunderstanding.
I also took out the claim that objects exist only in the present if there are no temporal parts. Obviously, no endurentist is going to accept that.
The other change I made was to alter the claim that nihilism was a denial of mereology, making it clear that it is only a denial of classical mereology.
merometaphysics (η μερομεταφυσική) < meros (part) + metaphysics
Is a bowl of rice a mereological simple?
Can a dead person imagine a rice bowl? No! Either somewhere should we print a schematic, either we must explain what a rice bowl is.
The fact that one might take for granted a living brain able to think, or a manual book, doesn't mean that a rice bowl is a mereological simple.
Many pseudosophists claim "I don't care about an issue, I take it for granted, so that's not an issue." This isn't mathematical or philosophical thinking. It's juvenile thinking without metalogical analysis. I don't claim that the rice bowl is the ideal example, but no mereological simples exist.
If you accept soft philosophy, then mistakes are accepted, but we call that softosophy.
Human notions aren't mereological simples because a. are results of active thought, without it they immediately die, even if we take life for granted by mistake, b. all human notions are derived from other human notions, anything can be explained with other terms, and without explanation, we have no notion.
No fundamental principle in our Universe is genuinely fundamental, but it's a phenomenon that occurs while the whole universal mechanism is functioning. Neither our Universe is a mereological simple, because it's constituted of metalogically interconnected parts.
Can something that isn't yet defined be a "probable monomer" (monomer: mer[e]ological simple)
of course still
Answer: No! Potentiality doesn't create monomers (mer[e]ological simples). Even if something only potentially exists or might exist, it still requires some probable metalogical basis, and that can never allow monomerism (state of being a mereological simple). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:2149:8408:A600:ED1D:A045:9381:3E0B (talk) 10:48, 10 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]
The second sentence of "explanation" states:
Huh?? Only if you are mentally deranged or schizophrenic! Now, during manufacture, a ball might be assembled out of multiple parts, sure. But once the ball is completed, it no longer has any "halves" (unless you mean "the inside half" and "the outside half" ??? The "top half" and the "bottom half"??? Which way is up??? The left half? Balls are sphere symmetric, there is no naturally distinguished direction. Footballs are not sphere-symmetric, but they still do not have any "halves" in any sort of perceptual common-sense manner.) Is there some other example that doesn't blatantly violate common-sense perception? Like "For example, a piston engine consists of pistons and an engine block" or "A banana consists of a peel and an edible pulpy interior."? Or is something fundamentally lost when you use something that obviously does have actual parts as an example of something that obviously does have parts? Does the example require the parts to only be imaginary, in-your-head, can't-actually-point-to-them kinds of parts that don't have a physical existence? 67.198.37.16 (talk) 18:58, 20 May 2019 (UTC)[reply]
The intro currently is tragically incorrect w.r.t physics, as is commonly understood. It states:
Umm, leptons and quarks are hypothesized to be made out of preons, we have a WP article out of that. Please don't just make stuff up cause it sounds good to you! Next -- leptons and quarks are "seen" and "experienced directly" all the time: quarks, as jets in all the major particle accelerators, and leptons, in many typical college physics classes, e.g. the Millikan oil drop experiment that undergraduates do. The last sentence seems to imply that quarks and leptons have "emergent properties". This is a minority opinion, held by only a few (albeit famous) theorists, e.g. Eric Verlinde, but is definitely not the mainstream interpretation. The physics in these sentences is ... painfully wrong, and a deep mischaracterization of physics. 67.198.37.16 (talk) 19:22, 20 May 2019 (UTC)[reply]
The "discussion" section contains this claim:
This too seems to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of modern particle physics. Just like you will not find any physics textbook or ArXiv preprint that talks about the "emergent properties" of a electron, so also you won't find one that talks about "wholeness", either. Let me give a flavor of that: There are many theories in physics that interpret fermions as being themselves little knots in space-time and fields constructed in various ways, ranging Skyrmions in pion fields, instantons in Minkwoski space-time, spin manifolds as generic constructs in Riemannian geometry, or even whizzy ideas e.g. from Leonard Susskind's ER=EPR argument, suggesting that, uhhh fermions are knots in spacetime. From a physics standpoint, to argue that there is some kind of "whole" that exists at some fabled subatomic level is incoherent and meaningless. Is this claim being made by some serious, academically accepted philosophers, or is this just made-up non-sense inserted into this WP article by someone who didn't know any better? 67.198.37.16 (talk) 03:52, 21 May 2019 (UTC)[reply]
... And even if there were subatomic-wholes, the full sentence itself is incoherent, as a sentence written in the English language:
The word "since" implies an if..then, cause-effect relationship: to say "A since B" is shorthand for saying "if B then A, and B is unarguably true" ... not only is B false, but A does not follow from B: lets try rewording it: "if wholes exist at the subatomic level, then relations between part and whole do not exist", which is a strange non-sequiter, an incoherent claim. 67.198.37.16 (talk) 04:03, 21 May 2019 (UTC)[reply]
... And then there is this:
This statement appears to be founded on theoretical concerns in physics, dating from the 1950's-1980's that has largely abated. For a while, if you imagined that subatomic physics is just like human-scale physics, except smaller, then one might imagine that parts are made of parts are made of parts, ad infinitum. But subatomic physics is not at all like human-scale physics. It's different down there. The big break-through of the 1980's and 1990's was the application of cohomology theories to fields, including space-time itself - not only instantons, alluded to above, but also Donaldson's knot theory, or Milnor's exotic spheres, or the non-rigidity of affine Lie algebras. Or string theory, more generally. If subatomic particles are indeed just knots in space-time, then asking if a particle is made out of parts is like asking: is a trefoil knot made out of parts? Show me the parts that a trefoil knot made out of! So, although it would be true that, at some point, some-when, certain philosophers, physicists and grad students wrung their hands about parts being made of parts, ad infinitum, this is no longer a plausible concern, based on what we know about physics, today. It is perhaps still a valid philosophical concern, but if that is the case, do not drag physics into the debate.
The entire "objections" section seems incoherent. After reading this article three times, I believe it is safe to say that the vast majority of practicing physicists are mereological nihilists. It doesn't take long to arrive there: Just try giving a Hilbert space basis to a hydrogen atom experiencing the Zeeman effect and you promptly run into the problem of wondering what the correct basis is for that Hilbert space. Now, the answer is that Hilbert space is sphere-symmetric; its like a ball, there is no preferred basis; there's no way to decompose it into parts, or preferred-parts. It's just a whole, its not composable or decomposable, it just "is". At best, there's just some coordinate charts that are more convenient than others. For a student, this feels like a crisis for a while, until you get over it. Perturbation theory forces you into accepting mereological nihilism as a fact, as the fundamental state of matter ... at least, in the domain of quantum mechanics. Now, of course, not everyone agrees, and perhaps the most insightful attempt to slay the dragon of nihilism comes from Max Tegmark, specifically this ArXiv paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 where he tries to define a QM version of Tonini's Phi as a tool to evade nihilism, and to show how take a Hilbert space and create a "whole" that is a preferred assemblage, rather than an ambiguous homogeneous choice of coordinates. Its a way of thinking about compositionality, in quantum mechanics, as something that is non-trivial. Some coordinate frames are actually fundamentally better than others; some coordinate frames for Hilbert space actually allow you to perceive parts, which was not possible in the 20th-century theory. But all this is definitely brand-new, its not textbook stuff. Now, I am not expecting Tegmark's stuff to appear in this article, but it sure would be nice if the various claims about physics that are made in this article actually lined up with actual physics, or at least, with whatever it is that the philosphers actually said, with some explanation of why they would have said it. 67.198.37.16 (talk) 04:32, 21 May 2019 (UTC)[reply]
The section titled "Discussion" states:
Fine. But then the section titled "Objections" states:
Do I need to explain the contradiction? The first statement says that nihilists do not decompose wholes into parts. The second statement implies that nihilists actually do decompose wholes into parts, just not correctly. Which is it?
Its worse than that. Let's look at the surrounding sentences:
The standard solution for this would be that all physicists are de-facto mereological nihilists: that is exactly how one evades the perennial particle-wave duality problem: stop thinking about the "parts", there are no "parts". Feynman apparently said "shut up and calculate" as the solution to the inane parts-whole debate. There are no parts. Trust the formulas. The formulas describe reality, not the ambiguous word-play. Quit asking whether its a particle or a wave. Its both. Its neither. Yes. No. All of the above. Wrong question. Physicists are defacto nihilists, yet it seems to be somehow turned around, upside-down throughout this article. (I'm assuming that nihilists deny the existence of a parts/whole relationship. Right? I think that is what this article is saying.) 67.198.37.16 (talk) 04:13, 21 May 2019 (UTC)[reply]
