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{{Short description|Type of mixed electoral system}}
{{distinguish|Mixed-member majoritarian representation|Parallel voting}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=February 2017}}
{{Use Oxford spelling|date=August 2017}}
[[File:Electoral systems mmp.svg|thumb|300x300px|Use of MMP, AMS systems: MMP used on the national level (purple), German MMP (blue), AMS used in some regional elections (Lavender), limited AMS in Mexico (Pink), former use (Red),]]
{{Electoral systems}}

'''Mixed-member proportional representation''' ('''MMP''' or '''MMPR''') is a [[mixed electoral system]] which combines local [[Majoritarianism|majoritarian]] elections with a compensatory tier of party list votes, which are used to allocate additional members in a way that aims to produce [[proportional representation]] overall. In most MMP systems, voters get two votes: one to decide the [[legislator|representative]] for their single-seat [[electoral district|constituency]], and one for a political party. Some countries use [[Mixed single vote#Proportional systems|single vote variants]] of MMP, although this article focuses primarily on dual vote versions of MMP.

Seats in the legislature are filled first by the successful constituency candidates, and second, by party candidates based on the percentage of nationwide or region-wide votes that each party received.<ref name="AceMmp">{{cite web|last1=ACE Project Electoral Knowledge Network|title=Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)|url=http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd03/esd03a/default|access-date=21 October 2017}}</ref><ref name="ShugartMixMember">{{cite book|last1=Shugart|first1=Matthew|last2=Wattenberg|first2=Martin P.|title=Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Best of Both Worlds?|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=n_ufahHi7DoC|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|year=2001|isbn=9780191528972}}</ref><ref name="BochslerTerritory">{{cite book|first1=Daniel|last1=Bochsler|title=Territory and Electoral Rules in Post-Communist Democracies|chapter=Chapter 5, How Party Systems Develop in Mixed Electoral Systems|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qkCBDAAAQBAJ|date=May 13, 2010|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=9780230281424}}</ref> The constituency representatives are usually elected using [[first-past-the-post voting]] (FPTP). The nationwide or regional party representatives are, in most jurisdictions, drawn from published [[electoral list|party lists]], similar to [[party-list proportional representation]]. To gain a nationwide representative, parties may be required to achieve a minimum number of constituency seats, a minimum percentage of the nationwide party vote, or both.

MMP differs from [[parallel voting]] in that the nationwide seats are allocated to [[political party|political parties]] in a compensatory manner in order to achieve [[proportional representation|proportional election results]]. Under MMP, two parties that each receive 25% of the votes end up with about 25% of the seats, even if one party wins more constituency seats than the other. Depending on the exact system implemented in a country and the results of a particular election, the proportionality of an election may vary.<ref name="Linhart Raabe Statsch pp. 21–40">{{cite journal | last1=Linhart | first1=Eric | last2=Raabe | first2=Johannes | last3=Statsch | first3=Patrick | title=Mixed-member proportional electoral systems – the best of both worlds? | journal=Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties | publisher=Informa UK Limited | volume=29 | issue=1 | date=2018-03-01 | issn=1745-7289 | doi=10.1080/17457289.2018.1443464 | pages=21–40| s2cid=149188878 }}</ref> [[Overhang seat]]s may reduce the proportionality of the system, although this can be compensated for by allocating additional party list seats to cover any proportionality gap.<ref name="Golosov 2013 p.">{{cite journal | last=Golosov | first=Grigorii V. | title=The Case for Mixed Single Vote Electoral Systems | journal=The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies | volume=38 | issue=3 | date=2013-10-01 | issn=0278-839X | url=https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-3109814051/the-case-for-mixed-single-vote-electoral-systems | access-date=2020-11-16 }}</ref>

MMP was first used to elect representatives to the [[Germany|German]] [[Bundestag]], and has been adopted by [[New Zealand]] and others, with modifications.

== Other names ==
In [[Germany]], where it is used on the federal level and in most states, MMP is known as ''personalized proportional representation'' ({{lang-de|personalisiertes Verhältniswahlrecht}}). This version of MMP produced very [[Proportional representation|proportional]] election results by a number of additional compensatory seats, known as [[leveling seat]]s. Germany recently modified their system to not allow overhang seats in a way that not all local districts are guaranteed to elect the plurality winner, thereby eliminating the need for leveling seats also: However due to this revision, the system is no longer considered to be MMP in the sense of a mixed member system combining [[Proportional representation|proportional]] and [[majoritarian representation]], but a personalized/localized version of PR. As it retains the individual candidate vote in a clearly distinct fashion from [[Open list|open-list]] systems, it may still be considered mixed-member proportional in the sense of a proportional system having two kinds of MP: one (may be) elected by personal (candidate) votes, one elected by (closed list) votes.

In the [[Provinces and territories of Canada|Canadian province]] of [[Quebec]], where an MMP model was studied in 2007,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fairvote.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Quebec-Chief-Electoral-Officers-Report-English.pdf|access-date=24 October 2017|date=December 2007|title=Characteristics of a compensatory mixed member voting system: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer|publisher=Le Directeur général des élections du Québec|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180115170755/http://www.fairvote.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Quebec-Chief-Electoral-Officers-Report-English.pdf|archive-date=15 January 2018}}</ref> it is called the ''compensatory mixed-member'' voting system ({{Lang|fr|système mixte avec compensation}} or SMAC). In the [[United Kingdom]] the [[Semi-proportional representation|semi-proportional]] implementation of MMP used in Scotland and the London Assembly is referred to as the [[additional member system]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Electoral Reform and Voting Systems|url=http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/electoral-reform-and-voting-systems|access-date=25 March 2016|archive-date=8 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200408184539/http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/electoral-reform-and-voting-systems|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="Additional-member system: Politics">{{cite web|title=Additional-member system: Politics|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/additional-member-system|access-date=24 March 2016|publisher=[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]}}</ref>

== Procedures ==
[[File:German Federal Election 2021 - Results by Constituency & Regional Seats.svg|250px|thumb|right|Results of the [[2021 German federal election]]. The image shows both the seats directly won by constituency representatives and those gained via party lists. For example, the FDP (yellow) did not win a single constituency; all its 92 MPs were elected on party lists.]]
[[File:Bundestagswahl 05 stimmzett.jpg|200px|thumb|right|Ballot for [[Würzburg (electoral district)|electoral district 252, Würzburg]], for the [[2005 German federal election]]. Constituency vote on left, party list vote on right.]]In MMP, the voter casts two votes: one for a constituency representative and one for a party. In the [[Mixed single vote#Proportional systems|original variant]] used in Germany, citizens gave only one vote, so that voting for a representative automatically meant also voting for the representative's party, which is still used in some MMP elections today. Most of Germany changed to the two-vote variant to make local members of parliament (MPs) more personally accountable. Voters can thus vote for the local person they prefer for local MP without regard for party affiliation, since the partisan make-up of the legislature is determined only by the party vote. In the [[2017 New Zealand general election|2017 New Zealand election]], 27.33% of voters split their vote (voted for a local candidate of a different party than their party vote) compared to 31.64% in 2014.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2017/statistics/split-votes-index.html|title=2017 Split Voting Statistics|website=electionresults.govt.nz}}</ref>

In each constituency, the representative is chosen using a [[Voting system#Single-winner methods|single winner method]], typically [[First-past-the-post voting|first-past-the-post]] (that is, the candidate with the most votes, by plurality, wins).

Most systems used [[closed list|closed party lists]] to elect the non-constituency MPs (also called list MPs). In most jurisdictions, candidates may stand for both a constituency and on a party list (referred to in New Zealand as ''dual candidacy''). In Wales between 2006 and 2014 dual candidacy was banned, i.e. candidates were restricted to contend either for a constituency or for a party list, but not both. If a candidate is on the party list, but wins a constituency seat, they do not receive two seats; they are instead crossed off the party list and the party seat goes to the next candidate down.

In [[Bavaria]], the second vote is not simply for the party but for one of the candidates on the party's regional list: Bavaria uses seven regions for this purpose. A regional [[open list|open-list]] method was recommended for the [[United Kingdom]] by the [[Jenkins Commission (UK)|Jenkins Commission]] (where it is known as AMS) and for Canada by the [[Law Commission of Canada]]; neither recommendation was ever implemented.

In contrast, the [[open list|open-list]] method of MMP was chosen in November 2016 by voters in the [[2016 Prince Edward Island electoral reform referendum]].

In [[Baden-Württemberg]], there are no lists; they use the "best near-winner" method in a four-region model, where the regional members are the local candidates of the under-represented party in that region who received the most votes in their local constituency without being elected in it ([[Zweitmandat]], literally "second mandate").

The Scandinavian countries have a long history of using both multi-member districts (members elected through party-list PR) and nationally-based compensatory top-up seats using the same method as MMP, however because the local MPs are also elected using PR, these systems are not usually considered MMP as they are not [[Mixed electoral system|mixed systems]].

=== Apportionment methods===
At the regional or national level (i.e. above the constituency level) several different calculation methods have been used, but the basic characteristic of the MMP is that the '''total''' number of seats in the assembly, including the single-member seats and not only the party-list ones, are allocated to parties proportionally to the number of votes the party received in the party portion of the ballot. This can be done by different [[Apportionment (politics)|apportionment method]]s: such as the [[D'Hondt method]] or the [[Sainte-Laguë method]]. Subtracted from each party's allocation is the number of constituency seats that party won, so that the additional seats are compensatory (top-up).

If a party wins more FPTP seats than the proportional quota received by the party-list vote, these surplus seats are called [[overhang seat]]s ({{Lang|de|Überhangmandate}} in German), which may be an obstacle to achieving full proportionality. To combat disproportionalities caused by overhang seats, in most German states, and federally since 2013, [[leveling seats]] (''Ausgleichsmandate'' in German) are added to compensate for the overhang seats and thereby achieve complete proportionality.

===Dealing with overhang seats===
{{see also|Overhang seat}}
When a party wins more constituency seats than it would be entitled to from its proportion of (party list) votes, most systems allow for these [[overhang seat]]s to be kept by those candidates who earned it in the constituency elections. A counter-example would be the MMP variant used in Romania in the [[2008 Romanian legislative election|2008]] and [[2012 Romanian legislative election|2012 legislative elections]], where constituency seats could only be earned by the winning candidate if they also achieved an absolute majority in their district, thereby eliminating overhang seats.

In Germany's ''[[Bundestag]]'' and the [[New Zealand House of Representatives]], all members elected for constituencies keep their seats. For example, in the [[2008 New Zealand general election]] the [[Māori Party]] won 2.4% of the party vote, which would entitle them to 3 seats in the House, but won 5 constituency seats, leaving an overhang of 2 seats, which resulted in a 122-member house. If the party vote for the Māori Party had been more in proportion with the constituency seats won, there would have been a normal 120-member house.

In most German states, and in the federal [[Bundestag]] since 2013, the other parties receive extra seats (leveling seats) to create full proportionality. For example, the provincial parliament (''[[Landtag]]'') of North Rhine Westphalia has, instead of the usual 50% compensatory seats, only 29% unless more are needed to balance overhangs. If a party wins more local seats than its proportion of the total vote justifies, the size of the ''Landtag'' increases so that the total outcome is fully proportional to the votes, with other parties receiving additional list seats to achieve proportionality. The leveling seats are added to the normal number of seats for the duration of the electoral period. In the German state of [[Bavaria]], the constituency vote and party vote are combined to determine the distribution of seats.

[[Scottish Parliament|Scotland]] and [[Wales]] use a modified variant of MMP known as the [[additional-member system]] where due to the nature of the calculations used to distribute the regional list seats, overhang seats are not possible; the list allocation works like a [[Mixed-member majoritarian representation|mixed-member majoritarian]] system, but in using the [[d'Hondt method]]'s divisors to find the averages for the allocation, the first divisor for each party takes into account the number of constituency seats won by the party; i.e. a party that won 7 constituency seats would start with a divisor of 8 (7 seats + 1 per the method's divisor formula) instead of 1. The resulting table would then give 7 seats for Scotland and 4 seats for Wales to the parties possessing the highest averages on the table, although both devolved parliaments do not use a table, instead using a sequential method. The compensatory effect characteristic of MMP is in the fact that a party that won constituency seats would have lower averages on the table than it would if the election used MMM. Because of no provision for overhang seats, there have been cases where a party ended up with fewer total seats than its proportional entitlement. This occurred, for example, in the elections in the [[South Wales East (Senedd Cymru electoral region)|South East Wales electoral region]] in both 2007 ([[Welsh Conservatives]] under-represented) and in 2016 ([[Welsh Labour]] over-represented, [[Plaid Cymru]] under-represented). Labour has also been over-represented on this basis in every election in the [[South Wales West (Senedd Cymru electoral region)|South Wales West]] region, and every election in the [[South Wales Central (Senedd Cymru electoral region)|South Wales Central]] region apart from  the 2003 election. This situation arises because Labour has continued to hold the overwhelming majority of constituency seats in these regions, and only around one-third of the total number of seats are available for distribution as additional regional seats.

===Threshold===
{{see also|Election threshold}}
As in numerous [[party-list|proportional systems]], in order to be eligible for list seats in many MMP models, a party must earn at least a certain percentage of the total party vote, or no candidates will be elected from the party list. Candidates having won a constituency will still have won their seat. In New Zealand the threshold is 5%, in Bolivia 3%, in Germany 5% for elections for federal parliament and most state parliaments. A party can also be eligible for list seats if it wins at least three constituency seats in Germany, or at least one in New Zealand. Having a member with a 'safe' constituency seat is therefore a tremendous asset to a [[minor party]] in New Zealand.

In elections for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, there is no threshold set, because the [[district magnitude]] of each electoral region is small enough to impose an inherent threshold in the seat distribution calculations.

==Countries using MMP==
=== Current and former use ===
{| class="wikitable"
!Country
!Legislative body
!Use
!Number of votes (personal and list)
!Notes
|-
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |'''{{Flagicon|Albania}} [[Elections in Albania|Albania]]'''
(formerly)
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |[[Parliament of Albania|Parliament]] (Kuvendi)
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |2001–2005
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |Two votes
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |MMP was used from 2001 to [[2005 Albanian parliamentary election|2005]] (after having used [[parallel voting]] in the 1996 and 1997 elections).{{sfnm |1a1=Gallagher |1y=2011 |1p=185 |2a1=Gallagher |2y=2014 |2p=18}}<ref>{{cite web|last=Lublin|first=David|title=Albania|url=http://www.electionpassport.com/electoral-systems/albania/|access-date=24 March 2016|website=Election Passport|publisher=American University}}</ref>
|-
|'''{{Flagicon|Bolivia}}''' '''[[Elections in Bolivia|Bolivia]]'''
|[[Chamber of Deputies (Bolivia)|Chamber of Deputies]]
|1994–present
|Two votes
|Ballots use a [[double simultaneous vote]] with the presidential election{{sfnm |1a1=Mayorga |1y=1997 |2a1=Mayorga |2y=2001 |2p=194}}
|-
|'''{{Flagicon|Ethiopia}}''' '''[[Elections in Ethiopia|Ethiopia]]'''
|'''{{Flagicon|Tigray}}''' '''[[Tigray Region|Tigray]]''' State Council
|2020
|{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}}
|The General Election was supposed to be held in [[Ethiopia]] on 29 August 2020, but they were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.<ref>{{Cite news|date=31 March 2020|title=NEBE Says Impossible To Hold Election As Per Scheduled Due To COVID-19|work=fanabc.com|url=https://www.fanabc.com/english/nebe-says-impossible-to-hold-election-as-per-scheduled-due-to-covid-19/|access-date=31 March 2020}}</ref> But the government of [[Tigray Region|Tigray]] dismissed the postponement and decided to create its own electoral commission and hold a regional election. On August 6, 2020, the State Council of [[Tigray Region|Tigray]] decided to amend its constitution and change the electoral system to MMP, this will affect the upcoming regional elections. The amendment increases the number of seats in the council from 152 to 190 (+38), 80% of the seats will be filled with first-past-the-post voting and the rest 20% by proportional voting.<ref>{{Cite news|date=6 August 2020|title=ባይቶ ትግራይ፡ ሕገመንግስታዊ ምምሕያሽ ብምግባር 38 መናብር ወሲኹ|work=bbc.com|url=https://www.bbc.com/tigrinya/news-53679868/|access-date=6 August 2020}}</ref> This Tigray National Regional States law is annulled by [[House of Federation]] which is empowered to interpret the constitution for violation of the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.<ref>Toward an End to Ethiopia’s Federal-Tigray Feud https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b160-toward-end-ethiopias-federal-tigray-feud</ref>
|-
| rowspan="2" |'''{{Flagicon|Germany}}''' '''[[Elections in Germany|Germany]]'''
|[[Bundestag]] (lower house of the federal parliament)
|1949–present<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schorkopf |first=Frank |date=2023-03-24 |title=Abschied von Adenauer oder weshalb die Wahlrechtsreform ein Verfassungsrechtsproblem ist |url=https://verfassungsblog.de/abschied-von-adenauer-oder-weshalb-die-wahlrechtsreform-ein-verfassungsrechtsproblem-ist/ |journal=Verfassungsblog |language=de-DE |doi=10.17176/20230324-185228-0}}</ref>
|Two votes
|Referred to as personalized proportional representation (see [[electoral system of Germany]]).<ref>{{cite web|title=The Voting System|url=https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/constitution/electoral-law/voting-system/voting-system-node.html|website=BMI|publisher=Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building & Community}}</ref> Came about in 1949 as a result of inter-party bargaining.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Krennerich|first1=Michael|title=Germany: The Original Mixed Member Proportional System|url=https://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/DE/case-studies/germany-the-original-mixed-member-proportional-system|website=ACE Project|publisher=The Electoral Knowledge Network}}</ref> Originally used single vote version, switched to two vote version before the 1953 election. Levelling seats were established for the [[2013 German federal election|2013 federal election]] after a ruling of [[Federal Constitutional Court]], with a minor modification for the [[2021 German federal election|2021 federal election]] to reduce the size of the Bundestag. The system was recently modified to eliminate the need for overhang seats by not guaranteeing that all local districts will elect the plurality winner, thereby eliminating the need for leveling seats also.
|-
|[[State parliaments of Germany|State parliaments]], except

* '''{{Flagicon|Bremen}}''' [[Bremen (state)|Bremen]], 
* '''{{Flagicon|Hamburg}}''' [[Hamburg]]
* '''{{Flagicon|Saarland}}''' [[Saarland]]
|''varies by state''
|''varies by state''
|[[Bavaria]] uniquely uses an [[Open list|open-list]] system for its party-list seats. [[Baden-Württemberg]] uses [[Zweitmandat|MMP without lists]].
|-
|'''{{Flagicon|South Korea}} [[Legislative elections in South Korea|Republic of Korea]] (South Korea)'''
|[[National Assembly (South Korea)|National Assembly]]
|2019–present
|Two votes
|Originally used a hybrid system with 253 single-member constituency seats, 17 supplementary seats (a la [[parallel voting]]) and 30 compensatory seats elected using the [[additional-member system]] variant of MMP. Now uses a straightforward AMS system with all proportional seats being compensatory since 2024.
|-
|'''{{Flagicon|Lesotho}} [[Elections in Lesotho|Lesotho]]'''
|[[National Assembly (Lesotho)|National Assembly]]
|2002–present
|Single vote ([[Mixed single vote|MSV]])
|Initially used two vote version, changed to the single vote version in 2012 due to the use of [[Mixed-member proportional representation#Splitting parties|decoy lists]].
|-
|'''{{Flagicon|New Zealand}} [[Elections in New Zealand|New Zealand]]''' 
|[[New Zealand House of Representatives|House of Representatives]]
|1994–present
|Two votes
|Following a long [[Electoral reform in New Zealand|electoral reform process]], beginning with the [[Royal Commission on the Electoral System]] in 1985 and ending with the [[1993 New Zealand voting method referendum|1993 referendum on the voting system]]. It was first used in an [[1996 New Zealand general election|election in 1996]]. The system's use was [[2011 New Zealand voting system referendum|reviewed by referendum]] in November 2011, with the majority (56.17%) voting to keep it. In [[2020 New Zealand general election|2020 general election]], the Labour Party won 65 out of 120 seats, becoming the first party under MMP to receive a majority.
|-
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |'''{{Flagicon|Romania}}''' '''[[Elections in Romania|Romania]]''' (formerly)
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |[[Chamber of Deputies (Romania)|Chamber of Deputies]]
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |2008–2012
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |Single vote ([[Mixed single vote|MSV]])
| style="background:#b2b2b2" |Local candidates who did not win at least 50% of votes in their districts did not get a direct mandate, but these seats were added to the list seats allocated proportionally.
From the [[2016 Romanian legislative election|2016 elections]], [[Closed list|closed]] [[party-list proportional representation]] was used instead.<ref name="ro2016">{{cite web|last=Filimon|first=Paul|date=20 July 2015|title=Legea ALEGERILOR PARLAMENTARE pe LISTE, promulgată de Iohannis|url=http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/legea-algerilor-parlamentare-pe-liste--promulgata-de-iohannis-386442|work=România Liberă|language=ro}}</ref>
|-
|'''{{Flagicon|South Africa}} [[Elections in South Africa|South Africa]]'''
|Local elections in all [[Municipalities of South Africa|municipalities]] designated as metropolitan, district/county council (DC) or local/borough council(LC)<ref>{{cite news|title=Election Types|url=https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Election-types/|access-date=9 September 2021}}</ref>
|{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}}
|{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}}
|{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}}
|-
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |'''{{Flagicon|Thailand}}''' '''[[Elections in Thailand|Thailand]]''' (formerly)
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |[[House of Representatives (Thailand)|House of Representatives]]
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |2019
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |Single vote ([[Mixed single vote|MSV]])
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |Referred to as "mixed-member apportionment", uses a [[mixed single vote]] for both the constituency and the party list. The 350 constituency seats are won by [[first-past-the-post voting]] as in previous elections. However, the 150 party-list seats serve a [[Mixed electoral system#Compensatory/non-compensatory seat allocation|compensatory]] function, and are allocated so as to give each party a total number of seats proportional to the nationwide number of votes they received (top-up).<ref>{{cite news|author1=Bangkok Pundit|date=10 February 2016|title=The effects of Thailand's proposed electoral system|work=Asian Correspondent|url=https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/02/the-effects-of-thailands-proposed-electoral-system/|access-date=24 March 2019|archive-date=5 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190605025006/https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/02/the-effects-of-thailands-proposed-electoral-system/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Kendall|first1=Dave|date=6 January 2019|title=Explainer: New rules for the House of Representatives|work=Bangkok Post|url=https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/1605898/explainer-new-rules-for-the-house-of-representatives|access-date=24 March 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author1=Bangkok Pundit|date=10 February 2016|title=The effects of Thailand's proposed electoral system|work=Asian Correspondent|url=https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/02/the-effects-of-thailands-proposed-electoral-system/|access-date=29 March 2019|archive-date=5 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190605025006/https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/02/the-effects-of-thailands-proposed-electoral-system/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Kendall|first1=Dave|date=6 January 2019|title=Explainer: New rules for the House of Representatives|work=Bangkok Post|url=https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/1605898/explainer-new-rules-for-the-house-of-representatives|access-date=29 March 2019}}</ref> The next elections are again set to be held under parallel voting due to a change in the constitution.<ref>{{Cite web|title=With Eye to Next Election, Thai Government Tweaks Voting Rules|url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/with-eye-to-next-election-thai-government-tweaks-election-rules/}}</ref>
|-
| rowspan="3" |'''{{Flagicon|United Kingdom}}''' '''[[Elections in the United Kingdom|United Kingdom]]'''
|'''{{Flagicon|Scotland}}''' '''[[Elections in Scotland|Scotland]]''' - [[Scottish Parliament]]
|1999–present
| rowspan="3" |Two votes<ref name="ers-ams-explainer">{{cite web |title=Additional Member System |url=https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/additional-member-system/ |access-date=31 May 2024 |website=www.electoral-reform.org.uk}}</ref>
| rowspan="3" |Modified version of MMP referred to as the [[additional-member system]], with the number of constituency seats a party won being taken into account when calculating proportional seats, which in Scotland and Wales is divided into regions. In Wales, starting in 2026, the additional member system will be replaced by a [[closed-list]] [[party-list proportional representation|proportional representation]] system following the approval of the [[Senedd Reform Bill]].
|-
|'''{{Flagicon|Wales}}''' '''[[Elections in Wales|Wales]]''' - [[Senedd (Welsh Parliament)]]
|1999–2026

|-
|Local elections in

* '''{{Flagicon|London}}''' [[London]] ([[London Assembly|Assembly]])
|2000–present
|-
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |'''{{Flagicon|Venezuela}}''' '''[[Elections in Venezuela|Venezuela]]''' (formerly)
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |[[National Assembly (Venezuela)|National Assembly]]
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |?–2009{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}}
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |Two votes 
|style="background:#b2b2b2" |The link between list and constituency representatives was removed in 2009, which changed the system to parallel voting.{{cn|date=June 2022}}
|}

===Proposals for use===
====Canada====
In March 2004, the [[Law Commission of Canada]] proposed a system of MMP,{{sfn|Law Commission of Canada|2004}} with only 33% of MPs elected from regional open lists, for the [[House of Commons of Canada]]<ref>{{citation|url=http://www.elections.ca/res/eim/article_search/article.asp?id=129&lang=e |title=A Mixed-Member Proportional System Applied to the 2004 Election|author1-link=Henry Milner (political scientist)|last=Milner|first=Henry|date=January 2005|publisher=Elections Canada On-Line |work=Electoral Insight}}</ref> but Parliament's consideration of the Report in 2004–5 was stopped after the 2006 election.

The [[New Democratic Party]] has been a longtime supporter of MMP. The [[Green Party of Canada]] has generally been a staunch supporter of a move to a [[Proportional representation|proportional]] electoral system.

A proposal to adopt MMP with closed province-wide lists for elections to the [[Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island]] was defeated in a [[2005 Prince Edward Island electoral reform referendum|referendum]] in 2005.

In 2007, the [[Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform (Ontario)|Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform]] in [[Ontario]], Canada, also recommended the use of MMP in future elections to the [[Legislative Assembly of Ontario]], with a ballot similar to New Zealand's, and with the closed province-wide lists used in New Zealand but with only 30% compensatory members. [[2007 Ontario electoral reform referendum|A binding referendum]] on the proposal, held in conjunction with the [[2007 Ontario provincial election|provincial election]] on 10 October 2007, saw it defeated.<ref>For further details on the recent proposals in Ontario, Quebec, and Prince Edward Island, see Andre Barnes and James R. Robertson, ''[http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0417-e.htm Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian Provinces]'', Library of Parliament, revised 18 August 2009.</ref>

In June 2016, the [[Canadian House of Commons Special Committee on Electoral Reform]] was formed to examine potential changes to the voting system with MMP being one of the options examined. The committee presented its report to Parliament on 1 December of the same year. In early 2017, the Government announced that it would accept only some of the committee's recommendations, and would not pursue the issue of electoral reform any further.<ref name="G&M reform abandon">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/trudeau-abandons-electoral-reform/article33855925/|title=Trudeau abandons electoral reform, breaking key campaign promise|newspaper=The Globe and Mail|access-date=2017-02-06|language=en-ca}}</ref><ref name="cbc response story">{{cite news|last1=Wherry|first1=Aaron|title=Liberals say no to mandatory and online voting|url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-mandatory-online-voting-1.4054412|access-date=April 4, 2017|work=CBC News|date=April 4, 2017}}</ref>

In a non-binding [[2016 Prince Edward Island electoral reform referendum|plebiscite]] between 27 October and 7 November 2016, Prince Edward Islanders voted for MMP over FPTP in the final round of counting, 52%–43%; however, the provincial government, despite having set no [[voter turnout]] threshold, subsequently claimed that the 36 percent turnout was insufficient to change the electoral system.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Bradley|first1=Susan|title=P.E.I. plebiscite favours mixed member proportional representation|url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/mixed-member-proportional-representation-in-plebiscite-1.3840172|access-date=7 April 2017|work=CBC News|date=7 November 2016}}</ref> A [[2019 Prince Edward Island electoral reform referendum|second referendum]], held simultaneously with the [[2019 Prince Edward Island general election|provincial election]], saw MMP rejected by a margin of 48% in favor to 52% against, with 76% turnout.

During October–December 2018, [[British Columbia]] [[2018 British Columbia electoral reform referendum|held a referendum]] on proportional representation,<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://elections.bc.ca/referendum/ |title=Elections BC - 2018 Referendum on Electoral Reform |access-date=14 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116023902/https://elections.bc.ca/referendum/ |archive-date=16 November 2018 |url-status=dead}}</ref> promised as part of the election platform of the [[BC NDP|British Columbia New Democratic Party]] who took office following the [[2017 British Columbia general election|May 2017 provincial election]]. In the referendum citizens were presented with two questions. The first question asked them to choose whether they would like to keep [[first-past-the-post voting]] or change to [[proportional representation]]. The second question asked them to rank three types of proportional voting systems in order of preference; one of those was MMP.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://elections.bc.ca/referendum/voting-systems/mixed-member-proportional-mmp/|title=Elections BC - Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)|access-date=14 September 2018|archive-date=21 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821093857/https://elections.bc.ca/referendum/voting-systems/mixed-member-proportional-mmp/|url-status=dead}}</ref> Citizens could still rank the voting systems even if they selected [[first-past-the-post voting]] in the first question. According to official results, voters chose FPTP over PR by 61.3% to 38.7% on the first question. While the first question was not successful for PR, the second question resulted in MMP winning over the two other systems on the ballot. If PR had been successful on the first question, MMP would have been adopted in time for the next provincial election and would have been subject to a second referendum after two election cycles.

In September 2019, Quebec's government, supported by two of the three opposition parties (PQ and Quebec Solidaire), introduced a [[43rd Quebec general election#Electoral reform referendum|referendum]] on MMP to be held in 2022. However, On April 28, 2021, Justice Minister [[Sonia LeBel]] informed a legislative committee hearing that the government would not move forward with a referendum on electoral reform in 2022. LeBel blamed the [[COVID-19 pandemic in Quebec|COVID-19 pandemic]] for altering the government's timeline and could not or would not commit to providing an alternate date for the referendum, effectively ending discussions about electoral reform in Quebec.<ref name="EndOfReform">{{cite news |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-electoral-reform-referendum-2022-1.6005897 |title=Quebec backtracks on promise, no referendum on electoral reform in 2022 |first=Jonathan |last=Montpetit |date=April 28, 2021 |work=CBC Montreal |access-date=April 28, 2021 |archive-date=April 28, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210428204943/https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-electoral-reform-referendum-2022-1.6005897 |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Costa Rica ====

Currently Costa Rica was debating the switch from the current [[closed party list]] [[proportional representation]] system to a mixed member proportional representation based on the [[Elections in Germany#Election system|German model]]. The bill presented by the Citizen Power Now movement and endorsed by the majority of parliamentary groups would create two types of deputies; 42 elected proportionally by lists presented by the political parties and would be called "national" deputies, while another 42 deputies would be elected directly by population-based [[electoral district]]s on a [[First pass the post]] basis.<ref name=poder>{{cite news|last1=Ramírez|first1=Alexander|title=Grupo propone aumentar a 84 el número de diputados|url=https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/grupo-propone-aumentar-a-84-el-numero-de-diputados/|agency=CRHoy|date= 2016}}</ref> As the bill requires a constitutional reform it would require a two-thirds majority of votes, however as of 2019 the caucuses of the four main parties support the reform.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Carmona |first1=Fiorella |title=Congreso se acerca al cambio en sistema de elección de diputados |url=https://www.pulsocr.com/congreso-se-acerca-al-cambio-en-sistema-de-eleccion-de-diputados/ |access-date=28 March 2019 |agency=Revista Pulso |date=29 March 2019}}</ref>

==== European Union (European Parliament) ====
The pan-European party [[Volt Europa|VOLT Europa]] proposes transnational mixed-member proportional representation with the combination of [[Majority judgment|Majority Judgment]] and [[Party-list proportional representation|party-list PR]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://assets.volteuropa.org/2021-12/Electoral%20Reform%20Policy%20October%202021.pdf|title=Volt's Electoral Reform Policy: Making Europe More Democratic}}</ref>

====Sri Lanka====
In September 2015, [[Sri Lanka]]n Foreign Minister [[Mangala Samaraweera]] announced that they will change the country's system to MMP.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.adaderana.lk/news/32423/new-electoral-system-based-on-german-model-mangala|title=New electoral system based on German Model - Mangala|website=www.adaderana.lk}}</ref>

====South Africa====
In South Africa, MMP is generally referred to as a "mixed-system". The Van Zyl Slabbert Commission on Electoral Reform (published in January 2003)<ref>{{Cite web |last=Van Zyl Slabbert |first=Frederik |title=Report of the Electoral Task Team |url=https://pmg.org.za/files/Van-Zyl-Slabbert_Commission_Report.pdf |access-date=15 October 2023 |website=Parliamentary Monitoring Group}}</ref> recommended that a multi-member system, which has been adopted for municipal elections, be expanded to elections for the [[National Assembly of South Africa|National Assembly]]. It proposed that 300 of 400 members be elected from closed-constituency lists (from 69 national multi-member constituencies) and 100 members from closed, national-level party lists. Parliament's High Level Panel report of 2017, chaired by former president [[Kgalema Motlanthe]], validated the Van Zyl Slabbert mixed-system and recommended its adoption, stating: "Such a system will serve to limit the power of individual party leaders and encourage MPs to vote in accordance with the needs and desires of their constituencies rather than only following party lines".<ref>{{Cite web |last=High Level Panel on the Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change |date=November 2017 |title=Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change |url=https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf}}</ref> Although a constitutional amendment is not required, and a simple majority in parliament can amend the Electoral Act (No. 73 of 1998) it seems unlikely that such an amendment will come before parliament before the 2019 General Elections. A former MP, Michael Louis, who wishes to stand as an independent, is actively pursuing a judicial route to force an amendment.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/can-independents-run-for-national-sa-elections-concourt-says-yes-20180824|title=Can independents run for national SA elections? ConCourt says yes|first=Paul|last=Herman|website=News24}}</ref> The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has stated that it is not opposed to an amendment but there is simply not enough time to implement it in time for the 2019 elections.

After the [[Constitutional Court of South Africa]] declared the Electoral Act unconstitutional in 2020 because there was no way for independent candidates to be elected and in 2021, [[Minister of Home Affairs (South Africa)|Home Affairs Minister]] [[Aaron Motsoaledi]] told [[Parliament of South Africa|Parliament]] that a new electoral system must be put in place, calls for MMP intensified and a Motsoaledi-appointed, [[Valli Moosa]]-led ministerial advisory committee was formed to determine the new system.

==Tactical manipulation==

=== Split ticket voting ===
In other cases, a party may be so certain of winning a large number of constituency seats that it expects no extra seats in the proportional top-up (list seats). Some voters may therefore seek to achieve double representation by voting tactically for another party in the regional vote, as a vote for their preferred party in the regional vote would be wasted. This tactic is much less effective in MMP models with a relatively large share of list seats (50% in most [[States of Germany|German states]], and 40% in the [[New Zealand House of Representatives]]) and/or ones which add "[[Leveling seat|balancing seats]]", leading to fewer opportunities for overhangs and maintaining full proportionality, even when a party wins too many constituency seats.

==== Solutions ====
The problem of ticket splitting strategies can be solved either by eliminating at least one of the two mechanism that create the opportunity for abuse: Either the double vote can be abolished, returning to a [[mixed single vote]] (the original version of MMP used in Germany), in which case voters cannot split their ticket, even if it is a sincere preference. Another solution is to eliminate the seat linkage mechanism and use a vote linkage one instead, in which case most likely more compensatory seats would be needed.<ref name="Golosov 2013 p." /> A negative vote transfer based system (scorporo) retains the flaw that decoy lists can be used to abuse it, but if the two votes were tied in a [[mixed ballot transferable vote]], the potential this kind of strategic manipulation would be eliminated. However, in this a case party proportionality is not likely and overall equality of votes would depend largely on the specifics of the system (the amount of compensation).
{| class="wikitable"
! colspan="3" |Compensatory mixed systems
|-
!
!single vote systems (MSV)
!dual vote systems
|-
! rowspan="4" |Seat linkage
| rowspan="4" |'''[[Mixed single vote#Proportional systems|mixed single vote, top-up versions]]'''
* '''single vote MMP'''
* '''single vote AMS (Bolivia, Lesotho)'''
|'''mixed-member proportional representation (MMP)'''
|-
|'''[[additional member system]] (AMS)'''
|-
|[[alternative vote plus]] (AV+)
|-
|Hybrids: e.g. parallel voting+AMS (South Korea)
|-
! rowspan="3" |Vote linkage
|[[Mixed single vote|positive vote transfer]] (PVT/MSV)

* Hungarian PVT/MSV (local elections)
* Romanian PVT/MSV system (2008-2012)
|Hybrids:

* Parallel voting+PVT (Hungary)
* [[Scorporo|negative vote transfer/scorporo]] (Italy, 1993-2005)
|-
| colspan="2" |Others systems:
|-
|[[Dual-member proportional representation|dual-member proportional]] (DMP)
|[[mixed ballot transferable vote]] (MBTV)
|}

===Splitting parties===
{{split section|talk=Talk:Bloc party#South Korea|date=March 2024|Decoy list}}
This sort of strategy for a coalition of parties to capture a larger share of list seats may be adopted formally as a strategy. By way of example, in [[2005 Albanian parliamentary election|Albania's 2005 parliamentary election]], the two main parties did not expect to win any list seats, so they encouraged voters to use their list votes for allied minor parties.{{which|date=October 2023}} This tactic distorted the working of the model to the point that the parties that won list seats were almost always different from the parties that won constituency seats. Only one constituency member was elected from parties that won list seats. The election was condemned by the [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] which said it failed to comply with international standards because of "serious irregularities", intimidation, vote-buying and "violence committed by extremists on both sides."<ref>[http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/109214/stuart-stevens-shady-past-clients-revealed Stuart Stevens' ... Past Clients]| Penn Bullock| 29 October 2012| tnr.com| accessed 29.10.2012</ref> Rather than increasing the number of list seats or "overhang" seats, Albania subsequently decided to change to a pure-list system.

In an abusive gambit similar to that used in Albania, major parties feeling that they are unlikely to win a large number of list seats because of their advantage at the constituency level might choose to split their party in two, with one subdivision of the party contesting the constituency seats, while the other contests the list seats—assuming this is allowed by electoral law. The two linked parties could then co-ordinate their campaign and work together within the legislature, while remaining legally separate entities. The result of this approach, if it is used by all parties, would be to transform MMP into a ''de facto'' [[Parallel voting|parallel voting mechanism]].

An example of how this could happen manifested itself in the [[2007 Lesotho general election]]. In this case the two leading parties, the [[Lesotho Congress for Democracy]] (LCD) and the [[All Basotho Convention]] (ABC) used decoy lists, respectively named the [[National Independent Party]] and the [[Lesotho Workers' Party]] to avoid the compensatory mechanisms of MMP. As a result, the LCD and its decoy were able to take 69.1% of the seats with only 51.8% of the vote. ABC leader [[Tom Thabane]] called the vote "free, but not fair." In the [[2012 Lesotho general election|2012 election]], the voting system was adjusted to link the local and list seats to limit the decoy lists' effectiveness, resulting in an almost perfectly proportionate election result for the competing parties.<ref>See blog articles on the 2007 and 2012 elections posted by political science professor Matthew Sobery Shugard, University of California in Davis [http://fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com/category/africa/lesotho/ Fruits and Votes – Lesotho page]. Accessed 26 April 2014.</ref>

Another interesting case is that of Venezuela, which also ended up changing its system, in this case by formally adopting a parallel voting system and legitimizing party efforts to game the MMP approach. Venezuela introduced an MMP [[National Assembly of Venezuela#Electoral system|electoral system]] in 1993, but the tactic of creating a decoy party was introduced only in 2000, by the opposition governor of [[Yaracuy]]. The tactic was later adopted by pro-Chavez parties at the national level in 2005.{{Explain|date=October 2023|reason=Which parties were created and how effective was this method?}} After the decoy list tactic withstood a constitutional challenge, Venezuela eventually formally reverted to a [[parallel voting]] system, which yields a lesser degree of proportionality compared to MMP. On [[2010 Venezuelan parliamentary election|September 26, 2010]], Chavez' party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, took 57.4% of parliamentary seats with only 48.2% of the vote under the new system (ignoring the role of small allied parties). One can see to what extent parallel voting had nonetheless helped to redress the balance toward proportionality somewhat by noting that Chavez' party would have taken an even larger share of assembly seats under a strict single-winner approach (71 constituency seats out of 109, or 65%).{{cn|date=June 2022}}

Another example is that of the [[2001 Italian general election]], in which one of the two main coalitions (the [[House of Freedoms]]), which opposed the [[scorporo]] system (a system compensatory system similar to MMP), linked many of their constituency candidates to a decoy list ({{Lang|it|liste civetta}}) in the proportional parts, under the name {{Lang|it|Abolizione Scorporo}}. As a defensive move, the other coalition, [[The Olive Tree (Italy)|Olive Tree]], felt obliged to do the same, under the name {{Lang|it|Paese Nuovo}}. This meant that the constituency seats won by each coalition would not reduce the number of list seats available to them. In the case the House of Freedoms list faction [[Forza Italia]], the tactic was so successful that it did not have enough candidates in the proportional part to receive as many seats as it in fact won, missing out on 12 seats. Italy subsequently changed its system.

Ahead of the [[2020 South Korean legislative election]], the electoral system was changed from parallel voting to a hybrid mixed-member proportional system, with 30 seats allocated in a compensatory manner. The opposition [[Liberty Korea Party]] subsequently set up a decoy list, the [[Future Korea Party]], to win extra proportional seats.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191224005700315|title=Main opposition to set up satellite party for more proportional representation seats|date=24 December 2019|publisher=[[Yonhap News Agency]]}}</ref> The ruling [[Democratic Party of Korea]] condemned them for exploiting the electoral law, but nonetheless set up its own decoy list, the [[Platform Party]], in response.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20200425/2047133/1/Election-law-should-be-revised-before-integration-with-proportional-parties|title=Election law should be revised before integration with proportional parties|date=25 April 2020|publisher=[[The Dong-a Ilbo]]}}</ref> The decoy lists were successful on election day, with Future Korea winning 12 compensatory seats and Platform winning 11. After the election, both decoy lists merged into their mother parties.

=== Electoral thresholds ===
In systems with a threshold, people who prefer a larger party may [[tactical voting|tactically vote]] for a minor party that is predicted to poll close to or slightly below the threshold. Some voters may be afraid the minor party will poll below the threshold, and that that would weaken the larger political camp to which the minor party belongs. For example, the German moderate-right [[Free Democratic Party (Germany)|Free Democratic Party]] (FDP) has often received votes from voters who preferred the larger [[Christian Democratic Union (Germany)|Christian Democratic Union]] (CDU) party, because they feared that if the FDP received less than 5% of the votes, the CDU would have no parliamentary allies and would be unable to form a government on its own. This tactical voting also ensures that fewer votes are wasted, but at the cost of giving the FDP more seats than CDU voters would ideally have preferred. This tactic is the same in any method of proportional representation with a threshold.{{cn|date=May 2023|reason=I'm writing a thesis on this and in my literature I haven't found any sources that confirm that CDU-voters vote or have voted for the FDP because they fear it might fall under the threshold. If I, after a lot of study on this subject, can't find a source that corroborates with this, I think it is safe to say that this claim needs a source!}}

Similarly, in New Zealand, some voters who preferred a large party have voted for the minor party's local candidate to ensure it qualifies for list seats on the back of winning a single electorate. This notably occurred in the right-wing inner Auckland electorate of [[Epsom (New Zealand electorate)|Epsom]] in 2008 and 2011, where the [[New Zealand National Party|National Party]] voters gave their local vote to the [[ACT New Zealand|ACT Party]]. In this case the tactic maintained some proportionality by bypassing the 5% threshold, but is largely disfavoured by the public due to it awarding smaller parties extra list seats while parties with a higher party vote percentage that do not win an electorate receive no seats; this occurred in 2008 when ACT was awarded 5 seats on the back of one electorate seat and 3.7% of the party vote, while [[New Zealand First]] with no electorate seats and 4.1% of the party vote were awarded none. In 2011, some Epsom voters voting for the left-wing Labour and Green parties tried to block the tactic by giving their local vote to the National candidate; while it was unsuccessful, it did reduce ACT's majority over National from 12,900 to 2,300. In August 2012, the initial report on a review of the MMP system by the Electoral Commission recommended abolishing the one electorate seat threshold, meaning a party winning an electorate seat but not crossing the 5% threshold (which the same report recommends lowering to 4%) is only awarded that electorate seat.<ref name="MMPproposal">{{cite web |date=13 August 2012 |title=Review of the MMP voting system: Proposals Paper |url=http://www.mmpreview.org.nz/sites/all/themes/referendum/resources/ProposalsPaper/MMP%20Proposal%20Paper.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120901022210/http://www.mmpreview.org.nz/sites/all/themes/referendum/resources/ProposalsPaper/MMP%20Proposal%20Paper.pdf |archive-date=1 September 2012 |access-date=13 August 2012 |publisher=Electoral Commission}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Politics}}

* [[Additional member system]], MMP as implemented in the United Kingdom
* [[Alternative Vote Plus]]
* [[Leveling seat]]
* [[Mixed single vote]]
* [[Mixed ballot transferable vote]]
* [[Dual-member proportional representation|Dual-member proportional]]
* [[Biproportional apportionment]]

==References==
===Notes===
{{reflist|30em}}

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{{refend}}

==Further reading==
{{refbegin|35em|indent=yes}}
* Malone, R. (2008). ''[http://ips.ac.nz/publications/publications/show/217 Rebalancing the Constitution: The Challenge of Government Law-Making under MMP]. Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington: Wellington, New Zealand.
* Massicotte, Louis; Blais, André (1999). "Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey", Electoral Studies, Vol. 18, 341–366.
* Mudambi, R. and Navarra, P. 2004. Electoral Strategies in Mixed Systems of Representation. ''European Journal of Political Economy'', Vol.20, No.1, pp. 227–253.
* Shugart, S. Matthew and Martin P. Wattenberg, (2000a), "Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology", in Shugart, S. Matthew and Martin P. Wattenberg (2000). ''Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?'' Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.&nbsp;9–24.
{{refend}}

==External links==
*[http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esy/esy_de/ ACE Project: "Germany: The original MMP system"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928004629/http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esy/esy_de/ |date=28 September 2007 }}
*[http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/index.cfm A Handbook of Electoral System Design] from [http://www.idea.int International IDEA]
*[http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es Electoral Design Reference Materials] from the [http://www.aceproject.org ACE Project]
*[http://nesstar.esds.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?rightside=mode%3Ddocumentation%26submode%3Dabstract%26study%3Dhttp%3A//nesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80/obj/fStudy/5076&treeview=mode%3Dtreeview%26open%3Dhttp%3A//nesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80/obj/fCatalog/ESDS%26open%3Dhttp%3A//nesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80/obj/fCatalog/Catalog38%20%26open%3Dhttp%3A//nesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80/obj/fStudy/5076%26open%3Dhttp%3A//nesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80/obj/fCatalog/Catalog13%26open%3Dhttp%3A//nesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80/obj/fCatalog/Catalog38%26open%3Dhttp%3A//nesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80/obj/fStudy/5076 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2003.]
* [http://works.bepress.com/josep_colomer/3/ Handbook of Electoral System Choice]

===Videos===
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3guVBhKmDc 6 min. video (2015). Explains how MMP (recommended by the Law Commission of Canada) could work in Canada – Presented by the nonpartisan Fair Vote Canada's Dennis Pilon, Associate Professor, Political Science, York University]

[[Category:Party-list proportional representation]]
[[Category:Mixed electoral systems]]
[[Category:Proportional representation electoral systems]]
[[Category:Electoral systems]]
[[Category:Electoral reform in Canada]]

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