Too large to be manportable, it was typically deployed from specialised vehicles or helicopters. The missile was intended to supplement traditional anti-tank weapons, like the 100 mm anti-tank gun whose accuracy beyond 1,500 m is poor. The missile's accuracy in contrast remained high as far as its maximum range of 2,000 m.
However, the system's bulk, slow speed and poor combat accuracy drove development of later SACLOS systems, like the 9M113 Konkurs.
Development of the missile proceeded rapidly, with the first unguided flights in April 1958 followed by controlled flights in June and July 1958, where testing showed the probability of a hit to be anywhere from 75—90%, depending on the range.[7] However, Soviet Army field exercises showed that hit rates could decrease to as low as 25% due to the complexity of the guidance system.[8]
The system would enter service by August 1st, 1960.[9] Later, parade 2P27 vehicles sporting four 2K16 launchers on May 1st, 1962 were noted by Western observers in parade formation, just before the 1962 Moscow Victory Day Parade.[10] The weapon would later be described in the US Army journal Military Review as being 'about the same size' and having 'approximately the same range' as the French SS.11, later overestimating its range to be from 500 to 3,000 metres.[11]
History
[edit]2P26 in Batey ha-Osef Museum, Israel.Polish 2P27
There were two ground-based platforms for the missile
2P26 Based on the unarmored GAZ-69 light truck - with four backward pointing launch rails. The control station can be deployed up to 30 m away from the launcher vehicle. It entered service in 1960
2P27 Based on the armored BRDM-1 - with three pop up launch rails protected by an armored cover. It entered service in 1964.
These vehicles were deployed in anti-tank batteries attached to motor rifle regiments. Each battery has three platoons, each with three launch vehicles and a single command BRDM.
While a few were used by Egyptian forces during the 1967 Six-Day War and from 1969 in the War of Attrition, only one tank loss was attributed to the system. The system's hit probability is estimated to have been 25% in combat[citation needed].
The system was also used by the Cypriot National Guard during the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus in a man-portable version. Several dozen shots were fired in action during a number of July and August engagements in the conflict, with low effectiveness.
North Korea began producing a reverse-engineered version of the missile in 1975.
The missile is guided to the target by means of a joystick, which requires some skill on the part of the operator. The operator's adjustments are transmitted to the missile via a thin wire that trails behind the missile.
The missile is steered by an unconventional arrangement of vibrating spoilers.
As stated before, MCLOS requires considerable skill on the part of the operator. The system's effectiveness in combat drove the development of missiles based on the easier to use SACLOS system.
One problem with the missile is the amount of time it takes to reach maximum range—around 20 seconds—giving the intended target time to take action, either by retreating behind an obstacle, laying down a smoke screen or firing on the operator. Also, the large size of the missile means that only a few rounds can be carried; the BRDM-1 vehicle can only carry three missiles.
Operators
[edit]Map with 3M6 operators in blue with former operators in red
^Ангельскии, Ростислав Д. (2002). Отечественные противотанковые комплексы: Иллюстрированный справочник. Москва: ООО «Издательство АСТ». p. 9. ISBN5170117442.
^ abС. Г., Тихонов (2010). Оборонные предприятия СССР и России : в 2 т. (Т. 1. ed.). Москва: ТОМ. p. 94. ISBN978-5-903603-02-2.
^ abШирокорад, Александр Борисович (2003). Энциклопедия отечественного ракетного оружия 1817-2002. Москва: ООО «Издательство АСТ». p. 154. ISBN5-17-011177-0.
^В. Л., Солунина (2003). Высокоточные системы управления и приводы для вооружения и военной техники. К 50-летию ЦНИИ автоматики и гидравлики (2-е изд. ed.). Москва: Московский государственный технический университет имени Н.Э. Баумана. p. 83. ISBN5-7038-1407-3.
^С. Г., Тихонов (2010). Оборонные предприятия СССР и России : в 2 т. (Т. 1. ed.). Москва: ТОМ. p. 543. ISBN978-5-903603-02-2.
^В. Л., Солунина (2003). Высокоточные системы управления и приводы для вооружения и военной техники. К 50-летию ЦНИИ автоматики и гидравлики (2-е изд. ed.). Москва: Московский государственный технический университет имени Н.Э. Баумана. p. 81. ISBN5-7038-1407-3.
^Непобедимый, Сергей Павлович (2008). Оружие двух эпох. Записки генерального конструктора ракетных комплексов. Москва: Московский государственный технический университет имени Н.Э. Баумана. p. 108. ISBN978-5-7038-3158-8.
^Мальгинов, Виктор (2008). «Шмель» на броне // М-Хобби : журнал (Май (вып. 4, №90) ed.). p. 37. ISSN0236-0586.
^Ангельскии, Ростислав Д. (2002). Отечественные противотанковые комплексы: Иллюстрированный справочник. Москва: ООО «Издательство АСТ». p. 24. ISBN5170117442.
^Military Review (Volume XLIII, Number 2, February 1963 ed.). Fort Leavensworth, Texas: United States Army. February 1963. p. 105.
^Military Review (Volume XLIII, Number 1, January 1963 ed.). Fort Leavenworth, Texas: United States Army. January 1963. p. 106.
Afghanistan[14]: 766 
Algeria[14]: 766 
Bulgaria[14]: 767 
Cyprus − 80 missiles received in 1973 in violation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot arms embargo.[15]
Czechoslovakia[14]: 768 
East Germany[14]: 768 
Egypt[14]: 768 
Hungary[14]: 769 
Iraq[16]
Israel - Captured units from Egypt[17][18] and Syria.[citation needed]
Mongolia − 100 missiles received in 1963.[15]
Poland[14]: 772 
Romania[14]: 772 
Soviet Union[14]: 406 
Syria[14]: 773 
Yugoslavia[14]: 774 - 500 missiles received between 1964 and 1965.[15]
