パレスチナ独立戦争
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パレスチナ独立戦争 | |||||||
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イギリス委任統治領パレスチナの反乱中 | |||||||
武装列車に乗るイギリス兵と2人のパレスチナ人捕虜 | |||||||
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衝突した勢力 | |||||||
イギリス パレスチナ・アラブ平和団 |
パレスチナ人 地方勢力反乱(ファサーイル) アラブ世界の義勇兵 | ||||||
指揮官 | |||||||
アーサー・グレンフェル・ワウチョープ将軍 エリヤフ・ゴロンブハガナー司令官 |
アブドゥ・アル・ラヒム・アル・ハッジュ(アブ・カマル)最高司令官 † ファウジ・アル・カウクジ(追放) ハサン・サラマ アミーン・フサイニー(亡命) ラグヒブ・アル・ナシャシビ(戦傷) イッザトゥ・ダーワザ(亡命) アブドゥル・ハッリク † ユスフ・サイドゥ・アブ・ドゥッラ ユスフ・ハムダン † ファフリ・アブドゥ・アル・ハディ(戦傷) アリフ・アブドゥ・アル・ラジク モハンマドゥ・マフモウドゥ・ラナーアン ハミドゥ・スレイマン・マーダウィ † ムスタファ・オスタ † ファーハン・アル・サーディ アブドゥ・アル・カディー・アル・フサイニ(亡命) アフマドゥ・モハマドゥ・ハサン(アブ・バクー) イブラヒム・ナッサー モハンメドゥ・サレー・ハマドゥ † アブ・イブラヒム・アル・カビー ワシフ・カマル イッサ・バッタトゥ † サーイドゥ・アル・アス † | ||||||
戦力 | |||||||
イギリス兵:2万5000人~5万人[1][2] ユダヤ人警察、臨時定住護衛:2万人[3] ハガナー戦士:1.5万人[4] パレスチナ警察軍:2883人(1936年)[5] エツェル兵:2000人[6] |
1000人~3000人(1936年~37年) 2500人~7500人(1938年) 6000人~1.5万人の追加兵[7] | ||||||
被害者数 | |||||||
イギリス軍:262人が死亡、550人が負傷[8] ユダヤ人:300人が死亡、4人が処刑[9][8] |
アラブ人:5000人が死亡、1.5万人が負傷、108人が処刑、1万2622人が監禁、5人が亡命[1] [1][8] [8][8] |
背景[編集]
1930年、シェイクのイッズ・アドゥ・ディン・アル・カッサム(1882年~1935年)は、反シオニズム且つ反イギリスの軍事組織である黒の手を設立した。カッサムは貧民を雇用し軍事訓練を施し、1935年までに200人~800人を数えるようになった。構成員は爆弾や火器で武装し、ユダヤ人入植者を殺害し、入植者が植えた木やイギリス人が引いた鉄道を破壊した[16]。 1935年11月、カッサム軍の2人が果物泥棒を探すパレスチナ警察を1人殺害した。この事件の後、イギリスはカッサムをヤーバドゥ近くの洞窟に追い込み、戦闘によって殺害した。[16]カッサムの死はアラブ社会に大きな怒りを引き起こした。多くの人がカッサムの遺体をハイファに埋葬した。(Gilbert 1998, p. 80)1935年10月、パレスチナ人はヤッファ港のセメント事件でハガナーの運命を決定した。アラブ人がユダヤ軍を恐れる感情がパレスチナ人も覆い、[17][18]ユダヤ人入植が最多となる1935年の数か月前にパレスチナ人が全土で反乱を起こした。[1][19]1933年~36年の4年間で16.4万人以上のユダヤ人がパレスチナに入植し、1931年~36年の間にユダヤ人人口は17.5万人から2倍以上の37万人に増加した。これはユダヤ人人口が17%から27%に増加した事を意味し、パレスチナ人とユダヤ人の間に決定的な関係破壊を齎した。[20] 1936年4月15日、ナーブルスからトゥルカームに向かう護送団への攻撃から反乱は始まり、その中で恐らくカッサミテの攻撃者がユダヤ人運転手イスラエル・カザン、ズヴィ・ダンネンベルグの2人を撃った[21]。カザンは即死、ダンネンベルグは5日後に死亡した[1][22][23][24]。 翌日、ユダヤ人のエツェル(ユダヤ民族軍事機構)は報復としてペタク・チクヴァ近くの小屋で眠っていたアラブ人労働者2人を射殺した[1][25]。 4月17日にテルアビブで行われたカザンの葬儀はユダヤ人による暴動に繋がり、アラブ人の子供達が殴られ所有物が破壊された。[26]4月19日~22日のヤッファとテルアビブの暴動で、ユダヤ人16人とアラブ人5人が殺害された。[27]これを受けてアラブ人将軍が始めた反乱は1936年10月まで続いた。[1] 1936年の夏には、何千ものユダヤ人の果樹園が破壊され、ユダヤ人は攻撃され殺害され、ベト・シェアンやアッコ等のユダヤ人社会は安全な地域に避難した。(Gilbert 1998, p. 80)経済背景[編集]
経済要因も独立戦争の開始に大きな影響を与えた[28] 。パレスチナのファッラーヒーン(貧農)はアラブ人人口の2/3を占め、1920年代から都市に大量に移住したが、そこでも貧困と社会的限界にぶつかるだけだった[28]。 多くはヤッファとハイファのあばら家に住み、そこで貧者の中で働くカリスマ的伝道者のカッサムの援助と励ましを受けた。[28]カッサムの存在が独立戦争を全土に広めた。[28]第一次世界大戦はパレスチナの特に田舎を深く貧しくした。[28]オスマン帝国と委任統治政府が農作物に重税を課し、更に1920年~30年代に安い輸入品や自然災害によって価格が急落した為貧農の生活は更に苦しくなった。[28] 貧農の地代は人口密度上昇やユダヤ人入植機構(ユダヤ人国立基金)による土地の強奪により鋭く上昇し、地代を払えない為に追い出される貧農が続出した。[28]1931年までに59万人のアラブ人が164km²の低地農地を所有していたのに対し、5万人のユダヤ人が102km²を所有していた。[28] 1931年以降﹁土地を持たないアラブ人﹂問題は大きくなり、ワウチョペ高等委員はこの社会的貧困が不満を生み、深刻な混乱に繋がるかも知れないと警告した。[28]委任統治政府はアラブ人からユダヤ人への土地の移動を制限したが、容易に法の抜け道が見つけられ上手く機能しなかった。[28]政府の経済成長・健康維持への投資の失敗と、イシューブ(ユダヤ人共同体)への投資だけを考えるシオン主義政党により、問題は更に拡大した。[28]政府はアラブ人の最低賃金をユダヤ人より低く設定する事で、ユダヤ人共同体の経済基盤(例‥ハイファ発電所、シェメン石油・石鹸工場、グランズ・モウリンズ製粉所、ネシェーセメント工場等)を地方のアラブ人に低賃金で作らせる事に成功した。[28] 1935年以降は、建設過熱期の停滞と排他的ヘブライ労働計画へのユダヤ人共同体の集中によって、地方からの流入者は職を殆ど得られなくなった。[28]1935年にはアラブ人労働人口のたった5%の1.2万人がユダヤ人部門で働き、その内半分は農業部門だった。3.2万人は委任統治政府で働き、21.1万人は自営業かアラブ人雇用者の下で働いていた。[29]オスマン帝国時代から続くパレスチナの農業の崩壊は、土地を持たない為に都会で阻害され貧しく暮らす貧農を多く生み出し、彼らは喜んで独立戦争に参加した[28]。政治・社会文化的背景[編集]
地域的政治背景[編集]
近隣のアラブ諸国の政治体制の変化は、パレスチナ人に西側諸国の植民地の中で政治圧力と交渉技術を使って何が得られるか考えさせた。[36]シリアでは1936年1月20日~3月6日にかけて総同盟罷業が全土の主要都市で行われ、国中で起きた政治的示威運動はシリア民族運動に新鮮な弾みを付けた。フランスの反応は厳しかったが、政府はフランス・シリア独立条約(1936年)を交渉する為にシリア人の代表をパリに派遣する事に3月2日に合意した。[37]この事は経済的・政治的圧力によって脆い帝国支配に対抗出来る事を示した。[38] 1936年3月2日、エジプトで行われたイギリスとエジプトの一連の交渉はイギリス・エジプト条約(1936年)に繋がり、スエズ運河地域におけるイギリス軍の駐留は続くもののエジプトは独立を勝ち取った。[39][40]イラクでは総同盟罷業が1931年7月に起き、通りで組織された示威行動を行った事もあり、ヌーリー・アッ=サイード首相(1888年~1958年)の下でイギリス委任統治領から独立し、1932年10月には国際連盟に正式加盟した。[41]時系列[編集]
アラブ総攻撃と武装反乱[編集]
ピール委員会[編集]
1936年10月11日に同盟罷業は終了し、[52]ピール委員会があった約1年間暴力は弱まった。1936年5月18日に宣言された王立委員会とその委員は6月29日に呼ばれたが、ピール委員会は11月11日までパレスチナに到着しなかった。[60]ピール委員会は後に1000人のアラブ人独立勢力が同盟罷業中に殺された事を踏まえ、この混乱を﹁植民地支配に対抗するパレスチナのアラブ人の開けた反乱で、他国のアラブ人が手助けしている﹂と描写した。また、2つの前代未聞の事件がこの独立運動で起きたと述べた。1つ目はパレスチナ行政府(全てのアラブ人裁判官を含む)の全てのアラブ人司令官、政治家、技術局が独立運動を援助した事である。2つ目は近くの国(シリア、イラク)のアラブ人が興味と共感を示し義勇兵として独立運動に協力した事である。[61]計画的反乱(1937年9月~39年8月)[編集]
ピール委員会の提案が失敗に終わったことで、反乱は1937年の秋に再開された。アンドリュースはガリラヤ地方長官代理のルイス・アンドリュースが9月26日にナザレでクアッセマイトの武装集団に暗殺されたことでパレスチナ人から広く嫌われていた。9月30日、政府は大英帝国のどの地域でも政治亡命者を拘留することを許可する規則が発行され、高等弁務官はその目的が公序良俗に反するとみなす団体を非合法化する権限を与えられた。ハジ・アミン・アル・フセイニは最高モスレム評議会の指導者から解任され、ワクフ一般委員会、地方全国委員会、アラブ高等委員会は解散させられ、5人のアラブ人指導者が逮捕され、セーシェルに強制送還された‥ 逮捕を恐れてジャマール・エル=フセイニはシリアに、ハジ・アミン・エル=フセイニはレバノンに逃亡した。パレスチナとのすべての国境は閉鎖され、近隣諸国との電話回線は引き揚げられ、報道検閲が導入され、特別な強制収容所がアクレ近郊に開設された。 1937年11月、イルグンはハブラガ政策を正式に否定し、ユダヤ人市民に対するアラブ人の攻撃に対する﹁積極的防衛﹂と呼ばれる形態として、アラブ人市民に対する一連の無差別攻撃に着手した。イギリス当局は軍事法廷を設置し、銃器の携帯・発砲、破壊工作、脅迫に関する罪の裁判を行った。しかし、それにもかかわらず、アラブ人による殺人と破壊工作のキャンペーンは続き、丘陵地帯のアラブ人ギャングは組織化されたゲリラ戦闘員の様相を呈した[105]。警察は陸軍司令官の作戦統制下に置かれ、軍関係者は秩序の執行において文民当局に取って代わった。10月には、反乱軍の拠点となっていたエルサレム旧市街が軍によって再占領された。年末までに町々では秩序が回復されたが、農村部では第二次世界大戦が勃発するまでテロが続いた。反応[編集]
委任統治政府とイギリス軍の役割[編集]
テガート要塞[編集]
イギリス空軍の役割[編集]
The Royal Air Force developed close air support into its then most refined form during the Arab Revolt.[78] Air patrols had been found effective in keeping convoys and trains free from attack, but this did not help to expose insurgents to battle conditions likely to cause their defeat.[78] From the middle of June 1936 wireless vehicles accompanied all convoys and patrols.[78] During rebel attacks these vehicles could issue emergency "XX calls" (XX with a coded location), which were given priority over all other radio traffic, to summon aerial reinforcements.[78] Bombers, which were usually airborne within five minutes, could then either attack insurgents directly or "fix" their position for infantry troops. Forty-seven such XX calls were issued during the revolt, causing heavy losses to the rebels.[78]This use of air power was so successful that the British were able to reduce the regular garrison.[78]In 1936 an Air Staff Officer in Middle East Command based in Egypt, Arthur Harris, known as an advocate of "air policing",[79] commented on the revolt saying that "one 250 lb. or 500 lb. bomb in each village that speaks out of turn" would satisfactorily solve the problem.[80] In 1937 Harris was promoted to Air Commodore and in 1938 he was posted to Palestine and Trans-JordanasAir Officer Commanding the RAF contingent in the region until September 1939. "Limited" bombing attacks on Arab villages were carried out by the RAF,[81] although at times this involved razing whole villages to the ground.[82] Harris described the system by which recalcitrant villages were kept under control by aerial bombardment as "Air-Pin".[83]Aircraft of the RAF were also used to drop propaganda leaflets over Palestinian towns and villages telling the fellahin that they were the main sufferers of the rebellion and threatening an increase in taxes.[76]Low flying RAF squadrons were able to produce detailed intelligence on the location of road blocks, sabotaged bridges, railways and pipelines.[84] RAF aerial photographs were also used to build up a detailed map of Arab population distribution.[84]Although the British Army was responsible for setting up the Arab counter-insurgent forces (known as the peace bands) and supplying them with arms and money these were operated by RAF Intelligence, commanded by Patrick Domville.[85][86]At the beginning of the revolt RAF assets in the region comprised a bomber flight at RAF Ramleh, an RAF armoured car flight at Ramleh, fourteen bomber squadrons at RAF Amman, and a RAF armoured car company at Ma'an.[5]イギリス海軍の役割[編集]
ハイファの戦略的重要性[編集]
Britain had completed the modern deep-sea port in Haifa in 1933 and finished laying a pipeline from the Iraqi oilfields to Haifa in 1935,[88] shortly before the outbreak of the revolt. A refinery for processing oil from the pipeline was completed by Consolidated Refineries Ltd, a company jointly owned by British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell, in December 1939.[89]These facilities enhanced the strategic importance of Palestine and of Haifa in particular in Britain's control of the eastern Mediterranean.[88] The threat to British control of the region posed by the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 and the deteriorating situation in Europe toward the end of the 1930s probably made British policy makers more willing to make concessions to Arab governments on the Palestine issue following the furore over the recommendations of the Peel Commission.[88]イギリス諜報局の役割[編集]
イギリスとユダヤ人の共同作戦[編集]
ユダヤ人入植者軍[編集]
Table 1: Security forces and infrastructure created during the Arab revolt Joint British-Yishuv Independent Yishuv Other Yishuv defence infrastructure Jewish Supernumerary Police Mobile units (mobile arm of the Haganah) Ta'as † (weapons manufacture) Jewish Settlement Police Fosh (field companies) Rekhesh † (arms procurement) Mobile Guards (mobile arm of the Settlement Police) Hish (field corps) Ran (counter intelligence) Special Night Squads Special Operations Squads Community ransom (defence tax) Tegart forts and Tegart's wall Guards Tower and stockade settlement
† Ta'as and Rekhesh were developed and expanded during the Arab Revolt but already existed before 1936 and of course the Haganah had been in operation from the earliest days of the Mandate.
ハガナー諜報局[編集]
There was no single body within the Jewish settlement capable of co-ordinating intelligence gathering before 1939.[107] Until then there were four separate organisations without any regular or formal liaison.[107] These were an underground militia, forerunner of the first official information service, Sherut Yediot (Shai); the Arab Platoon of the Palmach, which was staffed by Jews who were Arab-speaking and Arab-looking; Rekhesh, the arms procurement service, which had its own intelligence gathering capabilities, and likewise the Mossad LeAliyah Bet, the illegal immigration service.[107] In mid-1939 the effort to co-ordinate the activities of these groups was led by Shaul Avigur and Moshe Shertok.[107]
シオン修正主義者の役割[編集]
In 1931, a Revisionist underground splinter group broke off from Haganah, calling itself the Irgun organisation (or Etzel).[108] The organisation took its orders from Revisionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky who was at bitter loggerheads with the dominant Labour Zionist movement led by David Ben-Gurion.[109] The rift between the two Zionist movements further deteriorated in 1933 when two Revisionists were blamed for the murder of Haim Arlosoroff, who had negotiated the Haavara Agreement between the Jewish Agency and Nazi Germany.[109] The agreement brought 52,000 German Jews to Palestine between 1933 and 1939, and generated $30,000,000 for the then almost bankrupt Jewish Agency, but in addition to the difficulties with the Revisionists, who advocated a boycott of Germany, it caused the Yishuv to be isolated from the rest of world Jewry.[110][111][112]Ultimately, however, the events of the Arab Revolt blurred the differences between the gradualist approach of Ben-Gurion and the Maximalist Iron Wall approach of Jabotinsky and turned militarist patriotism into a bipartisan philosophy.[113] Indeed, Ben-Gurion's own Special Operations Squads conducted a punitive operation in the Arab village of Lubya firing weapons into a room through a window killing two men and one woman and injuring three people, including two children.[114]From October 1937 the Irgun instituted a wave of bombings against Arab crowds and buses.[115] For the first time in the conflict massive bombs were placed in crowded Arab public places, killing and maiming dozens.[115] These attacks substantially increased Arab casualties and sowed terror among the population.[115] The first attack was on 11 November 1937, killing two Arabs at the bus depot near Jaffa Street in Jerusalem and then on 14 November, a day later commemorated as the "Day of the Breaking of the Havlagah (restraint)," Arabs were killed in simultaneous attacks around Palestine.[115] More deadly attacks followed: on 6 July 1938 21 Arabs were killed and 52 wounded by a bomb in a Haifa market; on 25 July a second market bomb in Haifa killed at least 39 Arabs and injured 70; a bomb in Jaffa's vegetable market on 26 August killed 24 Arabs and wounded 39.[115] The attacks were condemned by the Jewish Agency.[115]Ironically, the Arab leader Mohammad Amin al-Husayni and his associates also received funding from Fascist Italy during the revolt as the Italians were in dispute with the United Kingdom over Abyssinia and wished not only to disrupt the British rear[116] but also to extend Italian influence in the region.[117]
平和団の役割[編集]
The "peace bands" (fasa'il al-salam) or "Nashashibi units" were made up of disaffected Arab peasants recruited by the British administration and the Nashashibis in late 1938 to battle against Arab rebels during the revolt.[54][118] Despite their peasant origins the bands were representative mainly of the interests of landlords and rural notables.[118] Some peace bands also sprang up in the Nablus area, on Mount Carmel (a stronghold of the Druze who largely opposed the rebellion after 1937), and around Nazareth without connection to the Nashashibi-Husayni power struggle.[119]From December 1937 the main opposition figures among the Arabs approached the Jewish Agency for funding and assistance,[120] motivated by the assassination campaign pursued by the rebels at the behest of the Husseini leadership.[121] In October 1937, shortly after Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, the leader of the Arab Higher Committee, had fled from Palestine to escape British retribution, Raghib al-Nashashibi had written to Moshe Shertok stating his full willingness to co-operate with the Jewish Agency and to agree with whatever policy it proposed.[122] From early in 1938 the Nashashibis received funding specifically to conduct anti-rebel operations, with Raghib al-Nashashibi himself receiving £5,000.[120] The British also supplied funding to the peace bands and sometimes directed their operations.[120]Fakhri Nashashibi was particularly successful in recruiting peace bands in the Hebron hills, on one occasion in December 1938 gathering 3,000 villagers for a rally in Yata, also attended by the British military commander of the Jerusalem District General Richard O'Connor.[120]Just two months earlier, on 15 October 1938, rebels had seized the Old City and barricaded the gates.[123] O'Connor had planned the operation by which men of the Coldstream Guards, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and Black Watch recaptured the Old City, killing 19 rebels.[120] He was later to win fame as the field commander for Operation Compass in World War II, in which his forces completely destroyed a much larger Italian army—a victory which nearly drove the Axis from Africa, and in turn, led Adolf Hitler to send the German Africa Corps under Erwin Rommel to try to reverse the situation.Towards the end of the revolt in May 1939 the authorities dissolved the peace bands and confiscated their arms.[120] However, because members of the bands had become tainted in the eyes of the Palestinian Arabs, and some were under sentence of death, they had little choice but to continue the battle against the national movement's leadership, which they did with the continuing help of the Zionist movement.[124]
反乱指導者の役割[編集]
At least 282 rebel leaders took part in the Arab Revolt and of these only four were Christians.[125] Some of the principal leaders among them, often known as "brigands" in the Jewish press and as "bandits", "terrorists", "rebels" or "insurgents", but never as "nationalists," to the British are described below.[126] The Arabs themselves used the term Ursabi meaning gang and the leader of an armed band was a Qaid al Ursabi.[126] The plural form Ursabat spawned the British soldiers' nickname for all rebels, which was Oozlebart.[126][127]
ナザレ地区[編集]
Abdul Khallik was an effective peasant leader appointed by Fawzi al-Qawukji who caused great damage and loss of life in the Nazareth District and was thus a significant adversary of the Mandate and Jewish settlement authorities.[128] He was trapped by British troops in a major engagement on 2 October 1938 and was killed whilst trying to lead his men to safety.[128][129]
ナーブルス地区[編集]
Abdul Rahim al Hajj Mohammed from the Tulkarm area was a deeply religious, intellectual man and as a fervent anti-Zionist was deeply committed to the revolt.[130] He was regarded second to Qawukji in terms of leadership ability and maintained his independence from the exiled rebel leadership in Damascus.[130][131] He personally led small groups of fighters called fasa'il and carried out nighttime attacks against British targets in the revolt's early stage in 1936. When the revolt was renewed in April 1937, he established a more organised command hierarchy consisting of four main brigades who operated in the north-central highlands (Tulkarm-Nablus-Jenin).[132] He competed for the position of General Commander of the Revolt with Aref Abdul Razzik, and the two served the post in rotation from September 1938 to February 1939, when al-Hajj Muhammad was confirmed as the sole General Commander.[133] Notably, he refused to carry out political assassinations at the behest of political factions, including al-Husayni, once stating "I dont work for Husayniya ('Husanyni-ism'), but for wataniya ('nationalism')."[134] He is still related by Palestinian Arabs as a hero and martyr and is regarded as a metonym "for a national movement that was popular, honourable, religious, and lofty in its aims and actions."[135] He was shot dead in a firefight with British forces outside the village of Sanur on 27 March 1939, after Farid Irsheid's peace band informed the authorities of his location.[130][136][137][138]Yusuf Said Abu Durra, a Qassamite leader in the Jenin area, was born in Silat al-Harithiya and before becoming a rebel worked as a Gazoz vendor.[139] He was said to be a narrow-minded man who thrived on extortion and cruelty and thus became greatly feared.[139] Yusuf Hamdan was Durra's more respected lieutenant and later a leader of his own unit; he was killed by an army patrol in 1939 and buried in Lajjun.[139] Durra himself was apprehended by the Arab Legion in Transjordan on 25 July 1939 and subsequently hanged.[139]Fakhri Abdul Hadi (Fakhri 'Abd al-Hadi) of the village of Arrabah worked closely with Fawzi al-Qawukji during 1936 but later defected to the British authorities.[140] He bargained for a pardon by offering to collaborate with the British on countering rebel propaganda.[140] Once on the payroll of the British consul in Damascus (Gilbert Mackereth) he carried out many attacks against the rebels in 1938–1939 as leader of his own "peace band".[141][142]
「 | Aref had a little mare Its coat as white as snow And where that mare and Aref went We're jiggered if we know. – British Army verse. |
」 |
エルサレム地区[編集]
Issa Battat was a peasant leader in the southern hills below Jerusalem who caused enormous damage to security patrols in his area.[145] He was killed by a patrol of armed police in a battle near Hebron in 1937.[145][146]結果[編集]
犠牲者[編集]
ユダヤ人イシューブへの衝撃[編集]
In the overall context of the Jewish settlement's development in the 1930s the physical losses endured during the revolt were relatively insignificant.[14] Although hundreds were killed and property was damaged no Jewish settlement was captured or destroyed and several dozen new ones were established.[14] Over 50,000 new Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine.[14] In 1936 Jews made up about one-third of the population.[147]The hostilities contributed to further disengagement of the Jewish and Arab economies in Palestine, which were intertwined to some extent until that time. Development of the economy and infrastructure accelerated.[14] For example, whereas the Jewish city of Tel Aviv relied on the nearby Arab seaport of Jaffa, hostilities dictated the construction of a separate Jewish-run seaport for Tel Aviv,[14] inspiring the delighted Ben-Gurion to note in his diary "we ought to reward the Arabs for giving us the impetus for this great creation."[148] Metal works were established to produce armoured sheeting for vehicles and a rudimentary arms industry was founded.[14] The settlement's transportation capabilities were enhanced and Jewish unemployment was relieved owing to the employment of police officers,[14] and replacement of striking Arab labourers, employees, craftsman and farmers by Jewish workers.[147] Most of the important industries in Palestine were owned by Jews and in trade and the banking sector they were much better placed than the Arabs.[147]As a result of collaboration with the British colonial authorities and security forces many thousands of young men had their first experience of military training, which Moshe Shertok and Haganah leader Eliyahu Golomb cited as one of the fruits of the Haganah's policy of havlagah (restraint).[149]Although the Jewish settlement in Palestine was dismayed by the publication of the 1939 White Paper restricting Jewish immigration, David Ben-Gurion remained undeterred, believing that the policy would not be implemented, and in fact Neville Chamberlain had told him that the policy would last at the very most only for the duration of the war.[150] In the event the White Paper quotas were exhausted only in December 1944, over five and a half years later, and in the same period the United Kingdom absorbed 50,000 Jewish refugees and the British Commonwealth (Australia, Canada and South Africa) took many thousands more.[151] During the War over 30,000 Jews joined the British forces and even the Irgun ceased operations against the British.[152]パレスチナのアラブ人への衝撃[編集]
The revolt weakened the military strength of Palestinian Arabs in advance of their ultimate confrontation with the Jewish settlement in the 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and was thus counterproductive.[153] During the uprising, British authorities attempted to confiscate all weapons from the Arab population. This, and the destruction of the main Arab political leadership in the revolt, greatly hindered their military efforts in the 1948 Palestine war,[15] where imbalances between the Jewish and Arab economic performance, social cohesion, political organisation and military capability became apparent.[147]The Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini and his supporters directed a Jihad against any person who did not obey the Mufti. Their national struggle was a religious holy war, and the incarnation of both the Palestinian Arab nation and Islam was Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Anyone who rejected his leadership was a heretic and his life was forfeit.[154] After the Peel report publication, the murders of Arabs leaders who opposed the Mufti were accelerated.[155] Pressed by the assassination campaign pursued by the rebels at the behest of the Husseini leadership, the opposition had a security cooperation with the Jews.[121] The flight of wealthy Arabs, which occurred during the revolt, was also replicated in 1947–49.[54]大英帝国への衝撃[編集]
As the inevitable war with Germany approached, British policy makers concluded that although they could rely on the support of the Jewish population in Palestine, who had no alternative but to support Britain, the support of Arab governments and populations in an area of great strategic importance for the British Empire was not assured.[159] Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain concluded "if we must offend one side, let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs."[159]In February 1939 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Malcolm MacDonald called together a conference of Arab and Zionist leaders on the future of Palestine at St. James's Palace in London but the discussions ended without agreement on 27 March.[88] The government's new policy as published in White Paper of 17 May had been determined already and despite Jewish protests and Irgun attacks the British remained resolute.[159]There was a growing feeling among British officials that there was nothing left for them to do in Palestine.[159] Perhaps the ultimate achievement of the Arab Revolt was to make the British sick of Palestine.[160] Major-General Bernard "Monty" Montgomery concluded, "the Jew murders the Arab and the Arab murders the Jew. This is what is going on in Palestine now. And it will go on for the next 50 years in all probability."[161]歴史編集[編集]
The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt has been and still is marginalized in both Western and Israeli historiography on Palestine, and even progressive Western scholars have little to say about the anti-colonial struggle of the Palestinian Arab rebels against the British Empire.[162] According to Swedenberg's analysis, for instance, the Zionist version of Israeli history acknowledges only one authentic national movement: the struggle for Jewish self-determination that resulted in the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948.[162] Swedenberg writes that the Zionist narrative has no room for an anticolonial and anti-British Palestinian national revolt.[162] Zionists often describe the revolt as a series of "events" (Hebrew מאורעות תרצ"ו-תרצ"ט) "riots", or "happenings".[162]The appropriate description was debated by Jewish Agency officials, who were keen not to give a negative impression of Palestine to prospective immigrants.[163] In private, however, David Ben-Gurion was unequivocal: the Arabs, he said, were "fighting dispossession ... The fear is not of losing land, but of losing the homeland of the Arab people, which others want to turn into the homeland of the Jewish people."[10]関連項目[編集]
- ティベリアスの虐殺(1938年)
- 嘆きの壁事件
- イラク・クーデター(1941年)
- パレスチナ民族主義
- シオン主義とパレスチナの共同影軍(1917年~48年)
- チャールズ・テガート
- イギリス委任統治領パレスチナ
- 木頭委員会
- イギリスとシオン主義者の紛争
- 中東近代紛争表
- 中東紛争表
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外部リンク[編集]
- The Arab Revolt in Palestine—A Zionist point of view
- The 1936–1939 Revolt in Palestine—A Palestinian point of view by Ghassan Kanafani.
- The First Intifada: Rebellion in Palestine 1936 – 1939—A view from British historian Charles Townshend.